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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This Report presents findings from a study of the operation of the Sexual Offences (Criminal 
Procedure) (Scotland) Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) which was introduced in response to the 
perceived failure of sections 274 and 275 (hereafter s.274 and s.275) of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”). 
 
SEXUAL OFFENCES (CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) (SCOTLAND) ACT 2002  
The 2002 Act introduced new procedures restricting the use of evidence or questioning 
concerning the sexual history and character of the complainer in sexual offence trials. The 
Act also introduced a requirement that advance notification must be given to the Prosecution 
if the defence is one of consent. 
   
A key difference between the 1995 Act and the 2002 Act is the scope of the otherwise 
prohibited evidence; whereas the earlier legislation focused on sexual history and sexual 
character evidence, the 2002 Act extends to more general character evidence.  
 
In order to introduce sexual history or character evidence, it is necessary that a written 
application is submitted to the court, in advance of trial. This requirement applies to both the 
Prosecution and the Defence. That the requirement applies equally to the Prosecution makes 
this legislation unusual as, in other jurisdictions, “rape shield” provisions apply only to 
evidence or questioning by the Defence.  A written application to introduce otherwise 
prohibited evidence or questioning must be submitted, ordinarily, not less than 7 days before 
the preliminary hearing in the High Court, to allow consideration at first or preliminary diet 
in solemn proceedings. 
   
The application must specify: the evidence sought to be admitted or elicited; the nature of any 
questioning proposed; the issues at trial to which the evidence is considered to be relevant; 
the reasons why the evidence is considered relevant to those issues; and the inferences that 
the court should draw from the evidence. 
  
The court can only admit such evidence where it is satisfied that it is relevant to whether the 
accused is guilty of the offence, and the probative value of the evidence is significant and is 
likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. 
 
Where a Defence application to introduce otherwise restricted evidence is allowed by the 
court, the Crown is required to place before the judge any previous analogous convictions 
that the accused may have. The provisions for the disclosure of previous convictions are 
unique to Scotland, and are not found in rape shield legislation in other jurisdictions.  
 
 
THE RESEARCH  
The research was commissioned by the Scottish Executive and took place from September 
2005 – December 2006. The research utilised a multi-method approach, and involved the 
mapping of all sexual offence cases indicted to the High Court over a 12 month period (1st 
June 2004 to 31st May 2005) using: court records; detailed analysis of a sample of 30 trials 
for sexual offences, using the taped proceedings of preliminary hearings and trials, and 
corresponding case Sitting Papers; attendance at court to observe 10 sexual offence trials; 
interviews with Judges, Advocates Depute, and Defence Counsel; and interviews with 
complainers in trials which had taken place since the introduction of the 2002 Act. Findings 
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were compared with research findings from an earlier baseline study which examined the use 
of sexual history and sexual character evidence under the 1995 Act.  
 
THE FINDINGS  
 
Sexual offence cases indicted to the High Court  
Two hundred and thirty one sexual offence cases were identified in the period 1st June 2004 
to 31st May 2005. Almost half (45%) of these contained a s.275 application to introduce 
sexual history or character evidence. Just over half (53%) of all cases called proceeded to 
trial. 
 
The research identified all cases for all types of sexual offences covered by the 2002 Act that 
were indicted to the High Court over a 12 month period. The research therefore extends 
beyond rape cases, and included cases for attempted rape, assault with intent to rape, indecent 
behaviour, the age-related statutory offences, and sodomy.  That said, 80 percent of all High 
Court sexual offence trials involved at least one charge of rape. Over half (55%) of the sexual 
offence trials had an advance intimation of a defence of consent. 
  
The accused was acquitted of all sexual charges in just over half of sexual offence trials 
(51%), found guilty of all sexual charges in just under a quarter of trials (23%), and guilty to 
some charges in just over a quarter of trials (26%). 
  
Cases with applications to introduce sexual history and/or character evidence 
There has been a substantial increase in the numbers of trials with s.275 applications under the 2002 
Act. Almost three quarters of High Court sexual offence trials (72%) now include an application, 
compared to just over one-fifth of trials (21%) in the base-line study. This represents an increase of 
almost 3 and half times that found in the base-line study. 
 
The proportion of cases involving multiple applications has more than doubled. In the baseline 
study, just 8 out of the 66 trials with s.275 applications (or just over one in 10) involved more than 
one application, this has risen to 26 out of the 88 trials (or just under 3 in 10).  
 
Whilst an increase in the use of sexual history and character evidence is the opposite of the intention 
of the legislation, comparison with the baseline study indicates that the increase is at least partially 
the consequence of the inclusion of questioning and evidence relating to matters of character in 
written s.275 applications which, prior to the 2002 Act, did not require to be the subject of an 
application. 
 
Over three quarters of rape trials (76%) involve s.275 applications, as do just over half of 
trials (52%) for sexual offences other than rape. The type of sexual charge involved is a 
factor affecting Defence decisions to challenge the credibility of a complainer through the use 
of sexual history or character evidence.  
 
Application decisions 
A total of 118 s.275 applications were made in 88 sexual offence trials. As in the base-line study, 
almost all applications were successful; just 8 (7%) were disallowed, although partial refusals, 
amendments and restrictions on questioning mean that a significant proportion of applications are 
modified by the court. In all but a few exceptions, all evidence allowed in the application was 
subsequently introduced in the trial, usually during cross-examination of the complainer. The 
evidence or questioning tended to be in more detail than outlined in the written application.  
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It is considered relatively easy to construct a case demonstrating that sexual history or sexual 
character evidence has some relevance to issues in the trial. 
 
Who is making applications? 
The majority of applications were made by the Defence, although the Crown were 
responsible for one quarter of applications made (22 out of 88). Just under one fifth of trials 
(17 out of 88) involved (separate) applications by both Crown and Defence. Applications by 
the Crown only were rarer, occurring in just 5 trials. 
 
Nature of questioning and evidence sought 
Written applications seek to introduce evidence or questioning about a wide range of sexual 
history and general character issues, over 40% of which concerned matters that were likely to 
have been asked without an application being regarded as necessary prior to the 2002 Act.  
 
Reasons given for proposed questioning on sexual history and character were relevance to 
consent; credibility; and the complainer’s character, in particular, dishonesty or motive for 
false allegation. Evidence or questioning concerning the character of the complainer featured 
in approximately one quarter of cases (24%). A common type of such proposed questioning 
concerned the complainer’s use of alcohol or drugs. This type of questioning also occurred 
without any application.  
 
Crown applications were typically made to introduce sexual history evidence that is required 
to enable a jury to make sense of subsequent evidence or to provide context for the alleged 
events.  
 
Complainers are not routinely informed by the Crown that an application to introduce sexual 
history of character evidence has been submitted or allowed, however this is to be changed as 
a result of the recommendations made by the recent COPFS Review of the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006).  
 
Deciding whether or not to admit the evidence or questioning sought  
The requirement to make a written s.275 application to the court, and for this to be discussed 
and decided at a preliminary hearing, provides the opportunity for much closer attention to be 
paid both to the probative value and possible prejudicial effects of any evidence sought.  
 
Communication between Defence and Crown at case preparation enhances the likelihood of 
agreement concerning the contents of applications. The majority of Defence applications are 
not challenged.  In court Advocates Depute tend to take a neutral view on Defence 
applications, and interviews with practitioners indicate that this neutrality often reflects prior 
consultation between Defence and Crown. Challenges by the Crown are most often in 
relation to general character evidence and in particular to allegations of dishonesty on the part 
of the complainer. 
 
Whilst the court decides each application on its merits, and is more likely to refuse 
applications that are seen to be poorly specified or of weak relevance, the position taken by 
the Crown is a factor affecting the likelihood of an application being allowed by the court. 
Judges are more likely to restrict or disallow Defence applications where the Advocate 
Depute registers opposition.  
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If duly enforced, the procedures introduced by the 2002 Act can remove some of the excesses 
of questioning on sexual and character matters that characterised sexual offence trials pre-
2002 but, as the opportunity for detailed discussion of relevance and prejudice is not taken 
up, the possibility of tighter enforcement is not acknowledged. 
   
Requiring applications in writing has resulted in greater transparency concerning the 
reasoning behind applications but it does not typically result in discussion of the relevance of 
evidence by the Court. Most preliminary hearings are characterised by a lack of discussion of 
relevance. Only a few cases where the relevance of questioning is challenged by the Crown 
provoke lively debate. The court disallows questioning or evidence which it considers to be 
too loosely phrased, too wide-ranging, lacking in specificity, or simply too speculative but 
applications which are loosely phrased and wide ranging or may be speculative are not 
always challenged.  
 
Although much of the debate preceding the legislation regarded a complainer’s past sexual 
history as likely to be largely irrelevant in a sexual offence trial, in practice sexual history 
evidence is generally regarded as relevant to establishing the guilt of the accused, particularly 
when it concerns a past history between the complainer and accused.  Application decisions 
and the legal practitioner interviews indicate that sexual history evidence is seen as relevant 
by the Crown, the Defence and the judiciary.    
 
The court tends to take the view that where what is included in the application can be 
demonstrated to have some relevance to the issues in the trial, in particular credibility and/or 
consent, then what might be termed “fair trial” considerations seem to outweigh the rights of 
the complainer.  This approach sets aside the need to weigh up the probative value of 
evidence against the invasion of the privacy or dignity of the complainer, or the possible 
prejudicial effects on the jury concerning their views of the complainer, because any 
relevance of evidence to the issues in the trial is sufficient for its admission. 
 
Most applications are decided by the court at one preliminary hearing, although several are 
continued to subsequent hearings before a court’s final decision. The Judge and Advocate 
Depute at the preliminary hearing are usually different to those at the trial.  Continuations 
occur due to lack of time or unavailability of relevant information, or where the application is 
refused or restricted, and the applicant amends or re-submits the application.  
 
Previous analogous convictions of the accused 
S.275A of the 2002 Act allows for the disclosure of the accused’s relevant previous 
convictions following a successful Defence application to introduce questioning or evidence 
about the complainer’s sexual history or character. The presence of analogous previous 
convictions does not appear to deter the accused from pleading not guilty, and the case 
proceeding to trial.  
 
All 162 rape cases were examined for the presence of previous convictions. In 3 cases where 
the accused had an analogous previous conviction, a successful application was made by the 
Defence. The relevant previous convictions of the accused were not placed before the court 
as the legislation intended.  
 
In 4 of the 7 rape cases in which an application was made by the Crown only, and not by the 
Defence, the accused had previous convictions. Although caution should be exercised in 
drawing conclusions from such a small number of cases, there is nevertheless some evidence 
 5
from transcripts of preliminary hearings where the consequences of a Defence application 
were discussed, where it was acknowledged that submission of an application by the Crown 
allows the introduction of sexual history evidence into the trial, without the need for a 
Defence application, which could result in the accused’s relevant previous convictions being 
disclosed to the court. It should be noted, however, that this was not a view fully endorsed by 
the legal practitioners interviewed. 
 
In 8 rape cases, the accused had a previous conviction for assault, assault to injury, or assault 
to severe injury in the context of domestic abuse. Under the 2002 Act, these convictions are 
not defined as relevant convictions since they do not involve a substantial sexual element. 
Yet, prior convictions relating to domestic abuse on the part of the accused may well be 
considered relevant in a sexual offence case in that they demonstrate a previous history of 
violence against a woman. Even more so where the history of violence evidenced through the 
previous convictions is against the same woman as in the current trial (as it was in at least one 
of the 8 cases identified here) where, arguably, this is as much a part of the facts of the case 
as the previous relationship itself.  
  
The “chilling” effect on applications of the potential disclosure of analogous previous 
convictions, which some practitioners anticipated, has not occurred. Although the numbers 
are small, we remain sceptical that practice follows legislative intent in relation to the 
disclosure of any analogous previous convictions of the accused following a successful 
Defence application.  Whereas practice may ensure the accused is protected from having 
potentially damaging information disclosed, the anticipated increased protections for 
complainers have not been forthcoming. 
 
Straying beyond boundaries set by the court 
Just less than half (14 out of 32) of the observed trials involved some evidence or questioning 
being led which had not been explicitly agreed in the application. Objections by the other 
party and/or interventions by the court occurred infrequently.  
 
Judges tended to allow evidence once it was before the jury, even if the nature of the 
evidence was such that it required an application.  The 2002 legislation has not reduced the 
amount of sexual history and character evidence that is introduced through straying beyond 
the permissions given following an application, indeed it has led to an increase in such 
evidence being introduced in sexual offence trials.  
 
Although, again, numbers are small and should be viewed with caution, the Crown was more 
likely than the Defence to introduce sexual history evidence without application. However, 
character evidence, and particularly questioning concerning alcohol consumption, continued 
to be introduced by the Defence without application. 
 
Complainers’ views  
A number of common themes emerged from interviews undertaken with 4 complainers who 
had given evidence in sexual offence trials since the introduction of the 2002 legislation. Due 
to the small numbers, the findings expressed here are illustrative rather than representative.   
 
Cross-examination on character was reported to be particularly distressing, and some 
complainers had difficultly in understanding the relevance of specific issues which had been 
raised (e.g. marital status, self harming behaviour). 
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The level of relevant information provided to complainers about the general process of giving 
evidence in court, and more specifically about the 2002 legislation, particularly whether or 
not an application had been successfully made to pursue questioning about sexual history 
and/or character, were highlighted as areas of particular concern. All complainers felt 
inadequately prepared for the process of giving evidence, and expressed the view that it 
would be helpful to meet the Advocate Depute prior to giving their evidence. The COPFS 
Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006) has made a number 
of positive recommendations in this regard. However, as yet, it is too early to evaluate their 
implementation, and the impact they may have on complainers’ experiences 
 
Impact of the 2002 Act  
The amount of sexual history and character evidence introduced in the court room has 
increased markedly under the 2002 Act. The proportion of trials with applications has 
increased substantially; applications to pursue questioning on sexual history and character is 
now sought by both the Crown and the Defence; the extent of questioning has increased; and, 
the numbers of trials containing multiple applications has doubled.   
 
The clear increase in applications has to be set against the fact that approximately 40 percent 
of the evidence or questioning sought would not have required an application under the 1995 
Act. Questioning concerning the complainer’s character figured in approximately one quarter 
of applications (24%), whereas it was not necessary to submit an application to introduce 
such evidence prior to the 2002 Act.  The admissibility, or otherwise, of such evidence was 
determined under law. One reading of the increase in applications therefore might be that it 
simply reflects a channelling of questioning that was previously asked without an application, 
into an application. This interpretation, in turn, suggests a general compliance, by those 
seeking to introduce such evidence, with the requirements of the 2002 Act. It is, to some 
extent, an indication that the rules were being followed.  
 
On the other hand, it is clear that the legislation has not had the effect of decreasing the kind 
of evidence that was previously prohibited, that is, questioning about the complainer’s sexual 
history and sexual character.  Moreover, character evidence is introduced in the absence of an 
application and again it seems clear that this type of evidence has not been reduced by the 
2002 Act.   
 
Questioning and evidence sought in applications is now more detailed and extensive than that 
sought under the 1995 Act. There are several reasons for the rise in level of detail and scale 
of information sought. Partly it is due to procedural changes, in particular, the requirement of 
a written application, which specifically seeks information on the nature and type of the 
proposed evidence or questioning. The increased level of detail is also due to the scope for 
refinement and/or expansion of the content of applications that is afforded by advance 
notification, and the ensuing pre-trial discussions that can span more than one preliminary 
hearing. A related contributory factor is the “belt and braces” or “scattergun” approach 
adopted by the Defence where they seek to include as much detail as possible in applications. 
The propensity of the Defence to do this has been exacerbated by a range of other factors, 
beyond the legislation, which have altered the general legal landscape within which 
applications are made.  
 
This increased detail has not resulted in more Defence applications being challenged by the 
Crown or refused by the Judge.  Questioning about sexual history and character allowed 
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under application typically continued to stray beyond the boundaries of what had been 
formally permitted by the court.  
 
This leads the research to conclude that the 2002 Act, launched with ministerial hopes of 
curbing sexual history and character evidence and support from campaigning organisations 
against violence against women, has had the largely unanticipated and unintended 
consequences of the introduction of more sexual history and character evidence than occurred 
under the 1995 legislation.  
 
Whilst the 2002 legislation has not reduced the extent to which complainers are subject to 
questioning about their sexual history and character, the procedures have however rendered 
this much more visible. The greater visibility of the use of this type of evidence enhances the 
possibility of informed debate among practitioners, yet there has been little apparent shift in 
the balance in favour of complainers when weighing up the relevance of such evidence 
against the dignity and privacy of the complainer. 
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CHAPTER ONE: “RAPE SHIELD” LEGISLATION IN SCOTLAND   
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 This Report presents findings from an evaluation of legislation intended to restrict the 
admission of previous sexual history and character evidence of the complainer in sexual 
offence trials in Scotland.  
 
1.2 The use of sexual history and sexual character evidence is highly controversial, and 
questions concerning the relevance, admissibility and probative value of such evidence have 
excited critical attention from the legal profession, academics, and politicians over the past 30 
years.   
 
1.3 Since the early 1970s many jurisdictions around the world, with broadly similar 
legislative intent, have enacted “rape shield” legislation designed to curb the use of such 
evidence in sexual offence trials. All jurisdictions have encountered similar difficulties in the 
effective implementation of these provisions, and consequently such legislative attempts are 
seen as limited in effectiveness (see Birch, 2002; Brown et al, 1993; Temkin, 1993, 2002; 
Hornick, 1996; McColgan, 1996; Kelly, Temkin and Griffiths, 2006).  
 
1.4  Scotland first enacted “rape shield” legislation in 1986.  The Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1975 sections 141A and 141B and 346A and 346B (as inserted by the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985 section 36) placed restrictions on the 
use of sexual history and sexual character evidence of complainers in sexual offence trials. 
The restrictions were later extended to a slightly wider range of sexual offences by s.274 and 
s.275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (hereafter “the 1995 Act”).  
 
1.5 The use of sexual history and sexual character evidence has been the subject of 
criticism since the first statutory provisions restricting the admissibility of such evidence 
were introduced.  Critics of the earlier Scottish legislation argued that the policy aims behind 
the provisions of protecting complainers from inappropriate character attacks were not being 
achieved and that, despite the statutory restrictions, irrelevant sexual character evidence, 
which was of limited probative value, continued to be admitted in sexual offence trials.  
 
1.6 Research carried out shortly after the introduction of the first “rape shield” legislation 
(Brown et al, 1992; 1993) and much more recently (Burman et al, 2005) concluded that the 
legislation was largely ineffective in terms of achieving its stated aims, in that despite the 
statutory provisions, sexual history and sexual character evidence of the type that the 
legislation aimed to limit was still being introduced in Scottish courts.   
 
1.7 The Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act, 2002 (hereafter “the 
2002 Act”) came into effect in Scotland in November 2002, replacing the earlier “rape 
shield” legislation, which had been in operation for the previous 16 years.  The 2002 Act 
introduced entirely new evidential and procedural provisions to limit the scope of questioning 
relating to a complainer’s character and sexual history in sexual offence trials.  Underpinning 
the reform is a chief concern with the relevance and admissibility of sexual history and 
character evidence. A key aim is to ensure that the questioning or evidence introduced is 
relevant to the issues of fact before the court, rather than calculated to demean or humiliate 
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the complainer by raising tangential and otherwise irrelevant issues (Scottish Executive, 
2001b).  
 
THE SCOPE OF THE REPORT  
 
1.8 The introduction of the 2002 Act was an attempt to address the perceived deficiencies 
of the earlier legislation, by ensuring an assessment of the relevance and admissibility of 
sexual history and character evidence by the court.  This research study endeavours to gauge 
the effectiveness of this legislation in achieving those aims. Although the 2002 Act covers 
sexual offence cases heard at both High and Sheriff Courts in Scotland, this research study is 
concerned only with the operation of the 2002 Act at High Court level.1   
 
1.9 The rest of this chapter describes the recent legislative background leading up to the 
introduction of the 2002 Act, and the perceived inadequacies of the earlier legislation that the 
2002 Act was designed to address.  It also describes the structure and terms of the relevant 
provisions of the 2002 Act.  
 
1.10 The chapter also describes some of the recent developments and reforms that have 
taken place in the High Court of Justiciary, providing a wider context against which the 
operation of the 2002 Act can be examined.  
 
1.11 Chapter Two sets out the research aims and objectives specified by the Scottish 
Executive for this study, and describes the multi-method approach that was designed to 
address the research questions.  
 
1.12 Chapter Three presents the findings of a case mapping exercise conducted in the High 
Court which aimed to estimate the proportion of sexual offence cases in which applications 
were made under the 2002 Act to introduce otherwise prohibited evidence (s.275 
applications), and the proportion which were allowed by the courts, and to provide some 
assessment of impact.  
 
1.13 Chapter Four sets out the findings of an in-depth analysis of a sample of sexual 
offence trials in order to establish more detail about the grounds and reasons given for s.275 
applications, and the contexts in which applications are made.  
 
1.14 Chapter Five draws on data from the in-depth analysis of trials to examine the point in 
the process when applications are decided and examines decision-making with regard to 
s.275 applications. This chapter also explores views held by the court in relation to the 
relevance and admissibility of sexual history and character evidence.   
 
1.15 Chapter Six examines the extent to which, and the circumstances under which, 
previous convictions of the accused are disclosed.   
 
                                                 
1 Scotland has a 3-tier criminal court system. These are, in order of precedence, the High Court of Justiciary (the 
High Court), the sheriff courts and the district courts. Criminal procedure (i.e. the procedure for the 
investigation and prosecution of crime) is mainly regulated by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and 
is divided into solemn and summary procedures.  Solemn procedure involves the most serious of criminal cases 
and may lead to a trial on indictment, either before a judge in the High Court or before a sheriff in the sheriff 
courts. All trials at the High Court are conducted with a jury. 
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1.16 Chapter Seven focuses on the use of sexual history and character evidence in sexual 
offence trials in which s.275 applications have been made, and examines whether and how 
the parameters of applications are adhered to in the course of examination-in-chief and cross-
examination of the complainer and other witnesses.  
 
1.17 Chapter Eight draws on data from those trials in which s.275 applications were not 
made, and considers the extent to which sexual history and character evidence is being used 
in the absence of an s.275 application.  
 
1.18 Chapter Nine reports on a small number of interviews undertaken with women who 
have given evidence as complainers in sexual offence trials heard since the introduction of 
the 2002 Act.  Finally, Chapter Ten sets out conclusions and recommendations drawn from 
this study.  
 
 
THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND  
 
1.19 In November 2000, the Scottish Executive issued a pre-legislative consultation 
document entitled Redressing the Balance: Cross-Examination in Rape and Sexual Offence 
Trials seeking views on proposals to change the law of evidence in sexual offence trials 
(Scottish Executive, 2000).  
 
1.20 Redressing the Balance acknowledged that sexual offences, by their very nature, have 
particular elements which distinguish them from other crimes, giving rise to difficulties of 
proof. These include: the fact that there is frequently a pre-existing relationship between the 
complainer and the accused which has the potential to divert attention from issues of fact; 
that there are rarely ear or eye witnesses to a sexual assault; that delay in reporting may lead 
to a loss of evidence; that even where physical evidence is present, this may be re-cast in the 
trial as ambiguous or given an alternative explanation (2000:5). The pivotal roles played by 
the consent of the complainer in such trials were also highlighted. In common with 
international research evidence (e.g. Temkin, 2002; Kelly et al, 2006), Redressing the 
Balance noted that the fact that consent of the complainer is under such scrutiny from the 
outset leads to a diversion of attention from what the accused said or did, to what the 
complainer did or did not say or do:   
 
“In many cases, and particularly those where there is either a previous 
relationship or some kind of previous contact between complainer and 
accused, he will do so by trying to show how the complainer’s behaviour led 
him to believe that she consented, expressly or by implication, or at least that 
she was not unwilling - and it is in doing this that he is most likely to try to 
take advantage of any prejudices about sexual behaviour which the judge or 
jury may hold, however unconsciously” (2000:5)  
 
1.21 Redressing the Balance also explored the issue of rape myths and stereotypes in its 
discussion of the law on sexual history evidence, noting the prevalence of beliefs that are 
often deployed in legal reasoning (Scottish Executive, 2000), and concluding that not only do 
these stereotypes have no basis on fact, they are also “illogical and at odds with any system of 
morality which places a value on the individual’s right to self-determination” (Scottish 
Executive, 2000: 6). 
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1.22 Redressing the Balance sought views on the perceived need for greater protection for 
victims of sexual offences, particularly rape. Specifically, it put forward proposals to change 
the law of evidence in sexual offence trials in order to: 
a) Prevent the accused in such cases from personally cross-examining the complainer, 
and 
b) To strengthen the restrictions on the use of evidence about the sexual history and 
sexual character of the complainer.  
 
1.23 The proposals, and in particular the first one, sparked some controversy. The 
consultation that followed received nearly 70 responses from a wide range of groups 
including women’s support groups, victim support organisations, members of the judiciary, 
organisations representing lawyers, local authorities and academics. The consultation 
revealed that, with a few exceptions, responses from organisations representing the legal 
profession and the judiciary thought the existing system largely satisfactory, and saw no need 
for reform in this area. This was in stark contrast to the views of other groups, in particular 
Rape Crisis Centres and other support groups and organisations, as well as legal academics.    
 
Limiting the accused’s right to conduct a defence  
1.24 The first proposal put forward in Redressing the Balance addressed a concern by the 
Scottish Executive that there was a trend developing in Scotland, similar to that in England, 
of an accused person dispensing with their legal representation and seeking to conduct the 
cross-examination of the complainer in a manner that was particularly intimidating and 
upsetting. The proposal to place limits on an accused’s right to conduct a defence aimed to 
prevent complainers from being humiliated, embarrassed, intimidated or otherwise inhibited 
in giving evidence as a result of having to submit to questioning by the accused personally 
about highly intimate or degrading matters.  Women’s groups and academics have long 
pointed to the ordeal of the witness box as adding a further level of “secondary victimisation” 
to the complainer’s experience (see e.g. Chambers & Millar, 1986; Adler, 1987, Brown et al, 
1993; Lees, 2002; Gregory & Lees, 1999; Temkin, 2000, 2002) and have also identified this 
as being a strong factor in women’s reluctance to report sexual assault.  
 
1.25 In Redressing the Balance, it was suggested that the court may be reluctant to 
intervene too severely in a case where an accused person is conducting his own defence and, 
because an accused is not normally legally qualified or trained in criminal procedure, the 
court may not wish to be seen to be unduly restrictive to an unrepresented accused, since to 
do so might be seen as oppressive, and give rise potentially to grounds for appeal (Scottish 
Executive, 2000).  
 
1.26 The proposal to place limitations on the right of the accused to conduct his own 
defence addressed an issue that received much media attention in Britain in the late 1990s, 
despite being a relatively uncommon event in Scotland. The number of sexual offence cases 
where the accused conducted his own cross-examination taking place in this country has been 
small but very high profile2.  Indeed, the Policy Memorandum which accompanied the 
subsequent Bill, which was published in June 2001, pointed out that such cases invariably 
receive wide media attention, and this may create apprehension amongst victims of sexual 
offences, thereby acting as a further deterrent to reporting sexual crimes.  
 
                                                 
2 Pressure for a change in the law intensified following the case of HMA v Anderson at the High Court in Perth 
in 2000. Anderson, who was acquitted, was accused of raping a 13-year-old girl and her mother and was 
allowed to subject his alleged victims to extensive cross-examination. 
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Strengthening restrictions on sexual history and sexual character evidence  
1.27 The second proposal presented in Redressing the Balance, relating to the effectiveness 
of the statutory restrictions on sexual character evidence, has been a long-standing source of 
public complaint.  Throughout the 1990s, there was growing disquiet with the criminal justice 
response to rape. Against a background of criticism of the conviction rate in rape compared to 
the number of complaints made to the police, the treatment of complainers in sexual offence 
trials became an increasing cause for concern, north and south of the border. 
  
1.28 The existing “rape shield” legislation in both mainland British jurisdictions was seen 
as ineffective, and the intentions of the legislature were considered to be undermined in legal 
practice (Brown et al, 1992, 1993; Burman et al, 2005; Kelly et al, 2006). In an attempt to 
address the well-documented failings of section 2 of the Sexual Offence Amendment Act 
1976 (see Adler, 1987; McColgan, 1996), which was the first concerted attempt to regulate 
sexual history evidence in England and Wales, sections 41-43 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 was introduced. This legislation placed restrictions on sexual 
history evidence and sought to offer a more structured approach to decision-making 
concerning the admission of such evidence.3  
  
1.29 In Scotland, critical attention focused on the perceived inadequacy of the existing 
legislation, in particular in relation to the issues of the relevance and admissibility of sexual 
history and sexual character evidence.  Underpinning the proposals on restrictions on such 
evidence outlined in Redressing the Balance are complex and long standing questions about 
the relevance and admissibility of such evidence. These questions were first debated in 
Scotland in the 1970s, and led to the introduction of the first Scottish “rape shield” legislation 
in 1986.4   
 
“RAPE SHIELD” LEGISLATION IN SCOTLAND  
 
1.30 The first Scottish “rape shield” legislation, in 1986, took the form of a general 
prohibition on the Defence introducing any sexual history or sexual character evidence 
concerning a complainer that was not part of the subject matter of the charge. The restrictions 
specified that the court shall not admit questioning or evidence designed to show that the 
complainer:  
(a) is not of good character in relation to sexual matters; 
(b) is a prostitute or an associate of prostitutes; or, 
(c) has at any time engaged with any person in sexual behaviour not forming part of the 
subject matter of the charge. 
 
1.31 The Crown was exempt from these restrictions. The legislation also specified a set of 
exceptions to the restrictions to which the Defence could appeal in making an application to 
the court to have the prohibition lifted. These were:  
(a) That the questioning or evidence is designed to explain or rebut evidence adduced, or 
to be adduced, otherwise than by or on behalf of the accused; 
(b) That the questioning or evidence:  
(i) is questioning or evidence as to sexual behaviour which took place on the 
same occasion as the sexual behaviour forming part of the subject matter of 
the charge; or, 
                                                 
3 This legislation is the subject of a detailed evaluation commissioned by the Home Office (see Kelly et al, 
2006). 
4 For a discussion of the earlier history of rape reform in Scotland, see Brown et al 1993, chapter 1. 
 13
(ii) is relevant to the defence of incrimination; or, 
(c) That it would be contrary to the interests of justice to exclude the questioning or 
evidence. 
 
1.32 The legislation was distinctive from other jurisdictions as it included all heterosexual 
and homosexual offences (except clandestine injury and incest) and it excluded evidence 
concerning the complainer’s previous sexual behaviour with the accused, as well as third 
parties.  
 
1.33 The stated aim of this first “rape shield” legislation was to achieve overall, a balance 
between minimising undue questioning of complainers about their sexual life, while 
continuing to admit all the evidence necessary for justice to be done to the accused.  One of 
the grounds for exception permits such evidence to be adduced if it would be “contrary to the 
interests of justice” to exclude the evidence the Defence sought permission to elicit.  Indeed, 
an early explanation for the shortcomings of the earlier legislation was the wide discretion 
given to the court by the “interests of justice” exception, which was regarded as a “loop-hole” 
through which the aims of the legislators could be subverted (Field, 1988). 
 
1.34 In order to introduce otherwise prohibited evidence, the Defence made a verbal 
application to the court during the course of the trial, at which point the judge would ask the 
jury to retire before hearing the legal argument and seeking the view of the Crown.  Research 
into the operation of the earlier legislation revealed that the subsequent discussion concerning 
the application by the Defence was usually very brief, and rarely addressed the relevance or 
probative value of the evidence (Brown et al, 1992, 1993; Burman et al, 2005). There was no 
statutory requirement in the legislation that any such relevance be shown by the Defence in 
making an application to introduce the evidence or questioning and, as such, the legislation 
gave little leeway for the probative value of the sexual evidence to be considered and 
weighed against its potentially prejudicial effects. While the court (at least in jury trials) was 
required to give reasons for its decision to be entered in the record of proceedings, there was 
no guidance as to what these should contain.  
 
1.35 Research conducted by Brown et al (1992; 1993) found that the provisions were not 
being properly observed, and identified 3 specific problems: 
  
1. Despite the existence of the rules restricting sexual history and sexual character 
evidence, the rules were not being followed, and evidence of the type that the 
legislation aimed to restrict was still being introduced;  
2. Even if the rules were followed, and applications to introduce evidence or 
questioning were made, the general aim of protecting complainers from irrelevant 
questioning was not achieved, because subsequent questioning overstepped the 
limits agreed in the application, or strayed into areas that were not outlined in the 
application or, following court’s refusal of an application, the Defence 
subsequently introduced the evidence or questioning; and,  
3. Despite the rules, more subtle character attacks on complainers were made 
through the use of innuendo and suggestion. 
 
1.36 The research found that questions of weak relevance to key matters in the trial, yet 
with much potential for connotations of “bad” sexual character, were introduced. Lines of 
questioning which were justified as tests of the credibility of the complainer often became 
attacks suggesting a person of “bad character” or sexual character and sometimes also 
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explicitly suggesting a tendency to consent to sexual acts (Brown et al, 1992; 1993). Such 
lines of questioning had the potential for diverting attention away from the key issues under 
determination in the trial, and were also likely to prejudice a jury against the complainer.  
 
Character evidence  
1.37 Redressing the Balance also drew attention to the unacceptability of the use by the 
Defence of subtle character attacks “intended to create an atmosphere of bad character and 
"easy virtue" around the complainer with (presumably) the intention of making her appear 
generally less credible, but without producing evidence that she has ever behaved 
dishonestly” which the law as it was drafted did nothing to prevent (2000: para 104).  
 
1.38 By way of background, “character” is an accepted legal concept in Scots law, 
although it is recognised as carrying tendencies for distorting judgement. As far as the law of 
evidence is concerned, a person's character includes known disposition from previous actions 
and general reputation in society. “Character” means both actual disposition and general 
repute and, as such implies certain propensities to act in certain ways. A “character for 
dishonesty” for example, may be indicated by evidence that someone has committed a crime 
of dishonesty, such as theft.   
 
1.39 Under the existing rules of evidence, character evidence is classed as a collateral issue 
in most cases, meaning that it is not directly relevant or material and, as a general rule, it is 
inadmissible, disallowed either as prejudicial, or irrelevant.   The character of a witness may 
be relevant in assessing credibility, but it is always subject to the broader rule that it is 
normally irrelevant and inadmissible.5  The trial judge has a wide discretion to refuse to allow 
questioning on the accused’s character in order to ensure a fair trial and avoid prejudice to the 
accused, bearing in mind that the justification of such questioning is that it has a bearing on 
the accused's credibility, but that evidence of his bad character is not relevant to his guilt of 
the offence charged. Prosecutors, too, are expected to exercise a wise discretion as to whether 
it is really necessary to ask for leave to cross-examine on character. 
 
1.40 The potential use of “bad” character evidence to challenge the complainer’s 
credibility in sexual offence trials had been recognised in past Scottish reform developments. 
In their deliberations which preceded the introduction of the first Scottish “rape shield” 
legislation, the Scottish Law Commission (1983: para 5.3) discussed the use of “bad” 
character evidence, concluding that it “opens the door to much that is irrelevant” and that to 
admit such evidence is “inconsistent with contemporary sexual attitudes.” The Scottish Law 
Commission also acknowledged that evidence of “bad character” can divert the jury from the 
proper issues in a case, although they did not fully address the issue of the possibly 
prejudicial nature of such evidence.6   
 
1.41 In the debates preceding the first “rape shield” legislation, the potential for blurring of 
general “bad” character and “sexual” character was also recognised, as was the problem of 
“character innuendo” - that is, the relative ease with which sexual character could be built up, 
through the course of the trial, over several witnesses’ evidence, without any direct reference 
to sex at all.7  But the commitment to do something about the problem of prejudicing a jury 
                                                 
5 At common law, it is always open to an accused to put their own character in issue - normally evidence of 
‘good’ character which he is entitled to raise as an issue (see Dickson on Evidence, n. 2, para. 15).   
6 Scottish Law Commission Report No 78 
7 First Scottish Standing Committee col 878 
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through evidence with a strong potential to mislead failed to find a legislative solution in the 
first Scottish “shield” legislation. 
  
1.42 The specificity of being “not of good character in relation to sexual matters” was not 
part of the original Bill drafted by the Scottish Law Commission, but was added during the 
passage of the legislation through Parliament (see Brown et al, 1993:34-39). The focus on 
lack of good character in sexual matters rather left the door open to innuendo which was not 
sexual but which could suggest someone was of “ill repute.” The result was that while 
questioning specifically in relation to “sexual” character was excluded under the 1995 Act, 
questioning could still slip through which, although not specifically related to a complainer’s 
sexual morals, could suggest “looseness of character” in general.  
 
1.43 Redressing the Balance proposed that evidence of complainer's “bad character” 
should only be admitted where: it is relevant to the issue of whether the complainer is worthy 
of belief; and it is of specific instances of behaviour casting doubt on the complainer's 
honesty or showing a motive to fabricate allegations. In the main, responses to the proposals 
from organisations representing the legal profession and the judiciary thought the present 
system largely satisfactory and saw little need for reform (Scottish Executive, 2000).  
 
Prejudicial effect  
1.44 The statutory provisions of the first Scottish “rape shield” legislation did not make 
any attempt to restrict the admission of evidence which may have a prejudicial effect. The 
concern highlighted by Redressing the Balance was that the Defence might suggest invalid 
inferences to the jury on the basis of evidence, and “play on the kind of doubtful 
presumptions and prejudices which judges and jury members might hold” (2000: para 100).   
 
Relevance  
1.45 Another key problem with the 1995 Act, identified by the research by Brown et al 
(1993) and flagged up by Redressing the Balance was that the provisions simply did not deal 
with the complex but very real issue of the relevance to the charges libelled of the evidence 
sought to be introduced. The court is given no indication as to what ought to be the guiding 
principles on which it makes its decision as to relevancy.  With the exception of 
incrimination, there was no requirement on the accused to demonstrate the relevance of the 
evidence which he wished to introduce to any of the issues requiring to be proven at trial and, 
even if only relevant evidence is admitted, the provisions took no account of its potentially 
prejudicial effect. In allowing too wide a discretion, through the “interests of justice loop-
hole”, the purpose of the legislation could be undermined, since the court is unlikely to 
exclude any evidence which may be even slightly relevant.  
 
1.46 Despite the recognition of some of the potential problems, in its final legislative 
formulation, there was no requirement in the first “rape shield” legislation to address the 
issue of relevance. The legislation also neglected to address the issue of the potential 
prejudicial effects of sexual history and sexual character evidence.  Hence the proposals set 
out in Redressing the Balance, to widen and strengthen the existing restrictions on sexual 
history and character evidence, and to sharpen the focus on relevance were a clear attempt to 
address the perceived deficiencies of the earlier legislation.   
 
1.47 In considering what changes to the law might be appropriate, Redressing the Balance 
had 2 basic objectives:  
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• To ensure that evidence of the complainer’s sexual history and/or her character is only 
admitted when its relevance to the crime libelled has been demonstrated; and, 
• To ensure that such evidence is not admitted if it is likely to cloud the issues 
unnecessarily or cause undue prejudice and accordingly distort the judicial process.  
1.48 In framing the proposals to address the question of relevancy Redressing the Balance 
drew heavily on the approach adopted in Canada, which requires the court to assess the 
probative value of the evidence against its possibly prejudicial or misleading effect. The 
approach adopted by  s.276(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code is to prohibit evidence of any 
sexual activity engaged in by the complainer, other than that forming the subject matter of the 
charge, unless the court has decided, following a written application, that: the evidence is of 
specific instances of sexual activity; is relevant to an issue at the trial; and, has significant 
probative value which is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the 
proper administration of justice. In determining admissibility, the Judge must take a range of 
factors, including the interests of the complainer, into account. 
1.49 Redressing the Balance also suggested the need for requiring applications to introduce 
otherwise prohibited evidence to be made in writing and for the court to be required by 
statute to state what its reasons are for admitting such evidence, to what issues it is 
considered relevant, the nature or extent of the evidence to be admitted, and the use to which 
it is to be put, on the basis that written applications and reasons should help to focus the 
issues of relevancy and possible prejudice more clearly, and prevent evidence admitted for 
one purpose thereafter being used for another invalid one.  
The Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Bill  
1.50 Following the consultation, the Scottish Parliament published the Sexual Offences 
(Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Bill in June 2001, which proposed the strengthening of 
the existing prohibitions and exceptions (s.274 and s.275), the latter limiting the discretion of 
the trial Judge through the introduction of more detailed guidance regarding the 
circumstances of when sexual character evidence may be adduced.  
 
1.51 The Policy Memorandum of the Bill acknowledged the deficiencies in the existing 
provisions: namely that they were sufficiently elastic not to discourage the use of sexual 
history and sexual character evidence; that even where such evidence was relevant, its 
probative value was frequently weak when compared with its prejudicial effect and, that the 
provisions rely heavily on individual Judges to achieve a proper focus on these matters, 
without providing clear guidance (Scottish Executive, 2001b: 5-6). Other deficiencies 
recognized by the Scottish Executive concerned the lack of any express requirement that 
evidence or questioning must be relevant before it is admitted; the lack of any weighing up of 
the potentially prejudicial effect caused by diverting a jury’s attention from the issues it 
requires to determine in arriving at a verdict; the lack of guidance on how the general 
“interests of justice” exception is to be interpreted; the lack of guidance on the content of a 
decision on admissibility; and the fact that the complainer’s privacy and dignity are not 
accorded any particular status (Scottish Executive, 2001b: 6). 
 
1.52 The Scottish Parliament passed a motion agreeing the general principles of the Bill 
following the Stage 1 debate in November 2001. Stage 2 consideration was undertaken in 
December 2001, and a number of amendments were agreed, including the addition of a new 
provision to change the law on the disclosure of an accused’s previous convictions in rape 
and other sexual offence cases.   
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THE SEXUAL OFFENCES (PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE) (SCOTLAND) ACT 
2002 
 
1.53 The Bill was passed by the Scottish Parliament in March 2002 and received Royal 
Assent in April 2002. The Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act 2002 
came into force in November 2002. It had 2 purposes. The first, to prevent the accused from 
personally cross-examining the complainer, was to be achieved by requiring the accused to be 
legally represented throughout the trial. Warnings and preliminary stages are built into the 
criminal justice process to ensure that the accused is made aware in good time of the need for 
legal representation and to encourage him or her to appoint a solicitor of choice, who can 
then instruct Counsel in the normal way if required. Where the accused does not do this, then 
a solicitor will be appointed by the court.  
 
1.54 The second purpose, to strengthen the existing provisions restricting the extent to 
which evidence can be led regarding the character and sexual history of the complainer, was 
to be achieved by replacing s.274 and s.275 of the 1995 Act, which deal with sexual history 
and sexual character evidence. The substitute sections are aimed at discouraging the use of 
evidence of limited relevance where the primary purpose of such evidence is to undermine 
the credibility of the complainer or divert attention away from the issues under determination. 
In addition, where the Defence does succeed in convincing the court that character or sexual 
history evidence should be introduced, the 2002 Act introduces provisions to allow the court 
to take into account any previous sexual offence convictions which the accused person has, in 
order to ensure equity in the possibility of deploying past history. These provisions for the 
disclosure of previous convictions are unique to Scotland, and are not found in rape shield 
legislation in other jurisdictions.  
 
1.55 At the time of its introduction, the Bill which preceded the 2002 legislation was 
greeted with mixed reactions from academics, politicians and the legal profession. Some 
thought the reforms entirely unnecessary. Some gave the legislation a qualified welcome. Yet 
others saw it as a rational and robust attempt to protect both the rights of the complainer and 
the accused in sexual offence trials, aiming to strike a balance between protecting the 
complainer from indignity and humiliating questions, whilst at the same time admitting 
evidence which is nonetheless so relevant that to exclude it would endanger the fairness of 
the trial (Jamieson and Burman, 2001; Raitt, 2001). 
 
Offences covered by the 2002 Act 
1.56 Like the earlier legislation, the 2002 Act has a wide ambit in terms of the range of 
sexual offences it covers. Section 288C subsection (2) lists rape and rape–related offences, 
sodomy, indecent assault, age-related statutory offences, procurement, abduction and 
homosexual offences under the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995. The 
provisions also give courts the discretion to apply the requirements of the 2002 Act to other 
cases with a substantial sexual element.  
 
1.57 The Act applies to trials for sexual offences heard under solemn and summary 
procedure in Scottish courts.   
 
Advance notice of consent  
1.58 A new section 149A requires the accused in a sexual offence case to give prior notice 
if his defence is to include a plea of consent on the part of the complainer. This incorporates 
both actual consent and the accused's belief in consent. Notice should be given at least 10 
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clear days in advance of trial, although the court can extend this on cause shown.  Prior to the 
2002 Act, such a defence could be introduced at any point in the trial. 
 
1.59 In evidence to the Justice 2 Committee, the Deputy Minister for Justice explained that 
the policy aim of this amendment was to provide a complainer with sufficient forewarning to 
be able to prepare psychologically for questioning aimed at supporting such a defence 
(Justice 2 Committee, 2001b: column 745).  
 
Restrictions on evidence relating to sexual offences 
1.60 The structure of the 2002 Act is somewhat similar to the 1995 Act, in that section 
s.274 lays down a general prohibition on certain types of evidence relating to the 
complainer’s sexual history and sexual character across a wide range of sexual offences, and 
at s.275 a set of exceptions are specified under which the evidence may be admitted, 
following permission to do so given by the court.   
 
1.61 There is a general prohibition on evidence at s.274 (1) which shows or tends to show, 
that the complainer:  
a) Is not of good character (whether in sexual matters or otherwise); 
b) Has, at any time, engaged in sexual behaviour which is not part of the subject matter 
of the charge; 
c) Has, at any time (other than shortly before, at the same time as or shortly after the acts 
which form part of the subject matter of the charge), engaged in such behaviour, not 
being sexual behaviour, as might found the inference that the complainer -  
(i) is likely to have consented to those acts; or,  
(ii) is not a credible or reliable witness; and,  
d) Has, at any time, been subject to any such condition or predisposition as might found 
the inference referred to in (c) above.  
 
 
Wider scope of restrictions on character  
1.62 As previously mentioned, a key concern of Redressing the Balance was that the 
provisions of the 1995 Act did not go far enough to prevent the kind of “subtle character 
attacks” used to undermine the credibility of the complainer which were identified in the 
research by Brown et al (1993).  A key difference between the 1995 Act and the 2002 Act is 
the scope of the otherwise prohibited evidence; whereas the earlier legislation focused on 
sexual history and sexual character evidence, the 2002 Act extends to more general issues of 
character or credit. The 2002 Act is thus much wider in scope as it includes general character 
evidence.  As previously stated, the use of character evidence was largely seen as not directly 
relevant or material, and so already subject to some controls under existing law. The trial 
judge has wide discretion to disallow such questioning. Consequently, at the time of its 
introduction, the widened scope of the 2002 legislation was greeted with some scepticism by 
legal practitioners on the basis that general character evidence was already largely excluded 
by existing law (Scottish Executive, 2001a). This theme was echoed by some of the legal 
practitioners interviewed in this study.  
 
 
 Exceptions to restrictions under s.274 of the 1995 Act  
1.63 As in the 1995 legislation, a set of exceptions to the restrictions under s.274 is 
specified, but the wording of this section is also somewhat different. S.275 (1) of the 2002 
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Act provides that the court may, on application made to it, admit such evidence or allow such 
questioning as is referred to in s.274 Act, if satisfied that:   
a) The evidence or questioning will relate only to a specific occurrence or occurrences of 
sexual or other behaviour, or to specific facts demonstrating:  
(i) the complainer’s character; or,  
(ii) any condition or predisposition to which he or she is or has been subject;  
b) That occurrence or those occurrences of behaviour or facts are relevant to whether the 
accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged; and,  
c) The probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted or elicited is significant and 
is likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice 
arising from its being admitted or elicited.  
 
Advance written notification to introduce restricted evidence  
1.64 There are a number of key differences to procedure; under the 2002 Act it is 
necessary that a written application is made to introduce the otherwise prohibited evidence, 
before a trial commences, if either the Crown or the Defence wishes to present sexual history 
or character evidence (whereas the restriction under the previous legislation did not relate to 
the Crown). 
  
1.65 Where either the Crown or the Defence seek to lead evidence about the complainer’s 
sexual history or behaviour, in the face of the general prohibition laid down in s.274, written 
notice must be given, ordinarily, not less than 14 days before trial. This was subsequently 
amended by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2004 to 7 days before the 
preliminary hearing in the High Court.  The purpose of this is to ensure that the application is 
raised, as far as possible, before the trial rather than at a point when evidence is being led. 
Although later notice of an application may be permitted, this is only on “special cause” 
shown.  
 
1.66 Such written applications require to specify: 
a) The evidence sought to be admitted or elicited; 
b) The nature of any questioning proposed; 
c) The issues at trial to which that evidence is considered to be relevant; 
d) The reasons why that evidence is considered relevant to those issues; and, 
e) The inferences which the applicant proposes to submit to the court that it should draw 
from that evidence. 
 
1.67 An intention of the written advance notification is to provide a greater degree of 
focus, requiring the courts to take time to consider in detail whether and how evidence is 
truly relevant and the extent to which it may divert attention onto issues which are not 
relevant. The Policy Memorandum which accompanied the Bill stated that advance written 
notice is an attempt to ensure that both the complainer and the Defence are clear at as early a 
stage as possible what the nature of the defence is, and what this may involve for the 
complainer (Scottish Executive, 2001b). 
 
1.68 This timing enables the written applications to be considered at first or preliminary 
diet in solemn proceedings.8 In practice, the requirement that applications to admit restricted 
evidence be decided at a preliminary hearing may mean that the judge evaluating the 
evidential value of the proposed evidence is not always the same judge that presides at trial. 
                                                 
8  Or at the intermediate diet in summary proceedings. 
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This is in contrast to the position under the 1995 Act, where applications to waive the 
restrictions upon evidence relating to the sexual history or sexual character of the complainer 
were made verbally to the court, during the trial, and the decision on whether or not to allow 
the proposed questioning or evidence was made by the trial Judge.    
 
Determining relevance and admissibility  
1.69 A notable difference between the 1995 Act and the 2002 Act is that the court has to 
determine the relevance of the proposed evidence or questioning.  In doing so, the court has 
to consider a broad test – the proper administration of justice – and to do so must weigh the 
comparative benefit to the accused in having such evidence against any impact it might have 
on the dignity and privacy of the complainer.  Section.275 sets up an explicit balancing 
exercise for the admissibility of evidence, where the court is required to take an evaluative 
approach.9  Hence, the Act provides for a sharper focus on the relevance of evidence.  
 
1.70 As stated earlier, Redressing the Balance (2001a) drew heavily on s.276 (2) of the 
Canadian Criminal Code in relation to assessing probative value and prejudicial effect of 
evidence, and this was largely taken up in the new legislation.  Under the 2002 provisions, 
applications for admissibility of evidence will succeed if “the probative value of the evidence 
sought to be admitted or elicited is significant and is likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice 
to the proper administration of justice arising from its being admitted or elicited”. The proper 
administration of justice includes “appropriate protection of a complainer’s dignity and 
privacy,” which acknowledges the rights of witnesses implicit in articles 3 and 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. According to some commentators, this balancing 
exercise preserves judicial discretion while making the conditions for its exercise more 
explicit (Raitt, 2001).   
 
1.71 In considering  s.275 applications and determining the admissibility of any evidence 
or questioning, the court may hear evidence to assist in its decision and, in so doing, may 
seek evidence from other parties, for example, from medical doctors, psychologists or social 
workers. This is intended to minimise the interruption which might otherwise occur during 
the trial itself.   
 
1.72 In considering a written application, the court may also set limits to the extent of the 
evidence to be admitted, or the questioning to be allowed. The admission of evidence may be 
subject to certain conditions, such as compliance with any directions issued by the court, or 
limitations on the use which can be made of evidence to support particular inferences  
 
1.73 The court is required to set out its reasons for the decision on admissibility. In issuing 
its decision, the court is required to state what items of evidence or lines of questioning (if 
any) are being allowed, why they are considered to be admissible, the issues to which they 
are expected to be relevant, any issues to which they are thought not to be relevant and any 
uses which ought not to be made of them, together with any conditions or general directions 
the court thinks appropriate, for example, to protect the complainer from further questioning 
straying beyond the boundaries set in the application. The legislation also provides that such 
conditions may include limitations on the use which can be made of evidence to support 
particular inferences.  
 
                                                 
9 Unlike the similar legislation enacted in England and Wales, and set out in Sections 41-43 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, section 275 of the 2002 Act does not impose strict pre-determined constraints 
on adducing evidence of sexual character. 
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1.74 The 2002 Act also confers on the court an additional power to limit questioning or 
evidence as the trial proceeds, notwithstanding the decision on admissibility, or any condition 
attached to it. 
 
Disclosure of accused’s analogous previous convictions 
1.75 In general, the Prosecution is prohibited from asking questions or leading evidence 
during a trial, before the sentencing stage, about any previous convictions that the accused 
may have. The justification for this rule is either that such evidence is irrelevant, or that it 
might prejudice the minds of the judge or jury against the accused, encouraging a tendency to 
judge the accused on past offences, rather than on the basis of evidence relating to the present 
charge.   
 
1.76 Sections 266 and 270 of the 1995 Act established exceptions to this general rule, 
including one allowing the Prosecution, with the agreement of the court, to ask questions or 
lead evidence to demonstrate the “bad” character of the accused, including evidence about 
previous convictions or charges. Although these exceptions were very seldom used, an 
application to lead such evidence could be made where the Defence has asked questions or 
led evidence with a view to establishing the accused’s “good” character, or attacking the 
character of the Prosecution witnesses, including the complainer. The purpose would be for 
the Prosecution to rebut evidence led by the Defence.  
 
1.77 Redressing the Balance proposed that, where an application to admit evidence about 
the complainer’s sexual history or character is granted, there should be automatic disclosure 
of any convictions the accused has for relevant sexual offences, arguing that if the past 
behaviour of the complainer is relevant to the case, then the same may be said to be true of 
the past behaviour of the accused (Scottish Executive, 2000). This sparked a good deal of 
controversy as it was considered, in particular by some members of the legal profession, that 
this would render the law in this area unfavourable to the accused, and that it would infringe 
the rights of the accused (Scottish Parliament, 2002). Arguments against automatic disclosure 
included the view that balance would require that the court should be obliged to determine 
whether any prejudicial effects of such disclosure were outweighed by the probative value of 
the information disclosed, as an equivalent to the arrangements proposed for the disclosure of 
the sexual history and character evidence of the complainer.  
 
1.78 Amendments to the proposal outlined in Redressing the Balance were incorporated 
into the Bill to allow the accused to argue that any previous convictions should not be 
disclosed on the basis that this would be contrary to the interest of justice to do so.   
 
1.79 Consequently, under sections s.275A (1) and (2) of the 2002 Act, where the Defence, 
following an application, does succeed in convincing the court that character or sexual history 
evidence should be introduced, the court is no longer prohibited from asking questions 
relating to offences other than the one with which the accused is charged.  When the Defence 
makes an application under s.275, which is at least partially successful, the Crown will 
require to place before the judge, a list of the accused's previous relevant convictions. These 
are convictions for sexual offences which have been notified to the accused in advance of the 
trial.  
   
1.80 Once the relevant convictions are before the judge, they will automatically be 
admitted as part of the evidence in the case and disclosed to the jury, unless the accused 
objects. The various grounds for objecting are set out at s.275 (4). An accused may object on 
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the basis that: the offence did not involve a substantial sexual element; that disclosure would 
be contrary to the interests of justice; or, that the conviction does not relate to the accused. 
Where the ground of objection is that disclosure would be contrary to the interests of justice, 
the onus is on the accused to show that is the case. The court is to presume, unless the 
contrary is shown, that disclosure is in the interests of justice.  
 
THE WIDER CONTEXT OF LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL REFORM 
 
1.81 Discussion of the procedural changes heralded by the introduction of the provisions of 
the 2002 Act needs to be located in its wider context, in order to allow a better understanding 
of the new provisions and an assessment of their impact. Since the publication of Redressing 
the Balance in 2000, a set of changes affecting the conduct and proceedings of the High 
Court have come into effect, which have, in turn, significantly transformed the legal and 
procedural context in which serious sexual offence trials are conducted. These developments 
include: 
• The far-reaching programme of reform introduced into the High Court of Justiciary 
heralded by the Bonomy Report (2002), which resulted in greater emphasis on pre-
trial procedures, early case preparation by the Defence, and disclosure of evidential 
material by the Prosecution to the Defence; 
• The phasing in of the Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004 which is designed to 
make it easier for vulnerable witnesses to give evidence in court; 
• The review of the law of rape by the Scottish Law Commission (2006) which attempts 
to re-define the definition of rape, and clarify the issue of consent; and, 
• The report of a Review by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service COPFS 
(2006) on the investigation and prosecution of rape and other serious sexual offences 
which made 50 recommendations for change.  
 
High Court Reform Programme  
1.82 In 2001, as part of a modernisation agenda following devolution, the Scottish 
Executive set up a review under Lord Bonomy, a High Court judge, to examine the practices 
and operation of the High Court of Justiciary, in the light of the increasing demands made on 
the court. The remit included the making of recommendations with a view to making better 
use of court resources in promoting the interests of justice. 
  
1.83 Lord Bonomy reported just after the inception of the 2002 Act with a set of 
recommendations for modernisation, and specifically with the objective of bringing more 
order and a greater degree of certainty to the court’s conduct and proceedings (Bonomy, 
2002). The main problems and solutions identified are summarised as follows:  
 
1. Volume of business and managing the caseload.  It was recognised that the High Court had 
become clogged with a high volume of cases. To alleviate this, the Report proposed raising 
the sentencing powers of the Sheriff and Jury court from 3 to 5 years, in order to reduce the 
volume of High Court indictments. 
 
2. Preparation of High Court cases.  There was a concern about the high number of cases 
reaching the trial date with essential preparation incomplete, and the inconvenience resulting 
from a high level of adjournments. The solutions proposed were to ensure better-resourced 
and organised work by the Prosecution; the provision of more and earlier information to the 
Defence about the Prosecution case; and pre-trial discussions between Prosecution and 
Defence through a managed meeting.  Mandatory preliminary hearings were proposed at 
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which both parties discuss preliminary issues in front of a judge, and confirm their readiness 
to go to trial.   
 
3. Modernising time limits.  Tight time limits were seen to contribute to a high level of 
adjournments. It was proposed that the only grounds for the court to extend a time limit 
should be “on cause shown” which means that the court has to be satisfied that there is a good 
reason for any extension. 
 
4. Encouragement to early realistic pleas. The Report recognised the inconvenience caused 
to witnesses, victims and jurors, by the high volume of cases where accused persons plead 
guilty on the day of trial.  This was to be partly addressed by the measures to encourage 
earlier case preparation (referred to above). 
 
5. (Un)certainty that trials will proceed. The Report pointed to problems arising from 
uncertainty concerning the scheduling of cases, and the disruption of trials, often due to non-
attendance of a bailed accused, or non-attendance of witnesses, and proposed a range of 
measure to address this, including the setting of a fixed date and time for most trials.  
 
6. Supporting victims and witnesses. A range of difficulties experienced by vulnerable 
witnesses were identified, including: lack of clarity concerning available support; trauma 
associated with the giving of evidence in the courtroom or listening to harrowing evidence; 
and anxiety surrounding the possibility of encountering the accused and his or her associates. 
It was proposed that the preliminary hearing address the needs of vulnerable witnesses for 
“special measures” helping them to give their evidence. Statutory backing for new forms of 
witness support would be provided by vulnerable witnesses’ legislation.10 
 
7. Infrastructure. The Report raised the need for appropriate resourcing of the High Court to 
support such changes, in terms of the training of practitioners and modernisation of buildings 
to provide a safe and secure environment. 
 
1.84 Following consultation on the proposals, the Scottish Executive subsequently 
published a White Paper in 2003, and a programme of change was introduced which acted on 
the Report’s recommendations (Samuel and Clark, 2003).  
 
1.85 New ways of working for the judiciary and for those who prepare cases and appear 
before the court were phased in. These incorporated an emphasis on more productive work 
early on in the process with the introduction of the new preliminary diets, and early case 
preparation by the Defence. These also included a greater degree of communication between 
parties and open exchange between Prosecution and Defence as early in the case as possible, 
                                                 
10 The Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004 is being introduced in phases, and the new regime has applied 
to cases tried at the High Court since 1st April 2005 for child witnesses (under 16 years when the indictment is 
served) and since 1st April 2006 for adult vulnerable witnesses. The Act is designed to make it easier for 
children and adult vulnerable witnesses to give evidence in court and provide clarity in relation to the use of 
special measures, such as screens and video-links. The Act can potentially apply in trials for sexual offences 
where it is considered that a victim or a witness is vulnerable.  In terms of the definition provided by s27(1)(b), 
an adult person is vulnerable where ‘there is a significant risk that the quality of the evidence to be given by the 
person will be diminished by reason of (i) mental disorder or (ii) fear or distress in connection with giving 
evidence at trial’. All children are considered vulnerable in terms of the Act.  
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including routine disclosure of statements and other evidential material at an early stage of 
the proceedings.  
 
1.86 From 1st April 2005, a new procedure introduced by the Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2004 came into effect, whereby all cases in the High Court 
were indicted to a Preliminary Hearing, rather than to a Trial Diet, which had been what 
happened before then.  The main purpose of the new procedure was to avoid the so-called 
“churn” in High Court trials, many of which had been adjourned on several occasions. Since 
1 April 2005 all preliminary issues were supposed to be dealt with before a High Court case 
is set down for trial.   
 
Scottish Law Commission Review of the Law of Rape  
1.87 In June 2004, Scotland’s First Minister, Jack McConnell, asked the Scottish Law 
Commission to carry out a wide-ranging and comprehensive review of the law of rape and 
other sexual offences. The terms of the review were to: “examine the law relating to rape and 
other sexual offences, and the evidential requirements for proving such offences, and to make 
recommendations for reform.” 
 
1.88 This followed some widely publicised High Court cases which sparked critical 
attention from the public, academics and lawyers. In the case of HMA v Edward Watt in 2001 
the trial Judge dismissed the charge of rape, and referred the ruling to the High Court of 
Justiciary for clarification of the law. Up until this point, a defining element of rape was that 
sexual intercourse took place against the will of the victim. To prove that intercourse was 
against the woman’s will it was necessary for the Crown to show that the accused used, or 
threatened to use, force. This understanding of the law changed when in what is known as the 
Lord Advocate's Reference (No 1 of 2001) the court held that rape is defined as a man having 
sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, regardless of whether or not force was 
used.  Following the Reference decision, a man commits rape if he has sexual intercourse 
with a woman without her consent, and he knows that she is not consenting or is reckless as 
to whether she is consenting.  
 
1.89 Subsequent to the clarification of the definition of rape in this case, a number of 
appeal cases led to concern about the inherent and significant difficulties faced by the Crown 
Office in bringing about successful prosecutions for rape. These issues were considered in the 
later decisions of McKearney v HM Advocate11 and Cinci v HM Advocate12, which were 
widely interpreted as pointing to the existence of major problems for the Crown in proving 
the accused's lack of belief in the consent of the victim. 
 
1.90 The appeal judgment in McKearney v HM Advocate in 2004 set out that the Crown 
has to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only that sexual intercourse took place and that it 
was without the consent of the complainer, but that the accused knew, or was reckless to the 
possibility, that the complainer was not consenting. In Cinci v HM Advocate the Court 
reiterated a further point made in McKearney that evidence of distress by the victim after an 
alleged rape could not act as corroboration of the accused's state of mind at the time of the 
rape.  
 
                                                 
11 McKearney v HMA 2004 SCCR 251 
12 Cinci v HMA 2004 JC 103 
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1.91 In addition to the issues arising from the decisions of the High Court, other more 
general aspects of the Scots law on sexual offences were identified as requiring consideration 
and reform. Consequently, the Scottish Law Commission published a consultation paper 
setting out proposals to reform the law of rape and other sexual offences. The key issues of 
the consultation paper were: the need to define consent in statute13; a redefinition of the act of 
rape to include non-consensual penetration with a penis of the vagina, anus or mouth; that 
protection should not only be given to those who cannot consent (such as children) but other 
vulnerable people (such as those with a mental disorder, or those over whom others hold a 
position of trust or authority); and, that sexual conduct with children should be a strict 
liability offence, for which no defence of mistaken belief in age or consent would be 
available. 
 
Crown Office Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences 
1.92 Two years after the introduction of the 2002 Act, in late 2004, the Crown Office and 
Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) announced a review of the investigation and prosecution 
of sexual offence cases in Scotland. The aims of the review were to make recommendations:  
• To improve the standard of service provided by COPFS to victims and witnesses of 
sexual offences; 
• For the development of comprehensive guidance for prosecution staff on the 
investigation and prosecution of sexual offences; and, 
• For the delivery of appropriate training to prosecution staff in the investigation and 
prosecution of sexual offences. 
 
1.93 The comprehensive Report was published in June 2006, and contained 50 
recommendations (COPFS, 2006).  Significantly for the research study reported on here, 
these include recommendations concerning the provision of guidance to Prosecution staff on 
the test to be applied and the approach to be taken to Defence s.275 applications, and the 
circumstances in which the Crown might require to make an application. Another important 
recommendation for change concerns the provision of information to the complainer at the 
precognition stage. Where the evidence suggests that sexual history or character evidence 
might be put in issue at a subsequent trial by the Defence, the precognoscer must seek to 
explore the complainer’s position and explain why questions which the complainer may find 
distressing are to be asked. Furthermore, where the Crown receives notification of a  s.275 
application by the Defence, Victim Information and Advice (VIA) should advise the 
complainer accordingly, and inform the complainer of the court’s decision on the application.  
The precognoscer must consider whether re-precognition is required in order to obtain the 
complainer’s position in relation to the matters raised in the application which have not been 
the subject of the earlier precognition. Other key recommendations of the COPFS Review 
include:  
• A comprehensive guidance manual on rape and other serious sexual offences should 
be produced for those who investigate and prosecute sexual offences; 
• A comprehensive system of specialised training should be developed within COPFS, 
and a system of certification should be developed for all COPFS staff working with 
sexual offences; 
                                                 
13 Since the decision of the High Court in the Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001) rape has been defined 
as a man having sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent. However ‘consent’ is not defined, and 
juries are expected to apply what they consider to be the ordinary meaning of that word. 
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• A programme of specialist training for Advocates Depute should be developed to 
ensure they are sensitised to the issues arising in sexual offences, and that they are 
supported in delivering the highest level of advocacy; 
• In all trials for rape and other serious sexual offences, there should be a presumption 
that the Advocate Depute introduces himself or herself to the victim and assists with 
any questions the victim may have about the procedure; and, 
• A comprehensive Information Pack should be published for use by both male and 
female victims of sexual offences, spanning their information needs across the entire 
criminal justice process. 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
1.94 The Sexual Offences (Criminal Procedure) (Scotland) Act 2002 was introduced in 
response to the perceived failure of s.274 and s.275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1995.  The 2002 Act introduced entirely new procedures designed to protect the complainer 
from irrelevant questioning. It excluded use by both the Defence and the Crown of evidence 
that is designed to show that the complainer: is not of good character; has engaged in sexual 
behaviour which is not part of the charge; has engaged in behaviour which might found the 
inference that he or she is likely to have consented; or is not a reliable or credible witness.  
  
1.95 Advance written notice must be given of any applications to adduce sexual history or 
character evidence. The court can only admit such evidence where it is satisfied that it is 
relevant to whether the accused is guilty of the offence, and the probative value of the 
evidence is significant and is likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper 
administration of justice. The court may request information or hear evidence to assist in the 
determination of an application, and must provide written reasons for its decision. 
   
1.96 The 2002 Act changed the law on the disclosure of an accused’s previous convictions 
in rape and other sexual offence cases. Where a Defence application is successful, the 
prosecutor is required to place before the judge any previous analogous convictions that the 
accused may have.  The 2002 Act also introduced a requirement that advance notification 
must be given to the Prosecution if the defence is one of consent. 
    
1.97 The 2002 Scottish “rape shield” legislation has some unique features. The restrictions 
extending to questioning or evidence introduced by the Prosecution are not found in other 
jurisdictions.  The scope of the restricted evidence is very wide, extending beyond “sexual” 
character to include questioning or evidence about the complainer’s general character, as well 
as sexual history. Under the existing Scots law of evidence “character” evidence is deemed 
collateral, in that it is not directly relevant or material, and largely inadmissible. This 
represents an important change to the scope of the legislation, and also constitutes another 
rather unique feature.  
 
1.98 In the years since the publication of Redressing the Balance, and the subsequent 
inception of the 2002 Act, Scotland has seen some considerable developments, in terms of a 
set of wider reforms that have streamlined procedure for serious prosecutions, along with 
policy and practice reviews, and broader legislative interventions that, taken together, have 
quite considerably changed the legal landscape in which sexual offences trials are conducted. 
It is within this wider context that Scotland’s latest attempt at the implementation of “rape 
shield” legislation needs to be assessed. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
2.1 The first part of this chapter describes the overall aims and objectives of the research 
as specified by the Scottish Executive. The second part provides a description of the research 
methods, data sources, sampling procedures, and data analysis.  
 
2.2 The stated aim of this research study is to evaluate the impact of the changes made to 
the law of evidence in sexual offences cases heard under solemn procedure at the High Court 
by the Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence (Scotland) Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”). The 
research has 5 main objectives:     
a) To establish how the legislation is being applied in practice and whether the use of 
sexual evidence differs from the use of such evidence prior to the inception of the 
Act; 
b) To establish the extent to which previous convictions of the accused are disclosed, the 
circumstances under which they are disclosed and any impact this has on proceedings; 
c) To establish the impact the Act has had on the outcome of cases; 
d) To establish the extent to which parties are continuing to use sexual history and/or 
character evidence without an application to the court and in cases where applications 
have been made the extent to which the parameters set within the application are 
adhered to; and, 
e) To examine complainers’ experiences of the court process. 
 
The Law of Evidence in Sexual Offence Trials Baseline Study  
2.3 In order to facilitate this work, a prior baseline study was commissioned to the same 
research team by the Scottish Executive in 2003.  The key objectives of the baseline study, as 
specified by the Scottish Executive, were:   
a) To explore the nature of the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of 
complainers in sexual offence cases and assess whether, to what extent, and in what 
circumstances questioning of the complainer may have been intimidating, humiliating 
or harassing, and to what extent and in what circumstances the judiciary or 
Prosecution intervened to prevent this;    
b) To examine how often, in what kinds of case and on what grounds the Defence 
applied to the court to lead evidence about sexual history and character, and how 
often these applications were granted, and how often and in what kinds of cases such 
evidence was introduced by the Defence without an application to the court, and 
without objection;   
c) To examine how often, in what kinds of case and on what grounds information about 
the sexual history and character of the complainer was led by the Prosecution or 
introduced as a result of questioning from the judge;   
d) To explore how often and from whom objections to the use of such evidence were 
made and how often these objections were upheld; 
e) To explore how often the defence of consent was employed by the Defence and at 
what point in the trial this was introduced; 
f) To provide data on the length of sexual offence trials, and the causes and extent of 
delays in trials starting or being adjourned;  
g) To examine the extent and nature of the use of special arrangements to assist 
complainers in giving evidence e.g. use of CCTV, screens, allowing a supporter to sit 
nearby; and, 
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h) To examine how often, and in what circumstances, judges used their powers to clear 
the courtroom before evidence from the complainer was led.    
 
2.4 Not all of the baseline study objectives are replicated in the current study.  
Furthermore, whereas in the baseline study, the research ambit included both High Court and 
Sheriff Court data on sexual offence cases, in the current study the research focuses solely on 
the High Court. Therefore the findings relating to High Court data only are drawn on 
throughout this Report.  
 
2.5 The baseline research study entailed a retrospective analysis of all sexual offence 
cases heard under solemn proceedings in Edinburgh and Glasgow Sheriff Courts.  Data was 
collected on sexual offence cases which took place in the High Court and the Sheriff Courts 
in 1999, 2000 and 2001, which were the 3 years preceding the implementation of the 2002 
Act. The baseline report provides a comparative starting point for an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the provisions of the 2002 Act, presenting a picture of how legislation to 
protect complainers in rape and other sexual offence trials was being applied before the 
change (see Burman et al, 2005).  
 
2.6 For the baseline, data were obtained from written records on sexual offence trial 
charges, outcomes, special measures and the uses of the relevant provisions of the 1995 Act, 
which restricted the use of sexual history and sexual character evidence. This information 
was obtained for 313 High Court sexual offence cases identified as having proceeded to trial 
in the 3-year research period.  A sub-sample of 84 High Court cases were selected for more 
detailed scrutiny by analysing sections of the tape-recordings of these trials.  This included all 
66 trials which involved an application to introduce sexual evidence under the 1995 Act, and 
an additional 18 trials which involved similar sexual charges, but which did not involve 
applications to introduce sexual evidence.    
 
2.7 It is important to note that evidence of “general” character was not specifically 
excluded under the 1995 Act in the same way as sexual history and sexual character.  
Consequently, quantitative data on the use of “general” character was not collected in the 
base-line study in the same way as sexual character and sexual history data, the introduction 
and use of which was identified in relation to the relevant restriction and exception clauses 
under the 1995 Act. Because of the different scope of the 1995 Act, applications in the base-
line study did not specifically seek to introduce “general” character evidence; nevertheless 
the use of character evidence in the base-line study can be determined from the transcribed 
trials.   
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
2.8 The current research study utilised a multi-method approach, using both qualitative 
and quantitative data collection methods. It employed both retrospective and prospective data 
gathering. That is, data on trials that took place since the introduction of the 2002 Act and the 
commencement of the research study (retrospective) and data on cases dealt with during the 
period of the research project (prospective).   The principal components of the research were 
as follows: 
• Mapping of all High Court cases involving the full range of sexual charges over a 12 -
month period using computerised and written records. The research therefore extends 
beyond rape cases, and includes cases for attempted rape, assault with intent to rape, 
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indecent behaviour, lewd and libidinous practices, the age-related statutory sexual 
offences, and sodomy;   
• Detailed analysis of 30 sexual offence cases drawn from the mapping exercise, using 
transcribed taped proceedings of preliminary hearings and trials, and corresponding 
case Sitting Papers;   
• Attendance at court to observe trials in full, and specifically the use of the 2002 
legislation during the complainer’s evidence; 
• Interviews with judges, Advocates Depute, and Defence Counsel; and, 
• Interviews with complainers in trials which had taken place since the introduction of 
the 2002 Act.  
 
Mapping sexual offences cases (1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005)   
2.9 An initial sexual offence case mapping exercise was carried out. This involved the 
collection of basic data on all cases involving sexual charges coming before the courts during 
a specified time period, in order to compile an accurate picture of the proportion of cases 
involving s.275 applications, and the outcomes in each case.  
 
2.10 Identifying relevant sexual offence cases was facilitated by the assistance of High 
Court IT personnel and the use of the High Court Case Management System (HCCMS), 
although not all of the information required to address the research objectives was obtainable 
from this system.  Data on s.275 applications, outcomes and the consent Defence are not 
routinely recorded by the Scottish courts. It was therefore necessary to use other sources of 
data, in particular the Books of Adjournal, and the individual sexual offence case Sitting 
Papers stored in paper form in the High Court. Using these sources, all sexual offence cases 
called to the High Court in the 12 -month period, 1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005, were 
identified. The period June 2004 to May 2005 was identified in consultation with the 
Research Advisory Group. This period was selected primarily because it was thought that the 
HCCMS database, which was introduced in early 2004, would assist in the identification of 
relevant sexual offence cases.   
 
2.11 Where available, the following information on the characteristics of the cases 
identified from the mapping exercise was inputted into an SPSS data file: case reference 
number; name of accused; charge(s); numbers of complainer(s); type of plea; whether case 
went to trial and evidence was led; duration of trial; whether notification of consent was 
lodged; whether, when, and by whom an application was made to introduce sexual history, 
sexual character or general character evidence and with what result; the outcome in the case 
of each charge and, where available, sentence.  
 
Sample of 30 sexual offence trials from the mapped cases  
2.12 A sample of 30 High Court sexual offence trials were identified from the mapping 
exercise. The trials were purposively selected, using a sampling rationale developed in 
consultation with the Research Advisory Group. The sample was not intended to be 
representative of all sexual offence cases, but rather to reflect the range of sexual offence 
trials heard at the High Court where the 2002 Act may apply. 
 
2.13 Given the range in the particular qualities of cases, in terms of charge type, presence 
and absence of s.275 applications, and decision of the court whether or not to allow the 
evidence or questioning sought, purposive sampling was considered the most appropriate 
approach. This allowed identification of cases most relevant to the key research objectives. 
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2.14 In order to address the research questions, it was agreed that trials which display 
different combinations of key characteristics would be sampled, and to aim to include the 
following kinds of cases: 
• Rape trials (involving both single and multiple charges) with  s.275 applications;  
• Other sexual offence trials (not including rape charges) with  s.275 applications; 
• Sexual offence trials where  s.275 applications were not made and, where possible, to 
try to match these with application cases which display similar characteristics (i.e. in 
terms of charge type, relationship between complainer and accused);   
• Trials where  s.275 applications were challenged and/or were not allowed, in order to 
try to determine what constitutes inadmissible or irrelevant questioning; and, 
• Trials where applications were lodged by the Defence only, the Crown only and both 
Defence and Crown.  
 
2.15 The sexual offence cases that proceeded to trial identified through the case mapping 
exercise provided the sampling frame. There were 123 sexual offence trials, and the target 
sample number for more in-depth analysis, specified by the Scottish Executive, was 30 trials, 
just under a quarter (or 24%) of the mapped trials.  
 
2.16 Differential selection criteria were employed for each category of trial in order to 
obtain a spread of trials involving different s.275 application decisions, whilst retaining a 
strong focus on single charge rape cases. Because of the relatively large number of such 
cases, single charge rape trials with fully and partially successful Defence applications were 
randomly selected; conversely, because of their relative scarcity, single charge rape Crown 
only application cases, and those involving applications by both Crown and Defence, were 
purposively selected. Refused applications were rare; hence all such cases in this category 
which were available were selected for transcription. Cases which did not involve 
applications were also included in the sample.  Table 2.1 shows the trials selected for 
transcription by the type of charge involved and whether or not an application was made in 
the case.  
 
2.17 All of the corresponding paperwork relating to each sexual offence trial and 
preliminary hearing was obtained. Details of the written applications were obtained from the 
case Sitting Papers. Each of the 30 trials, and the associated preliminary hearings in which 
applications were submitted and decided, were transcribed from the court tapes. The tapes of 
the relevant preliminary hearings where any applications were discussed were all transcribed 
verbatim. The trial tapes were selectively (rather than fully) transcribed, with a verbatim 
transcription of the complainer(s) examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-
examination, and a selective transcription of the summings-up by the Crown, Defence and 
trial Judge. The trials were highly variable in length, ranging from one to 6 days. 
Consequently, the typed transcriptions ranged from 30 to 170 pages in length, particularly 
those involving more than one complainer, and those where the complainer was in the 
witness box for several hours. 
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Table 2.1: Trials selected for transcription by type of sexual charge(s), whether s.275 
application made and decision of court   
 
                              With  s.275 applications   
Charge Type  
 
 
Without 
s.275 
   
 
       Allowed in full  
 
Partially allowed  
 
           Refused  
 
Total 
 
Transcribed 
trials 
 Defence 
only  
Crown & 
Defence 
Crown 
only 
Defence 
only  
 
 
Crown & 
Defence 
 
Defence 
only  
Crown & 
Defence  
Crown 
only  
 
 
Rape only  
 
      5 
 
3 
 
4 * 
 
3 
 
4 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
20 
Rape with other 
sexual/non-
sexual charges  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
5 
Sexual 
offences, other 
than rape  
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
5 
      Total  6 8 4 3 5 0 2 1 1 30  
* in 2 cases both applications were allowed in full; in one case the Crown application was allowed in full, and 
the Defence application in part; in one case the Crown application was withdrawn and the Defence application 
was allowed in full  
 
2.18 Pro formas for each of the 30 transcribed trials were completed, recording charge 
details; offence locus; relationship between complainer and accused; preliminary hearing and 
trial dates; whether a s.275 application was made, and by whom; s.275 application contents 
and court decisions regarding relevance and probative value; and any use of sexual history 
and/or character evidence in the trial (see Appendix 1).  
 
Court attendance and trial observation  
2.19 Notification procedures were established to enable the research team to be advised of 
forthcoming trials by High Court staff in order to facilitate trial attendance. This notification 
was highly beneficial and facilitated this aspect of the research. The researchers were 
regularly provided with a list of sexual offence cases, drawn from the HCCMS, with details 
of charge(s), court location and dates. This list also detailed whether or not a s.275 
application to introduce otherwise prohibited evidence had been made in the case.  
 
2.20 The researchers also obtained the weekly sitting lists for the High Court in Edinburgh 
and Glasgow. The Sitting Lists detail the dates and locations of fixed and dedicated floating 
trials, and allow for closer monitoring of the likely trial start date. Before a trial commenced, 
the research team contacted the relevant High Court for advice on dates of floating trials, and 
to notify the court clerk that a researcher would be in attendance.  
 
2.21 Although research access had been granted by the Lord Justice-General, permission to 
remain in the closed court was sought from the trial Judge on the day of the trial. The 
agreement of the complainer to the presence of a researcher was also sought.  
 
2.22 Ten High Court trials in all were attended from the start of the trial to its completion. 
Detailed notes were taken of the entire proceedings using a laptop.  As far as possible the 
exact sequence of questions and answers were recorded for all witnesses called in the case, 
but with particular attention paid to the questioning of the complainer(s) during evidence-in-
 32
chief, cross-examination and re-examination. All references made to s.275 applications and 
provisions of the 2002 Act were recorded as close to verbatim as it was possible to do so.  
The case Sitting Papers were used to obtain any further relevant information, such as the 
details of any application lodged and decided at a preliminary hearing, and the presence of 
previous analogous convictions of the accused. Table 2.2 shows the charge type and whether 
or not an application was made in the ten attended trials. 
 
Table 2.2: Attended trials by type of sexual charge(s), whether s.275 application made 
and decision of court   
 
                              With  s.275 applications   
Charge 
Type  
 
 
Without 
s.275 
   
 
       Allowed in full  Partially allowed 
 
           Refused  
 
Total  
 
 
 Defence 
only  
Crown & 
Defence 
Crown 
only 
Defence 
only  
 
 
Crown & 
Defence 
 
Defence 
only  
Crown & 
Defence  
Crown 
only  
 
 
Rape only 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1(a) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
5 
Rape with 
other sexual 
/non-sexual 
charges 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
Sexual 
offences, 
other than 
rape  
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1(b) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
  Total  2 2 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 10 
(a)  the Defence application was partially allowed, the Crown application was allowed in full;  
(b) there were 3 Defence applications in this case; one was partially allowed; one was refused; and the judge 
refused to consider the third. 
 
2.23 The corresponding tapes of any preliminary hearings dealing with s.275 applications 
in the attended trials were also transcribed. A list of observed trials with details of sexual 
charge type, whether an application was made, whether or not a defence of consent was 
made, and trial outcome can be found in Appendix 3.  
 
Interviews with legal professionals   
2.24 Interviews with Judges, Advocates Depute and Defence Counsel were undertaken to 
address specific aspects of the research questions, and to explore their perceptions and 
experiences of the legal reform.  Face-to-face interviews were undertaken with 4 Judges, 5 
Advocates Depute and 5 Defence Counsel (one of whom was a Solicitor-Advocate). Each 
interview lasted approximately one hour. With one exception, all interviews were digitally 
recorded and then fully transcribed.   The exception was an interview with a Judge who 
declined to be recorded; in this case 2 researchers attended, one asked questions and the other 
took handwritten notes.  Numbers of interviews with legal professionals are small but provide 
useful insights into the operation of the legislation. That said, the small number does mean 
that the views expressed are illustrative rather than representative.  
 
2.25 Legal professionals were approached for interview on the basis that they had been 
involved in sexual offence cases which invoked the 2002 Act.  All had considerable 
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experience of sexual offence cases, and most had experience of the operation of the earlier 
1995 Act.  
 
Interviews with complainers 
2.26 Interviews were undertaken with 4 complainers who gave evidence in sexual offence 
trials heard since the introduction of the 2002 Act.  Several research studies have reported 
difficulties in finding complainers willing to participate in research on criminal justice 
responses to sexual assault (see, e.g. Gregory and Lees, 1999; Harris and Grace, 1999) and 
this research was no exception.  The final decision to allow complainer interviews to be 
undertaken was taken by the Research Advisory Group relatively late in the research period, 
after all of the court-based fieldwork and most of the other interviews had taken place.  
 
2.27 As a result of this late decision, it was not possible to approach complainers for 
interviews at the same time that they were approached to ask whether they would object to a 
researcher’s presence during the trial, as intended, and this contributed to the difficulties of 
recruiting complainers to participate in the research. Consequently, complainers were 
approached solely through support organisations, such as Rape Crisis Scotland, Victim 
Support Scotland and the Violence Against Women Network of the Scottish Women’s 
Convention, which also ensured that they had access to appropriate support.  
 
2.28 All 4 complainers were female and white. The accused was well known to the 
complainer in each case.  Three of the complainers had been allegedly assaulted by a single 
male assailant. In the first, which involved a single charge of rape found not proven, the 
accused and complainer had dated previously. In the second, the accused was the 
complainer’s father. This case involved multiple sexual charges including a rape charge. The 
accused was found guilty of some charges, but not the rape. The third case involved a single 
charge of rape, found not proven. The fourth case involved 2 complainers (although only one 
was interviewed) and 2 accused charged with several charges of a sexual nature, but not 
including rape. None of the complainers knew whether an application had been made in the 
case. Interviews with complainers are discussed in Chapter Nine.  
 
2.29 Interviews with complainers typically lasted for between an hour and an hour and a 
half. Three took place in a comfortable private room in the offices of a support organisation. 
A support worker was present, at the complainer’s request, in one of these interviews. The 
fourth interview took place in a private office at the work place of the complainer. All 
complainer interviews were recorded and fully transcribed.  
 
Notations  
2.30 All direct quotes from interviews are anonymised and non-attributable. Where quotes 
are presented from interviews, or reference is made to specific cases, various notations are 
used. The interviews are identified by a number (e.g. Judge 1; AD 3; Defence 4; C 2). The 30 
transcribed trials and the 10 attended trials are coded by a 3 digit numeric reference (e.g. 006; 
156; 212), which relate to a case identifier. 

 34
CHAPTER THREE:  HIGH COURT CASES INVOLVING SEXUAL 
CHARGES    
 
FINDINGS FROM CASE MAPPING  
 
3.1 This chapter presents the findings of a case mapping exercise conducted in the High 
Court in Scotland over a 12 month period (1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005). The purpose of 
the case mapping was to assess: 
• The number of cases with sexual charges called to the High Court, and going to trial;  
• The proportion of such cases in which s.275 applications were made;  
• How often s.275 applications were allowed; 
• The relationship between the use of sexual history and character evidence introduced 
through a s.275 application, and trial outcomes; and, 
• The proportion of cases in which a defence of consent was lodged. 
 
3.2 The data from the case mapping exercise was also used as a sampling frame for the 
identification and selection of a sample of 30 cases for more in-depth analysis of s.275 
applications and the use of sexual history and character evidence.  
 
3.3 The first part of this chapter provides an overview of the mapped sexual offence cases 
called to court. The second part reports data on cases which proceeded to trial. Given the 
procedural differences between the 2 sets of legislative provisions, in particular concerning 
when (pre-trial and at trial) and how (written and verbal applications) s.275 applications were 
made, and the different legislative structure, the baseline data is drawn on mostly in the latter 
part of the chapter.    
 
Numbers of cases involving sexual charges  
3.4 The mapping exercise identified a total of 231 cases involving sexual charges called 
to the High Court in the 12 month period from 1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005.   
 
Type of sexual charges (mapped cases)  
3.5 Rape is the most common charge in sexual offence cases called in the High Court, in 
that 162 cases (70%) included at least one charge of rape.  
 
Table 3.1 Types of charge(s) in High Court sexual offence cases 
(June 2004 to May 2005) mapped cases 
 
Sexual charge type  n % 
Cases involving rape charge only  67 29 
Cases with multiple sexual and/or non-sexual offences, 
including at least one charge of rape   
95 41 
Cases with sexual offences other than rape (e.g. attempted 
rape, indecent assault, sodomy) 
69 30 
Total  231 100 
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3.6 Table 3.1 shows that 67 (29%) of sexual offence cases involved a single charge of 
rape only;14 whereas 95 (41%) involved at least one charge of rape with multiple (sexual 
and/or non-sexual) charges; and 69 (30%) involved sexual charges other than rape, such as 
indecent behaviour, sodomy, assault with intent to rape, and age-related statutory sexual 
offences.   
 
Numbers and sex of complainers and accused (mapped cases) 
3.7 Complainers in sexual offence cases called in the High Court are overwhelmingly 
female. Of the 231 mapped cases: 139 cases involved single female complainers (60%); 58 
involved more than one female complainer (25%); 13 involved only male complainers (6%); 
and 18 involved both male and female complainers (8%). In 3 cases the sex of the complainer 
was not known.  
 
3.8 Accused persons in sexual offence cases called in the High Court are almost always 
male. Two hundred and twenty five (97%) cases involved a single male accused. Sexual 
offence cases with multiple accused persons are relatively rare in Scotland’s High Courts: 3 
cases involved 2 male accused; one case involved 3 male accused.  
 
3.9 Female accused persons in sexual offences are also extremely rare; there were just 2 
cases involving females. In one case, a female accused was charged along with a male with 4 
charges of lewd and libidinous practices, 2 age-related statutory sexual offences15, and 4 non-
sexual charges; in the other case, 2 females were accused of indecent assault.   
 
Proportion of sexual offence cases with s.275 applications (mapped cases)  
3.10 One hundred and three (or 45%) of the 231 cases involving a sexual charge called in 
the High Court, involved a s.275 application to introduce sexual history or character evidence 
(see Chart 3.1 and Chart 3.2).    
 
3.11 Chapter One outlined the rationale for encouraging pre-trial written s.275 
applications, and the procedure for doing so. A stated intention was to allow the court more 
time to scrutinise the relevance of evidence and the extent to which it may divert attention 
onto tangential or irrelevant issues. It was not a stated intention to afford the Defence with 
multiple opportunities for making an application, although the procedures did exceptionally 
allow the Defence to make an application during the trial in the event of new evidence. The 
data presented in Table 3.2 shows the timing of when s.275 applications were lodged, 
although in over half of the cases this information was not recorded in the available data 
sources. The information in the table refers to the point in the process when the first s.275 
application was made (some cases involved more than one application).  
 
3.12 As described in Chapter One, under the 2002 Act, unlike the 1995 Act, the 
requirement that an application be made to introduce otherwise prohibited evidence extends 
to the Crown as well as the Defence.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Included in this category are a small number of single rape charge cases which also included a charge of 
contravention of bail.  
15 Section 6 Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 (indecent behaviour towards girl between 12 
and 16 years).  
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Table 3.2 Point in process when (first) s.275 applications made (June 2004 to May 2005) 
mapped cases 
 
Point in process when first s.275 
application made 
 
n 
 
% 
Pre-trial  41 40 
At commencement or during trial  7 7 
Not Known  55 53 
Total  103 100 
 
 
3.13 As Table 3.3 shows, in the majority of the mapped cases the s.275 application(s) were 
made by the Defence; most cases involved a single application by the Defence (64), and in a 
small number (11) a single application was made by the Crown. Ten cases involved more 
than one application by the Defence, and in 18 cases, separate applications were made by 
both the Defence and the Crown, some of which involved multiple applications by the 
Defence. 
 
Table 3.3 Numbers of s.275 applications in sexual offence cases and who made them 
(June 2004 to May 2005) mapped cases  
 
Who made s.275 
applications?  
No of cases with one  
s.275 application  
No of cases with more  
than one s.275 application  
Total 
n         % 
 
Crown only  
 
11 
 
0 
 
11 
 
11 
Defence only  64 10 74 72 
Crown and Defence  0 18 18 17 
Total  75 28 103 100 
 
S.275 applications by charges 
3.14 As Table 3.4 shows, there was variation in the proportion of cases involving a s.275 
application by the charges involved.  Cases involving charges of rape were more likely than 
not to involve an application.  
 
 
Table 3.4 Selected charges and whether s.275 applications (June 2004 to May 2005) 
mapped cases 
 
All cases involving selected charges  Without 
Application 
% 
With 
Application 
% 
Number of 
Cases 
    n           % 
Rape without other charges 40 60 67  100 
Rape whether or not with other charges 49 51 162  100 
 
All sexual offences cases, with no charge of rape 
 
71 
 
29 
69  100 
Attempted rape or assault with intent to ravish  
without rape 
57 43 21  100 
Indecent assault without rape 53 47 19  100 
Lewd and libidinous practices and behaviour  
(inc. towards a girl between 12-16 yrs) without rape
77 23  31  100 
Incest or sodomy or attempted sodomy without rape 87 13 16  100 
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3.15 Among cases that involve charges other than rape,  there is considerable variation in 
terms of the proportions involving applications.. Almost half (47%) of such cases with 
charges of indecent assault involved applications, as did 43 percent of such cases involving 
attempted rape or assault with intent to ravish. On the other hand, s.275 applications were 
found in very few cases involving incest or sodomy.  
 
3.16 Further analysis of rape cases involving multiple charges also shows variation in the 
incidence of applications by the nature of the other charges. Cases involving rape combined 
with indecent assault charges were the most likely to involve an application (applications 
were made in 73% of the 26 cases) followed by cases involving attempted rape or assault 
with intent to ravish (applications were made in over half of such cases). In contrast, 
applications were not made in 5 of the 6 cases involving both rape and sodomy and in 2 of 
the 3 cases involving rape and incest.  
 
Decisions relating to s.275 applications (mapped cases)  
3.17 Applications were rarely refused in full by the court. Almost all (60 out of 64) of the 
single applications made by the Defence were allowed either fully or in part. Of the 11 
Crown only applications, 8 were allowed in full, one was refused by the court and 2 were 
withdrawn by the Crown. 
 
Table 3.5 Decisions on s.275 applications (in cases with a single application June 2004 to 
May 2005) mapped cases  
 
Who made 
applications? 
Allowed in 
full 
Allowed in 
part  
Allowed 
following 
amendments
Refused  Other(a) Total 
  
Crown  
 
8 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
11 
Defence  31 16 13 1 3 64 
Total  39 16 13 2 5 75 
(a) these were either withdrawn by the party or considered “unnecessary” by the court. 
 
3.18 Cases containing more than one application show a similarly high rate of success, in 
that most are allowed either in full or in part. For example, 10 cases involved more than one 
application made by the Defence only. Of these, 9 cases involved 2 applications, and one case 
involved 3, making a total of 21 Defence applications in all. Of these, two thirds (14) were 
allowed.   
 
3.19 As stated above, 18 cases involved separate applications made by both Crown and 
Defence. Most (15) entailed one application by the Defence and a separate application made 
by the Crown.  All of the Crown applications in these 15 cases were allowed either in full or 
partially.  Thirteen of the Defence applications were allowed either in full or partially, one 
was refused and one was withdrawn. In one of these cases both the Crown and Defence 
applications were allowed in full on resubmission at trial having been refused in part during 
the original preliminary hearing.   
 
3.20 Of the 3 remaining cases which involved applications made by both parties, the 
Defence submitted 2 separate applications, both of which (in all 3 cases) were allowed either 
in full or in part. Two of the Crown applications were allowed, and one was withdrawn. 
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Sexual offence cases proceeding to trial  
3.21 Chart 3.1 shows the numbers of sexual offence cases called in the High Court, those 
proceeding to trial, and whether or not they contained an s.275 application.  Of the 231 sexual 
offence cases called in the 12 month period, just over half (123 or 53%) proceeded to trial 
and evidence was led.  In 89 cases (39%), the accused pled guilty to all or some of the 
charges in the indictment, and the case did not go on to trial. The remaining 19 cases (8%) 
were deserted by the Crown pro loco et tempore16 or the accused failed to appear, and a 
warrant to apprehend the accused was issued.  
 
3.22 Chart 3.1 shows that s.275 applications were made in 45 percent of all sexual offence 
cases indicted to the High Court. However when contested and non-contested cases are 
separated out, as in Chart 3.2, it becomes evident that a relatively high proportion of 
contested cases involve an application, compared to non-contested cases which have a 
relatively low incidence of applications.  
 
Chart 3.1 Sexual offence cases indicted to the High Court and proceeding to trial, with 
and without s.275 applications (1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005)  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sexual offence cases with s.275 applications proceeding to trial 
3.23 A very high proportion of sexual offence cases in which a s.275 application is 
submitted proceed to trial (that is, 85%, or 88 out of 103 cases); conversely those cases which 
do not involve an application are less likely to proceed to trial. The exact relationship 
between the presence of an application and the likelihood of a case proceeding to trial or not 
is not clear, although the findings suggest that there is some association.  One possible reason 
for an association between high rates of applications and high rates of “not guilty” pleas, is 
that the effort involved in preparing an application is not likely to take place if early 
                                                 
16 Cases which are deserted pro loco et tempore (‘without place and time’) on the motion of the prosecutor can 
be re-raised at a later date. 
Sexual offence cases with 
s.275 application(s) 
n = 103 (100%) 
Sexual Offence Cases 
n = 231 
Sexual offence cases without 
s.275 applications  
n = 128 (100%) 
Proceeded to 
Trial 
n = 88 (85%)
Proceeded to  
Trial  
n = 35 (27%) 
Did not proceed 
to Trial   
n  = 93 (73%)
Did not proceed 
to Trial   
n = 15 (15%) 
Sexual Offence Trials 
n = 123
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indications suggest an accused will plead guilty. Of the 231 sexual offence cases indicted to 
the High Court, more than half (128 or 55%) did not involve an application. Of these just 
over a quarter, (27% or 35) proceeded to trial. Of those cases which did involve an 
application, the majority (85% or 88) proceeded to trial.  
 
Chart 3.2 Sexual offence cases indicted to the High Court by plea and s.275 applications 
(1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.24 Table 3.6 shows that the total number of cases involving sexual charges indicted to 
the High Court in the 12 month period June 2004 to May 2005 was higher than the 
corresponding figures from each of the 3 years of the baseline study. Apart from the 2001 
figures, the proportion of cases proceeding to trial is broadly comparable.  
 
Table 3.6 Sexual offence cases indicted to the High Court, current and baseline study 
  
Year  Cases involving 
sexual offences 
n 
Sexual offence cases 
going to trial 
       n                % 
Current study 
June 04 -May 05 
 
231 
123    53 
Base-line study  
                  1999 
 
213 
111    52 
                  2000 198 111    52 
                  2001 211 91    43 
 
 
 
Sexual offence cases that proceeded to 
trial (contested cases) 
n = 123  (100%) 
Sexual offence cases 
indicted to High Court  
n = 231 
Sexual offence cases that did not 
proceed to trial (non-contested cases) 
n = 108  (100%) 
Trials with 
applications  
n = 88 (72%)  
Cases with 
applications  
n = 15 (14%) 
Cases without 
applications  
n  = 93 (86%)
Trials without 
applications  
n = 35 (28%) 
Sexual offence trials 
n = 123 
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Charges in sexual offence cases which proceeded to trial  
3.25 Of the 67 cases involving only rape identified in the case mapping exercise, 7 out of 
10 proceeded to trial; of the 95 cases involving a charge of rape along with other sexual 
and/or non-sexual offences, over half (54%) proceeded to trial; of the 69 cases involving 
other sexual offences, over a third (36%) proceeded to trial. Trials involving rape charges are 
more likely than other sexual offence cases to proceed to trial. These proportions are broadly 
similar to those found in the baseline study: in the period 1999-2001, 66 percent of the cases 
indicted with a single charge of rape or clandestine injury and 58 percent of those involving 
multiple charges including rape or clandestine injury went to trial 
 
Table 3.7   Charges in sexual offence cases proceeding to trial in the High Court (June 
2004 to May 2005)  
 
 
Charges in sexual offence cases  
Trials 
       n                      %  
 
Rape only 
 
47 
 
38 
Rape with other sexual and/or non-sexual charges  51 42 
Other sexual offences  (e.g. attempted rape, indecent 
assault, lewd and libidinous behaviour, sodomy,  
but not involving rape)  
 
25 
 
20 
Total                                                                                 123 100 
 
3.26 Rape was the most common sexual offence dealt with in the High Court. As Table 3.7 
shows, four fifths (or 80%) of High Court sexual offence trials involved at least one charge of 
rape. Almost two fifths (38%) of sexual offence trials involved rape only, with 42 percent 
involving at least one charge of rape along with other sexual charges.  One fifth (20%) 
involved sexual offences other than rape (e.g. attempted rape, indecent assault, sodomy).  
 
3.27 This is a rather different picture than that produced by the baseline study, as Table 3.8 
shows, where cases involving rape accounted for just under two thirds (65%) of High Court 
sexual offence trials in the 3 year period 1999 – 2001.   
 
Table 3.8 Numbers of cases with sexual charges proceeding to trial in the High Court 
(1999, 2000, 2001) baseline study  
 
Trials with sexual charges at the  
High Court  
1999 2000 2001 Total 
n       % 
 
Rape only (one or more charges of rape only) 
 
35 
 
38 
 
33 
 
106 
 
34 
Rape with other sexual and/or non-sexual 
charges * 
28 32 37       97 31 
Clandestine injury only  7 12 5 24 8 
Sexual offences (not involving rape or 
clandestine injury)  
29 28 29 86 27 
Total  99 110 104 313 100 
* includes 2 cases of rape and murder, one in 2000 and the other in 2001. 
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3.28 One explanation for the increase in trials for rape since then may be that, since a 
decision by the Appeal Court in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No. 1 of 2001), the offence of 
clandestine injury has been effectively abolished. Cases of clandestine injury are now 
necessarily rape.17 If the numbers of base-line clandestine injury cases were added to the 
base-line rape cases, then the overall proportion (73%) is not so markedly different to the 
proportion of rape cases in the current study (i.e. 80% of all trials in current study involve 
rape).   
 
Proportion of sexual offence trials with s.275 applications  
3.29 As Chart 3.1 shows, almost three quarters of sexual offence trials now utilise a s.275 
application (that is, 72%, or 88 out of 123 trials). This is a very marked increase, compared to 
the base-line study, see Table 3.9, where just over one fifth (21%, or 66 out of 313) of the 
sexual offence trials heard at the High Court over the 3 years 1999, 2000 and 2001 involved 
an  application.   
 
Table 3.9 Numbers of sexual offence trials, trials with s.275 applications, and total 
numbers of s.275 applications, current study and baseline study  
 
Year  Sexual offence 
trials 
n 
Trials with s.275 
applications 
  n                % 
Total s.275 
applications 
n 
Current  
June 04-May 05 
 
123 
 
88                 72 
 
118 
Baseline 
1999 
 
111 
  
22                 20 
 
28 
2000 111 19                 17 21 
2001 91 25                 27 26 
 Baseline Total 313 66                 21 75 
 
3.30 The numbers of trials with multiple applications has also increased. In the base-line 
study, a total of 75 applications were made in all, as 8 trials involved the submission of more 
than one application: 5 trials involved multiple applications in 1999; 2 trials in 2000; and one 
trial in 2001.  In the current study, there were a total of 118 applications in 88 trials.   
 
3.31 This can be primarily explained by the opportunities afforded through the changes in 
the way in which applications are submitted.  Although advance written applications are 
normally decided at a preliminary hearing, there is an opportunity for the Defence to request 
a continuation, usually to allow the incorporation of new or previously unavailable evidence. 
                                                 
17 Prior to the decision by the Appeal Court in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No. 1 of 2001) 2002 Scots Law 
Times 466, it was thought that rape required that the woman’s will had been overcome by force, threats of force, 
or drugging.  It was not rape to have sexual intercourse with a woman who was asleep, or insensible through 
drink or drugs (unless the accused or an accomplice had plied her with drink or drugs for this purpose).  Such 
acts amounted to the criminal offence of “clandestine injury” or indecent assault. The Reference decision arose 
after a student was acquitted of rape at a trial in March 2001 because there was insufficient evidence to prove he 
had used force to “overcome the will” of the victim.  Following a media outcry, the Lord Advocate exercised his 
statutory power to refer the point of law involved in the case to the Appeal Court for an authoritative ruling.  
The court ruled that previous court decisions which laid down a force requirement should be overruled.  As a 
result of this decision, the crime of “clandestine injury” was effectively abolished – such conduct is now 
necessarily rape. 
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As well as amended or extended applications, an entirely new application may be submitted 
at a subsequent preliminary hearing, or even at the trial diet itself.  
 
Sexual offence charges in trials with s.275 applications  
3.32 The increase in the proportion of trials occurred across all types of sexual charges, but 
particularly markedly in rape trials. Applications were made in less than one in 4 rape (or 
clandestine injury) trials (24%) in the base-line study, compared to more than 3 in 4 cases 
(77%) in the current study.   
 
3.33 Rape charges feature in four fifths of all sexual offence trials (80%, or 98 out of 123 
trials) and over three quarters of those rape trials involve applications (75 out of 98 trials).  
 
3.34 More detailed comparisons with the baseline data on the basis of charge type are 
illuminating. In the baseline trials involving a single charge of rape (or clandestine injury), 
one quarter of such trials (25%) involved an application, compared to over three quarters 
(77%) of such trials in the current study. The proportion of such trials in relation to all sexual 
offence trials was broadly similar in both data sets (33% in the baseline and 38% in the 
current study). 
 
3.35 Trials with multiple charges of rape (or clandestine injury) accounted for 18 percent 
of all sexual trials in the baseline, of which a quarter (26%) involved an application. 
Although there was a far lower proportion of such trials in the current study (8%), four-fifths 
of these involved an application.  
 
3.36 Looking at trials with sexual charges other than rape, in the baseline these accounted 
for 29 percent of all cases, and just 13 percent involved an application. Whilst there is a lower 
proportion of such trials in the current study (20%) over half of these (52%) involved 
applications to introduce sexual history and/or character evidence.  
 
Trials with more than one s.275 application 
3.37 Cases with multiple applications included those where separate applications were 
made by both the Defence and the Crown (although all multiples were made by the Defence, 
in all instances the Crown made only one application per case), and those cases where the 
Defence made more than one application, either because there was more than one 
complainer, or more than one accused or, as occurred in several of the cases identified here, 
where the Defence made a number of applications in relation to one complainer.   
 
3.38 The proportion of cases involving multiple applications has more than doubled post-
2002, as Table 3.10 shows. Whereas in the baseline study, just 8 out of the 66 trials with 
s.275 applications (or just over one in 10) involved more than one application, this has risen 
to 26 out of the 88 trials (or 3 in 10) under the 2002 Act.   
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Table 3.10 Numbers of s.275 applications made, and who made them (June 2004 to May 
2005) trials only  
 
Number of s.275 applications in trial s.275 application made 
by  1 2 3 
 
Total Trials 
 
Defence only  
 
57 
 
8 
 
1 
 
66 
Crown only  5 0 0 5 
Defence and Crown  0 14 3 17 
Total  62 22 4 88 
 
3.39 Under the 1995 Act, the requirement to make an application to introduce otherwise 
prohibited evidence, applied only to the Defence. A partial explanation for the rise in multiple 
application cases can be found in the requirement placed on the Crown to make an 
application to introduce evidence. In 17 trials involving applications, separate applications 
were made by both the Defence and the Crown.   
 
3.40 The increase is also partly due to the occurrence of cases involving more than one 
Defence application, although these numbers are relatively small.  Table 3.10 shows this 
occurred in 9 cases. There were no cases with more than one Crown application. Under the 
1995 Act, multiple applications occurred only in trials involving one accused and more than 
one complainer (i.e. one Defence application per complainer) or in cases with more than one 
accused (i.e. one Defence application made on behalf of each accused), but never in cases 
involving a single accused and a single complainer. While more than one application was not 
expressly prohibited under the previous procedure of speaking directly to the judge during the 
course of the trial, a second try would obviously risk testing the judge’s patience and was not 
the practice. In all but 2 of the 9 multiple application cases in the current study, there was a 
single complainer and a single accused.   
 
3.41 As previously stated, the fact that written applications are heard at a preliminary 
hearing in advance of trial, offers some scope for applications to be amended at subsequent 
pre-trial diets, or for entirely new applications to be made if, for example, additional evidence 
comes to light in the run-up to trial, or there is an indication from the court that the 
application is likely to be refused, or could be strengthened or amended in some way. This is 
explored in more detail in subsequent chapters.  
 
The decision of the court in relation to s.275 applications (trials) 
3.42 Of the total number of 118 applications, 105 were allowed either in full or in part. 
Two were withdrawn, 3 declared unnecessary by the judge and 8 were refused.  Table 3.11 
shows that in 57 trials, there was a single application made by the Defence, of which 55 were 
allowed either in full or in part by the court.  In the 5 trials in which the single application 
was made by the Crown, all were allowed in full.  
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Table 3.11 Decision of the court in single s.275 application cases (trials)  
 
Party making s.275 
applications 
Allowed in 
full 
Allowed in 
part  
Refused Other (a)  Total single 
s.275 
applications 
 
Crown only 
 
5 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
5 
Defence only  28  27  1  1 57  
Total  33 27 1 1 62  
(a) these were either withdrawn or considered “unnecessary” by the court. 
 
3.43 Table 3.12 shows the decisions of the court in those sexual offence trials which 
involved an s.275 application by both the Crown and the Defence. In 14 trials, both 
applications were allowed. In 2 other cases, the Crown applications were allowed and the 
Defence applications were refused and withdrawn respectively.  
 
3.44 In 3 of the trials where both parties made applications, the Defence submitted a 
second s.275 application, all of which (that is both Defence applications in each case) were 
allowed in full.  
 
Table 3.12 Decisions of the court where s.275 applications made by both Crown and 
Defence (trials)  
 
Decisions of the Court  n 
Both Crown and Defence s.275 applications allowed in full or in part  14 
Crown s.275 application allowed and Defence application refused 1 
Crown s.275 application allowed and Defence application withdrawn 1 
Crown s.275 application withdrawn and Defence application allowed in part  1 
Total  17 
 
 
3.45 In addition, there were 9 trials involving multiple Defence applications.  A total of 19 
applications were made in all: 8 cases involved 2 applications and one case involved 3 
applications.  Of the 19 Defence applications, 11 were allowed, 6 were refused, and 2 were 
considered “unnecessary” by the court.    
 
3.46 The rate of successful s.275 applications made under the 2002 Act is not dissimilar to 
that found in the baseline study where verbal applications made during the course of the trial 
were rarely unsuccessful; indeed only 5 out of 75 were refused entirely. Almost two thirds 
(63%) were wholly successful in that the court allowed all the evidence sought, and the court 
allowed the remaining 29 percent with some restrictions placed on the proposed line of 
questioning or evidence. 
 
The relationship between s.275 applications and trial outcomes  
3.47 The recent review of the investigation and prosecution of sexual offences in Scotland 
undertaken by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (published 2006) indicates that 
of the rape charges that reached court within the period of the one year sample,18 26 percent 
                                                 
18 The COPFS Review counted the number of charges rather than cases with a rape charge so, for example, an 
indictment with 2 rape charges was counted as 2 rapes (COPFS, 2006). 
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resulted in a conviction, (19% resulting in a verdict of guilty after trial and 7% resulting in a 
plea of guilty) (COPFS, 2006).   
 
3.48 As Table 3.13 shows, in the current study, the accused was acquitted of all charges in 
just over half of the sexual offence trials (51%), found guilty of all charges in 23 percent of 
trials, and found guilty to some offences in 26 percent of trials.  
 
Table 3.13 Trial outcomes for trials with and without s.275 applications (June 2004 to 
May 2005) trials only  
 
 Trials  
with s.275    
         n             
Trials  
without s.275 
            n              
 
        Total 
    n               % 
Acquittal on all charge(s) 47 16 63 51 
Guilty of all charges(s) 19 9 28 23 
Guilty of some charge(s) 22 10 32 26 
Total 88 35 123 100 
 
3.49 In 3 out of 5 rape only trials in which an application was made to introduce sexual 
history or character evidence, the verdict was one of acquittal, as Table 3.14 shows.  
 
Table 3.14 Trial outcomes for rape only trials, with and without s.275 applications (June 
2004 to May 2005)  
  
 Rape only trials with 
applications 
n 
Rape only trials 
without applications 
n 
 
Total  
 
Acquittal  
 
21  
 
2  
 
23 
Guilty  8  3  11 
Guilty to reduced charge 1 1 2 
Withdrawn 6 5 11 
Total  36 11 47 
 
 
Advance intimation of a defence of consent   
3.50 The 2002 Act necessitates that if the accused wishes to lead a defence of consent this 
should be intimated in advance of trial, Just under a third (74 out of 231, or 32%) of mapped 
cases lodged a defence in consent in writing.   
 
3.51 Looking only at the sexual offence cases which proceeded to trial, the proportion of 
cases involving an advance intimation of consent rose to over half of the trials (68 out of 123, 
or 55%), as shown in Table 3.15. 
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Table 3.15 Sexual offence trials with and without notification of defence of consent 
(June 2004 to May 2005)  
 
 Rape only  Rape with other 
sexual/non-sexual 
charges  
Other sexual 
offences  
 
Total  
Defence of consent lodged  39 23 6 68 
Defence of consent not lodged  7 23 12 42 
Not known  1 5 7 13 
Total   47 51 25 123 
 
3.52 Although advance notice of a defence of consent was not required under the 1995 
Act, the baseline study found that a defence that the sex was consensual was explicitly put 
forward by the Defence in approximately 40 percent of the sexual offence trials monitored.   
 
3.53 In the base-line. consent was given by the Defence as a key reason in 20 of the 75 
applications made in the High Court (4 of which involved mistaken-belief-in-consent). 
Consent was also the main defence argument in another 15 trials involving s.275 
applications, although not explicitly stated in the verbal application to the court.  Consent was 
most commonly introduced by the Defence during the cross-examination of the complainer, 
but was pursued through the cross-examination of subsequent Crown witnesses, and the 
examination of Defence witnesses.   
 
Chart 3.3 Sexual offence trials with s.275 applications, who made application, and 
whether or not a defence of consent (DoC) was intimated by Defence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.54 Chart 3.3 depicts the sexual offence trials with s.275 applications, showing which 
party made the application and whether or not a defence of consent was intimated.  The 
increased proportion of trials with a defence of consent suggests that the procedural 
requirement to make such a defence explicit prior to trial has led to the increase in the 
number of cases in which the defence is intimated. However, this must be treated with some 
Sexual offence trials with s.275 applications 
n = 88 (100%) 
Defence only      
 n = 66 (75%) 
 
DoC intimated          37 
DoC not intimated    22 
DoC unknown            7 
Defence & Crown    
 n = 17 (20%) 
 
DoC intimated          12 
DoC not intimated     5 
DoC unknown           0 
Crown only     
 n = 5 (6%) 
 
DOC intimated   5 
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caution, as quite different methods of recording whether or not a defence of consent was led 
were used in the 2 studies.19   
 
Reasons for increase in s.275 applications 
3.55 The explanation for the rise in the number of trials in which applications are made is 
complex and a number of causes are discussed in turn. First, however, one possible cause can 
be quickly eliminated. This is not solely the result of the requirement placed on the Crown to 
make an application to introduce evidence or questioning. There were just 5 trials (or 6%) in 
which the Crown made an application which did not also involve an application by the 
Defence; in the other 17 trials with a Crown application, the Defence also made an 
application (see Chart 3.3).   
 
3.56 The likelihood of an application being allowed by the court cannot be so easily 
discounted as a reason for the high numbers of applications.  Whilst the views from 
interviewees should be read as illustrative rather than representative, they nevertheless offer 
some useful insights.  All were aware of the high incidence of applications, and the likelihood 
that, for the most part, such applications will be allowed, at least in part if not in full, by the 
court.  This was put forward as a possible reason for the high numbers of applications by 
several interviewees.  It is also the key reason put forward for increased number of such 
applications by the many legal practitioners that the researchers came into contact within the 
course of doing the research.  However, it has to be remembered that a high likelihood of 
success was also a feature of the previous legislation. Whilst the very high likelihood of 
success is almost certainly an influential factor, there are other precipitating factors which, 
taken together, have led to the increase in applications, compared to the figures found in the 
baseline study.   
 
3.57 One factor leading to the increase in cases with applications may be found in what 
have been termed “Anderson appeals”, following the case in 1995 of Anderson v HM 
Advocate.20 The appellant in the case claimed that his defence had not been properly 
conducted, in that his solicitor advocate had ignored his instructions to challenge the 
character of one of the complainers.21  Here, it was recognised for the first time that the 
conduct of the Defence of an accused by his representatives could result in a miscarriage of 
                                                 
19 In the baseline study, researchers were reliant on the Defence identifying consent to sex on the part of the 
complainer as a reason for wishing to introduce otherwise prohibited evidence in the application made verbally 
to the court, usually just prior to the cross-examination of the complainer, or an indication that a defence of 
consent had been led in the trial recorded by the court clerk in the Book of Adjournal. In contrast, in the current 
study, whether or not a defence of consent had been lodged was ascertained from the presence of the written 
notification contained in the case Sitting Papers.   
20 Anderson v HM Advocate 1996 J.C.29; 1996 S.L.T.155; 1996 S.C.C.R.487 
21 The accused in Anderson was charged with assault. Following his conviction, he complained at appeal that his 
solicitor advocate had ignored his instructions to challenge the character of one of the complainers, who he 
claimed was a violent person, by putting to him in evidence his previous convictions. The court rejected the 
appeal, and highlighted that not only was the appellant’s contention regarding the complainer’s character 
unsupported by the evidence, any such attack was irrelevant to his defence of alibi. More fundamentally, 
however, the decision as to whether an attack should be made upon the character of a witness related to the 
manner in which the defence was conducted was accordingly for the solicitor advocate to take, not the accused. 
The Appeal Court drew a distinction between an instructed defence (on which the Defence required to accept 
direction from the accused) and decisions made as to how the defence should be presented (on which the 
Defence is entitled to refuse such direction and proceed according to his or her own discretion). Only when the 
instructed defence was not presented at trial would the court be prepared to intervene (Anderson v HMA 1996 
JC 29) 
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justice. It is impossible to measure in any objectively precise way the impact that that 
decision may have had on the approach of Defence practitioners to the preparation and 
conduct of cases. However, among legal practitioners the view is widely held that it has had a 
significant impact.  
 
3.58 Following Anderson, subsequent appeals in cases involving sexual offences (as well 
as other kinds of offences) saw some extension to the principles laid down in that case 
concerning the presentation of an accused’s Defence, and somewhat widened the scope of so-
called “defective representation” appeals.22  Although few appeals based on Anderson have 
been successful, subsequent opinions of the Criminal Appeal Court have led practitioners to 
be apprehensive that the principle in Anderson may not be restricted to the question of 
whether the accused’s Defence was presented, but may be extended to the manner in which it 
was presented.23 There is a perception amongst practitioners that Defence Counsel and 
solicitors may be reluctant to decide on the basis of their experience not to pursue what might 
be considered fairly speculative lines of inquiry. 
 
3.59 Three of the Defence interviewees spontaneously referred to being “aware of 
Anderson” when preparing to defend in sexual offence cases. As one said, 
 
“The obligations from a Defence perspective have increased and certainly the 
awareness of those obligations are much more sharply focussed I think, since 
the onset of the legislation.” (Defence 2) 
 
3.60 This is also a perception held by one of the Advocates Depute, who said: 
  
“The requirement to make a written application in advance and the making of 
an order combines with what are called Anderson Appeals - these are appeals 
                                                 
22 In Garrow v HMA 2000 SCCR 772, the court held that the failure of the Defence to obtain a medical opinion 
on the appellant’s amended defence to a charge of rape, resulted in that defence not being properly presented to 
the jury. The court was prepared to look beyond whether the defence was presented at all, and consider the 
manner in which it was presented. In  E v HMA 2002 SCCR 341; 2002 SLT 715, the appellant was convicted of 
raping his 2 daughters and appealed on the ground that his Counsel had not adequately prepared or presented his 
defence. In particular, it was alleged that the appellant had provided his solicitor with material bearing upon 
both the medical evidence which it was anticipated the Crown would lead, as well as the possible manipulation 
of the child witnesses into giving false accounts of sexual abuse. Following conviction the appellant obtained 
expert reports which reflected the material he had earlier produced, which supported certain aspects of his 
defence. He argued that to substantiate his defence, the children’s mother (his former wife) should have been 
cross-examined as to her character. He claimed she had previous convictions for dishonesty, had been vindictive 
and violent towards the complainers in the past and had unduly influenced them. E’s Counsel,  in his response, 
acknowledged that he had not made an “all out attack” on the mother’s character and explained that this had 
been a tactical decision, to avoid antagonising the jury, and exposing the appellant, who also had previous 
convictions, to a similar attack. The appeal was upheld. The Lord Justice Clerk stated that the distinction made 
in Anderson between a failure to present an instructed defence and the judgement as to the manner in which it is 
presented should not be applied “too rigidly”. The underlying principle was whether the presentation of the 
appellant’s defence was such that he did not receive a fair trial. A second appeal judge was of the view that a 
“substantial line of defence”, which supported the proposition that the complainers’ evidence was incredible and 
unreliable, was not presented to the jury. Given the nature of the defence, he considered that there was no option 
but to also attack the complainers’ credibility on the basis that their evidence was deliberately false. Such an 
approach would also have necessitated an attack upon the mother’s credibility, even though this would have 
exposed the appellant himself to such an attack.   
23 Hemphill v HM Advocate 2001 S.C.C.R.361; E v HM Advocate 2002 S.C.C.R.341 and Winter v HM Advocate 
2002 S.C.C.R.720 
 49
based on inadequate representation – to put the Defence under enormous 
pressure actually to make the applications and to ask the questions.  Whereas 
under the former law the Defence could take a view in the course of the 
conduct of the trial about whether or not this was really necessary, and 
desirable, now in order to avoid an Anderson Appeal which blames them, if 
they think there's a possibility of it, they put the application in.  If they get an 
Order granting the application, in whole or in part, they feel that having got 
the Order saying they can do this, they've got to ask the questions, because if 
they don't and the chap gets convicted he'll appeal on the basis that they didn't 
do what they'd been allowed to do.” (AD 1) 
 
3.61 A second set of factors contributing to the increased number of s.275 applications, put 
forward by interviewees, concerns the impact of some of the elements of the High Court 
Reform Programme, described in Chapter One. In particular, this concerns the emphasis on 
the early preparation of cases by the Defence, and the early disclosure of statements and other 
evidential material by the Prosecution to the Defence. This, along with the requirement to 
submit a written application at the preliminary hearing, means that the need for a s.275 
application is considered much earlier in the process than was the case under the 1995 Act, 
and information which may prompt a s.275 application by the Defence is available at an early 
stage of the proceedings.  
 
3.62 As one Defence interviewee said,   
 
“I think people have to grasp cases at an early stage and I think that’s 
beginning to, you know, there’s been a culture change with this Bonomy thing 
… which has meant disclosure at an earlier stage and people have to grasp 
cases at an earlier stage.” (Defence 3)  
 
3.63 This was echoed by an Advocate Depute:  
 
“It’s preliminary hearings.  And now the Defence know that they can’t come 
along on the Friday before the trial starts on a Monday with an application, 
with a list of witnesses, with a list of productions, and that’s what frequently 
happened in the past.  Now everything has to be put in place well in advance 
of the trial.  So people are having to apply their minds to this.”  (AD 2) 
 
3.64 There have also been some noteworthy appeals that have overturned the decision by 
the trial Judge not to allow evidence or questioning under application. The impact of the 
decisions taken by the Court of Appeal in such cases was seen by some of the legal 
practitioners interviewed in this research as another reason for the increase in s.275 
applications.   
 
3.65 In Cumming v HM Advocate 2003 SCCR, 261, the Appeal Court over ruled the trial 
Judge’s exclusion of some of the character evidence specified under a s.275 application.  In 
Kinnin v HM Advocate 2003 SCCR 295 an appeal against the exclusion of sexual history and 
character evidence was not opposed by the Crown and so was granted without much 
discussion. In Tant v HMA 2003 GWD 24-686, the appeal, which was against conviction, 
involved a successful submission that the trial Judge had wrongly refused an application for 
permission to ask the complainer whether she accepted that she had had consensual sexual 
intercourse with the accused some months previously. The Judge took the view that to allow 
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the application would be to allow the Defence to go into matters which the new legislation 
specifically excluded. The Appeal Court, however, took the view that such questioning was 
material to the accused’s Defence, and it was therefore contrary to the interests of justice to 
refuse to admit it. 
 
3.66 The role of the Crown in 2 of the appeal cases has been to support opposition to 
judicial rulings excluding sexual history or character evidence either at the preliminary 
hearing and/or during the appeal processes.  Whilst it was not possible to assess the direct 
effect of Appeal rulings on the making and deciding of applications, interviews with all legal 
professionals indicated that they consider Appeal Court decisions influential. 
 
3.67 Some commentators have alluded to the position taken by the Crown as an important 
factor in the incidence of s.275 applications made by the Defence (Lothian, 2003) on the 
basis that where an application is made which is not opposed by the Crown, the trial Judge 
may take the view that what is required is an adjudication on the parties’ submissions rather 
than an independent assessment, and hence allow the application (2003:53). The nature of the 
competing interests which must be weighed by prosecutors in their approach to applications 
was recognised in the COPFS Review (2006), which recommended that revised guidance on 
the approach to applications be issued to all prosecutors. Interviews with Judges concurred 
with this position to some extent, viewing the position taken by the Crown as an important 
factor in deciding whether or not to allow the evidence or questioning sought, and this is 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
 
3.68 Another set of related factors contributing to the increased numbers of applications 
concern the increased scope of the legislation and the fact that applications may cover 
questioning that would not have previously required an application, including general 
character evidence.  Several interviewees remarked upon the consequences of this, believing 
that there are more applications simply because the scope of the legislation is wider.  The 
extent to which applications include questioning or evidence that would not have previously 
required an application is pursued in subsequent chapters.  
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY  
  
3.69 Two hundred and thirty one sexual offence cases were indicted to the High Court in 
the 12 month period 1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005. Forty five percent of these contained a 
s.275 application to introduce sexual history or character evidence. Just over half (53%) of 
these sexual offence cases proceeded to trial. Eighty percent of all High Court sexual offence 
trials involved at least one charge of rape. 
 
3.70 The accused was acquitted of all charges in just over half of the sexual offence trials 
(51%), found guilty of all charges in the indictment in 23 percent of trials, and found guilty to 
some and acquitted on some offences in 26 percent of trials.  
 
3.71 Almost three quarters of sexual offence trials taking place in the High Court following 
the 2002 Act now seek to introduce sexual history or character evidence by means of a  s.275 
application (that is, 72%, or 88 out of 123 trials). This is a very significant increase, of almost 
3 and a half times, compared to the base-line study, where just over one fifth (21%, or 66 out 
of 313) of the sexual offence trials heard at the High Court over the 3 years 1999, 2000 and 
2001, involved a s.275 application.   
 51
 
3.72 The proportion of cases involving multiple applications has increased, from just over 
one in 10 cases in the base-line study, to 3 in 10. Successive applications were made both 
pre-trial and at the trial itself, in relation to the same complainer. This seems to run counter to 
legislative intent. The requirement for advance written application affords an opportunity for 
Defence requests for continuation, largely in order to assimilate new or previously 
unavailable evidence in the application. This can result in additional, as well as amended 
applications. 
 
3.73 The overwhelming majority (97%) of s.275 applications are successful, in that the 
evidence sought is almost always fully or partially allowed. The court sometimes facilitates 
applications and very rarely entirely disallows applications. This is similar to the situation in 
England and Wales (see Kelly et al, 2006).    
 
3.74 Rather perversely, it seems, the new provisions have resulted in an increased 
proportion of trials where requests are made to introduce sexual history or character evidence. 
The submission of an application shows signs of becoming a routine aspect of case 
preparation in sexual offence contested cases. Whilst the majority of applications are made by 
the Defence, the Crown made an application in one quarter of trials containing applications 
(or 22 out of 88 such trials). Most of these occurred in cases where an application was also 
made by the Defence. 
 
3.75 Over half of the trials involved an advance intimation of a defence of consent (55%). 
 
3.76 There are several reasons for the increase in applications. The requirement that the 
application be made in advance and in writing has combined with other changes in procedure 
to heighten early consideration of the possibility of an application by the Defence. These 
other changes include: greater emphasis on early preparation for preliminary hearings; more 
extensive and earlier disclosure by the Crown of material and evidence that may be pertinent 
to the decision of whether or not to lodge an application; and the effect of “Anderson 
Appeals” and other influential Appeal Court decisions on cases which have involved  
applications. Some appeals have over-turned decisions not to allow evidence sought, and 
upheld the inclusion of character evidence as material to the case.  It is widely understood 
that s.275 applications are likely to be successful and the otherwise prohibited sexual history 
and character evidence allowed, at least in part. Furthermore, the increased scope of the 
restrictions to include general character evidence has also contributed to the increase in the 
number for applications.  
 
3.77 The legislation has had an apparently rather perverse effect, in that the vast majority 
of sexual offence trials, and almost all trials for rape, now involve requests to introduce (often 
extensive) questioning or evidence on the sexual history or character of the complainer, and 
moreover, such requests are overwhelmingly allowed. The result is that the introduction and 
use of such evidence under the 2002 Act is more extensive than before.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  MAKING S.275 APPLICATIONS TO INTRODUCE 
OTHERWISE PROHIBITED EVIDENCE OR QUESTIONING 
 
APPLYING THE PROVISIONS  
 
4.1 This chapter aims to establish how the relevant provisions of the 2002 Act are being 
applied in practice, by focusing on how applications to introduce otherwise prohibited 
evidence or questioning are made. As such, the chapter focuses primarily on the pre-trial 
process.  
 
4.2 The chapter describes the process of submitting applications. It also provides a 
detailed examination of the written contents of s.275 applications, including the nature of 
evidence sought, the nature of questioning proposed, the issues in the trial to which evidence 
is considered to be relevant, the reasons why evidence is considered relevant, and the 
inference(s) that the court should draw from the evidence as put forward by the Crown and 
the Defence in their written s.275 submissions to the court (see Appendix 4 for a full list of 
evidence sought in applications).   
 
4.3 In order to illustrate the process of making applications and offer insights in terms of 
the nature of the evidence or questioning sought, the chapter also draws on data from the in-
depth analysis of transcribed trials and attended trials with applications.  
 
Table 4.1 Transcribed and attended trials by type of sexual charge(s), whether s.275 
application made and decision of court  
                              With  s.275 applications (Final decisions)   
Charge Type  
 
Without 
s.275 Allowed in full Partially allowed Refused 
 
Total 
 
Transcribed 
 trials 
 
Defence 
only 
Crown & 
Defence 
Crown 
only 
Defence 
only 
Crown& 
Defence
Defence
only 
Crown &
Defence
Crown
only
 
 
Rape only  
 
5 
 
3  
 
3 a 
 
3 
 
3 b 
 
1 c 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
19 
Rape with other  
sexual /non-
sexual charges  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
2 d 0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 c 
 
 
0 
 
 
6 
Sexual offences 
other than rape   
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
5 
      Total  6 8 3 3 5 1 2 1 1 30 
Observed Trials            
 
Rape only 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 0 
  
1 
 
1 0 0 0 
 
5 
Rape with other  
charges 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 0 
 
1 0 0 0 0 
 
4 
Sexual offences 
other than rape   
 
0 
 
0 0 0 
 
1e 0 0 0 0 
 
1 
  Total  2 2 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 10 
Total All Trials  8 10 5 3 8 2 2 1 1 40 
Notes to table: a.  In one case the Crown s.275 application was withdrawn before trial; b. One case involved 3 
s.275 applications for same complainer: one allowed, 2 refused; c. In both cases, the Crown s.275 application 
was allowed in full; d. Includes one case with 2 s.275 applications, one of which was refused; e. Defence 
submitted 3 s.275 applications: one partially allowed; one refused, and the third considered unnecessary.   
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4.4 Table 4.1 presents information on the quantity and the nature of the data used in this 
and subsequent chapters. It shows the types of charges involved in the 30 transcribed and the 
10 attended trials, whether or not s.275 applications were made in the trial, and the 
corresponding decisions by the court. Twenty four of the 30 transcribed trials involved at 
least one s.275 application, as did 8 of the 10 observed trials (see Appendices 2 and 3 for 
further details of charges, s.275 details and verdicts in these trials). 
 
4.5 The chapter also draws on interviews undertaken with the legal practitioners in order 
to present their views on the process of making applications and the changes in procedure 
introduced in the 2002 Act, including the need for the accused to give advance notification of 
a defence of consent.  Interview data is also drawn on in order to assess the impact of those 
changes from the perspective of practitioners involved in sexual offence trials.  
 
Advance notification of defence of consent 
4.6 Chapter Three detailed the proportion of cases which involved a defence of consent; 
in those cases which proceeded to trial, it was just over half (55%). 
 
4.7 Judges regarded the required prior notice of a defence of consent as either neutral or 
as helpful.  The former position was summed up by the observation that: “the Prosecution is 
on notice in any case that consent will be an issue” (Judge 1).  In contrast, Judge 4 stressed 
that it gave the Crown and the court proper notice and presuming that because the Crown had 
notice, it allowed the complainer notice that such a defence would be used. It also allowed the 
Crown to investigate any issues surrounding consent in advance of the trial.  
 
“I would say that's been helpful, in the sense that it means everyone knows the 
limitations of what's going to happen in the trial before you get there.  And so 
the Crown have proper notice of what the line is going to be.  The court has 
proper notice of what the line is going to be.  And of course, because the 
Crown have it that means that the complainer has it.  And so that means that 
the Crown can investigate any issues surrounding that in advance of the trial.  
And can raise it with the complainer as well.” (Judge 4) 
 
4.8 However, interviews with Advocates Depute suggested that complainers are not 
always informed of this, largely because of a concern that this might affect the evidence 
which the complainer will give, and create a risk of allegations of coaching. In response to a 
question on whether and when complainers are told, Advocate Depute 1 said: 
 
“No.  A defence of consent is simply notice to the Crown.  I would however 
expect that the precognoscer will always have asked the complainer questions 
directed to the question of consent.  You can see it coming.  You can see it 
coming in most cases anyway.  If you've got a rape and you can prove 
intercourse, then it's either consent or it's an honest belief that there was 
consent, it's got to be one of these 2, so you can see it coming and you take 
account of it.  What you don't do is say to the complainer “he says that you 
consented”, because if you do that you'll affect the evidence that she gives.  
And also what will happen will be that in the court she will say “the 
Prosecutor told me that he said that I consented and I didn't”.  And all hell will 
break loose about what the Prosecutor has been telling the complainer and 
were we influencing and coaching.” (AD 1) 
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Advance written notification to introduce otherwise prohibited evidence  
4.9 Where either the Crown or the Defence seek to lead evidence about the complainer’s 
sexual history or character, written notice must be given, ordinarily, not less than 7 days 
before the preliminary hearing in the High Court.24   
 
4.10 The purpose of this advance submission is to ensure that the application is raised, as 
far as possible, before the trial rather than at a point when evidence is being led. Although 
later notice of an application may be permitted, this is only on “special cause” shown, and in 
these circumstances, a s.275 application could be considered by the court at a later stage, or 
indeed, during the course of the trial itself. These requirements apply to both Crown and 
Defence.   
 
Who is making s.275 applications? 
 
Table 4.2 Party making s.275 applications (transcribed and attended trials)  
 
 Transcribed 
trials with s.275
Attended  
trials with s.275
Total s.275 
trials   
 
Crown and Defence  
 
4 
 
3 
 
7 
Crown only one s.275 5 0 5 
Defence one s.275 9 5* 14 
Defence two s.275 5 0 5 
Defence three s.275 1 0 1 
Total 24 8 32 
*In one case (234) the same application was submitted 3 times: the first time it was considered not relevant; the 
second submission was partially allowed; and on the third submission, the judge refused to reconsider the 
application.    
 
4.11 Chapter Three showed quite clearly that the majority of applications are made by the 
Defence. This is no different in the sample of 32 transcribed and attended trials as Table 4.2 
shows. 
 
Defence decision-making concerning s.275 applications 
4.12 The need for written s.275 applications to be notified in advance, and decided at a 
preliminary hearing, together with the enhanced disclosure of information gathered by the 
Crown (see Chapter One) have meant a number of changes in approach to case preparation 
taken by the Defence. In particular, this has affected the timing of their decision concerning 
whether or not to make an application to introduce sexual history or character evidence.    
 
4.13 Interviews with Defence practitioners revealed that they assess the need for a s.275 
application in a sexual offence case at a very early stage of the proceedings, often before the 
case has been indicted.  In answer to a question about when a decision to make an application 
would first be made, one said: 
 
                                                 
24 The 2002 Act stipulated that this should be not less than 14 days before trial, but this was subsequently 
amended by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2004 to 7 days before the preliminary hearing 
in the High Court. 
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“It depends on what information I have at the first meeting. Sometimes, 
historically the Crown has been quite slow in giving you information and you 
might not have the full set of precognitions. Now with the new disclosure 
rules, when you first come to consult with the client, you tend to have all the 
police statements, so you’ve got a broad picture of what the case is against the 
accused. My general practice is if I have a full set of statements, then we will 
go over that and yes my questions at that stage – because I will have a 
statement from the complainer – will be targeted to find out if there is 
anything that will require a s.275 application.” (Defence 1)  
 
4.14 The key impact of the requirement for advance notification of an s.275 application 
from the perspective of Defence practitioners is that consideration of whether there might be 
a need to introduce sexual history or character evidence comes at a much earlier stage in the 
proceedings than was the case under the 1995 Act or, as one said “preparations are a lot more 
front-loaded” (Defence 3). The following 2 extracts sum up the Defence position on the 
difference between the 1995 Act and the 2002 Act in terms of the need for early stage case 
preparation: 
 
“Now I specifically ask for information which I think might be the subject of 
a s.275 application. I mean I won’t identify it to an accused but I will ask 
around about information, if there’s any information that they know about the 
complainer etc. and my questions will be specifically targeted to eliciting 
information that might be the subject of a s.275 application.” (Defence 1)  
 
“I’m having a consultation this afternoon with a firm of solicitors in 
connection with a rape case which has not yet been indicted, it’s still at the 
petition stage, and this is our first consultation. It won’t be fully detailed, but 
it will be sufficient to let me know whether s.275 is going to be on and that 
will be the first note I’ll make today in big, bold letters s.275.” (Defence 2)  
 
 
4.15 Interviews with Defence practitioners also indicated an approach which erred on the 
side of making an application if they could identify any line of questioning or evidence that 
they regarded as having a bearing on the credibility or consent of the complainer which 
seemed likely to be admitted:  
 
“I do think that we're back to covering ourselves again and I want to make 
sure that I've done all that I can, it won't be left open to criticism in the future, 
whilst on the one view as you and I sit here we may say how could [sexual 
history evidence] be all that relevant, I think in the eyes of some people on a 
jury it might well be.  I think that may well ring as quite a strong factor to 
some people.” (Defence 3)  
 
4.16 The approach of erring on the side of making an application included taking the 
precaution of making an application even when the proposed questioning or evidence 
concerned events shortly before or after the subject matter of the charge, and were, therefore, 
arguably beyond the need for an application: 
 
“… you feel you really have to avoid any comeback on you in these days of 
Anderson appeals and all this sort of thing or defective representation.  You 
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really have to almost adopt a belt and braces approach. And if you are in 
doubt, “Is this shortly before or shortly after?” Put it in.” (Defence 4)  
 
4.17 This interviewee also went onto explain how changes in disclosure had opened up 
new material to draw on in constructing an application concerning the credibility of the 
complainer. 
 
“With disclosure now such as it is, I mean we get all the police statements 
now, statements given by the complainers, these can be used in cross 
examination which we couldn’t do before, … so that again opens up areas of 
attacks on credibility because there might be a prior and [in]consistent 
statement, for example if the complainer has said in evidence, “I was raped in 
the living room” and then in the police statement said “It all happened in the 
bedroom”.” (Defence 4) 
 
4.18 The fact that the Defence may be making  s.275 applications which need not be made 
in the first place, may be one of the reasons why the Crown do not oppose Defence 
applications, although this possibility was not put forward by any of those interviewed. 
 
Deciding not to make an application  
4.19 Informal conversations with Defence practitioners in the courts during the course of 
research field work revealed that where an accused had previous analogous convictions, then 
this would act as a strong disincentive for not making applications, even where they thought 
that the use of sexual history or character evidence was relevant and would assist the Defence 
case. This view was upheld in formal interviews, as Defence 5 put it: “It would have to be 
pretty powerful [evidence] before you’d put a rape conviction before the jury and so no I 
probably wouldn’t make one.” The view of practitioners in relation to the potential disclosure 
of an accused’s previous analogous conviction following a successful Defence application, 
and the extent to which previous convictions of the accused are disclosed is discussed in 
much more detail in Chapter Six.  
 
Crown decision-making concerning s.275 applications  
4.20 In the first instance, Crown applications are drafted by an indicter within the Crown 
Office, although, if called upon to do so, Advocates Deputes may give instructions as to the 
need for a Crown application, but only if asked at an early stage.   
 
“When we come to prepare a case for the preliminary hearing we should be 
considering whether there’s anything which should be covered by an 
application and then giving a further instruction that an application be 
prepared.” (AD 3)  
 
4.21 The Advocates Depute interviewed had mixed feelings about the need for the Crown 
to make an application to introduce sexual history evidence or, as one put it in relation to the 
leading of evidence about virginity, the need to make an application to lead evidence of “the 
absence of sexual history evidence”: 
 
“I've mixed feelings about that.  It's a pest.  And it's very easy to overlook it.  
And it's very easy to overlook it because this is our complainer.  Of course we 
need to lead evidence about that, if relevant.  ……… To have to go to court 
and make an application to do what of course we have to do.  On the other 
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hand if the point of this is to make the court take responsibility for the 
protection of the privacy and dignity of the complainer then I can see why this 
would have to be even handed and why the Crown would have to do it as 
well.  It just seems like an awfully cumbersome thing to have to do and the 
parameters of it are not very clear.  There was, in one case, an Application 
recently, I think, to establish that the complainer had not had sex.  Now I'm 
not at all sure that the Act requires authority for that.” (AD 1)  
 
4.22 Whilst there was broad agreement amongst Advocates Depute concerning the need 
for the Crown to make applications, there was a view that it was a “cumbersome” procedure 
and that, sometimes, the parameters are unclear. As one said:  
  
“It’s fair enough.  What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander and there 
are occasions which the Crown need to raise restricted issues to put matters in 
context and so it’s quite proper that the same restrictions should apply to the 
Crown and the Crown should have to ask permission of the courts to raise 
these issues.” (AD 2) 
 
4.23 A third suggested that the need for an application is not always at the forefront of the 
Crown’s mind, unlike the Defence who are very mindful of the possible need for an 
application from a very early stage in the proceedings. Moreover, the possibility that the 
Advocate Depute at trial may be a different person to the one at the preliminary hearing(s) 
can present difficulties:   
 
“… I think it’s more difficult to remember to prepare and to decide what the 
approach is, particularly from the point of view of the Crown when there will 
be a different AD who prepares the case from the one who runs it.  So it’s 
making a decision about what someone in the future would wish to have 
covered.  But I think, in general, there’s a greater risk that something will be 
overlooked from the Crown because we don’t come at it as thinking … we are 
attacking her character, … the Act appears to be to protect attacks on 
character.  We tend to be seeing it as explaining how it is that what she says is 
correct.  We will be doing it on the whole to boost credibility.” (AD 3) 
 
4.24 The Crown and Defence will inevitably have a different approach to “rape shield” 
legislation, as they have different interests. The Defence will be looking very keenly at 
undermining and attacking the complainer, who will be the principal witness against the 
accused. This will often be the basis of the Defence case. As Advocate Depute 3 notes, the 
Crown position is quite different. In the main, the Crown will not be intending to lead evidence 
which will serve to undermine the complainer. There may be no evidence from the Crown, 
which would require an application.  
 
The requirement of a written s.275 application  
4.25 Under the 1995 Act, s.275 applications were submitted verbally during the trial, 
usually following the complainer’s evidence, although occasionally during the complainer’s 
cross-examination by the Defence.  The discussion which preceded the decisions by the court 
as to whether or not to allow the evidence or questioning sought, was usually very brief.  The 
Defence usually made reference to the provisions of the legislation which set out the 
exceptions in s.275 (1) under which the evidence could be introduced. Ninety one percent of 
all applications in the baseline study invoked s.275 (1) (c) “the interests of justice”, either on 
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its own, or in combination with one or more of the other exceptions.  The issues in the trial 
which the evidence was intended to address were infrequently specified.  
 
4.26 Chapter One details how, under the current legislation, s.275 applications now need to 
specifically address certain matters and so adopt a particular format, as follows: 
a) The evidence sought to be admitted or elicited; 
b) The nature of any questioning proposed; 
c) The issues at trial to which that evidence is considered to be relevant; 
d) The reasons why that evidence is considered relevant to those issues; and, 
e) The inferences which the applicant proposes to submit to the court that it should draw 
from that evidence. 
 
4.27 An intention of the written advance notification is to provide a greater degree of 
focus, requiring the courts to take time to consider in detail whether and how evidence is 
truly relevant, and the extent to which it may divert attention onto issues which are not 
relevant. 
 
4.28 Written applications under the 2002 Act provide the court with the opportunity to see 
clearly what evidence is being sought, the precise nature of such questioning, and the reasons 
such evidence is considered relevant to those issues. 
 
4.29 The requirement that the s.275 application be in writing was generally seen by Judges 
as a sensible procedure encouraging precision and as one put it: “if one Judge is to be bound 
by another then it has to be in writing” (Judge 1).  Two others (Judge 2 and Judge 4) 
maintained that the requirement that a written application be lodged in advance of the 
preliminary hearing enabled the Crown to “prepare the complainer, for the lines of cross-
examination and indeed to produce evidence to rebut any lines which are being developed” 
(Judge 2). However, both Judges stated that they did not know whether the Crown sought to 
inform the complainer about applications.   
 
4.30 The need for precision in drafting was recognised by both Defence and Advocates 
Depute:  
 
“They don’t want general comments like on a day in 2004 the … complainer 
went to a nightclub and left with a stranger.  That is just … is not specific 
enough for the court’s purposes.  So they do require the Defence to do some 
work and not just fly kites.” (AD 2) 
 
4.31 Whilst Defence and Advocates Depute felt that written applications were useful for 
forcing attention on evidential requirements and the key issues in the trial, some spoke of the 
requisite format leading to a degree of overlap and repetition in the written application. 
Scrutiny of written applications indicated considerable overlap in the required parts, 
particularly those dealing with the issues to which the evidence is relevant, the reasons why it 
is relevant and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence or questioning sought.   
 
4.32 The next sections present findings from the written contents of applications made in 
the 32 transcribed and attended trials. Since the overwhelming majority of applications are 
made by the Defence, they primarily deal with those applications, although one section is 
devoted to Crown applications. 
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EVIDENCE OR QUESTIONING SOUGHT TO BE ADMITTED OR ELICITED 
 
4.33 In a little over half (18) of these trials, a single application to introduce sexual history 
or character evidence was made. Thirteen trials involved 2 applications, and one trial 
involved 3 separate applications. This means a total of 47 applications were made in the 32 
trials.    
 
4.34 Unlike such applications made under the 1995 Act, there was not always a specific 
reference made by the party making the application to the specific exception clauses that may 
apply in each case.  Rather, the written application details particular questions to be asked of 
the complainer (or any other witnesses), and outlines the purpose of the evidence to be 
elicited. 
 
4.35 The exclusion clauses25 were explicitly referred to in 10 cases, although for the most 
part, the specification of the provisions occurred following a query by the Judge or, on a few 
occasions, by the Advocate Depute in a challenge to an application made by the Defence.  
Reference to the exception clauses26 of the legislation was made by the applicant in 11 cases. 
The majority referred to s.275 (1)(a): “specific occurrences of sexual or other behaviour 
demonstrating the complainer’s character or predisposition”. 
 
4.36 Typically, under the heading the “nature of evidence sought”, applications identify the 
kind of questioning to be pursued, and often specify particular questions to be asked in the 
trial.  As some Defence practitioners pointed out, they try to be very precise in terms of 
specifying the evidence or questioning sought in applications, because of a belief that the 
Judge will be looking for precision in the drafting:  
 
“I’m very aware that the judges will interpret the section, I think reasonably 
strictly. Specifics, that’s really what it’s about, specifics, nature of detail, and 
a client trying to say “x”, “y” and “z” will have to be told unless we can come 
up with specifics perhaps in some occasions, details to back up what he’s 
saying, then we can’t consider a s.275.” (Defence 2)  
 
4.37 Table 4.3 shows the type of evidence and questioning sought. It draws on analysis of 
all of the applications (that is, 47) made in the 32 trials. The figures were compiled by doing a 
first count of all the different types of evidence and questioning sought across all 
applications, then aggregating this to show the overall proportions.   
 
4.38 The table shows the extent to which sexual history and character evidence is used in 
the court. Most of the applications sought to introduce more than one type of questioning or 
evidence. Some applications were very lengthy, seeking a range of different kinds of 
evidence. It was not uncommon for applications to seek to introduce the complainers’ 
(alleged) past sexual behaviour with the accused, as well as with someone else, and also seek 
to ask questions relating to general character.  Defence interviewees referred to this as a “belt 
and braces” or “scatter gun” approach to try to ensure that at least some evidence or 
questioning will be allowed. 
 
 
                                                 
25 S.274(1)  (a), (b), (c) (i) and (ii),  (d) Restrictions on evidence relating to sexual offences   
26 S.275(1) (a) (i) and (ii), (b), (c) Exceptions to restrictions under section s.274  
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Table 4.3 Nature of questioning sought in all s.275 applications made in transcribed and 
attended trials 
  
Nature of questioning sought  Proportion of all 
evidence sought 
% 
Past sexual history with accused  16 
Non-sexual past history with accused 3 
Behaviour with accused on/around same occasion 14 
Sexual behaviour with/in presence of a third party on same occasion  4 
Complainer’s current relationship status  4 
Sexual history of complainer (other than with accused) 20 
Sexual character of complainer  4 
General character of complainer  24 
Behaviour of complainer after offence  11 
Total  100 
Note: Percentages refer to overall proportion of questioning sought across all 47 applications in the 32 trials. Most 
applications sought to introduce different types of questioning.   
 
4.39 Evidence or questioning concerning the character of the complainer was a common 
feature in applications, accounting for approximately a quarter of all evidence sought (24%). 
This included questioning concerning the complainer’s (alleged) mental instability, 
depression, dishonesty (such as previous convictions or arrests, working and claiming 
unemployment benefit, committing benefit fraud, making fraudulent claims to the Criminal 
Injury Compensation Board, lying about age, and propensity for making up stories, including 
unproven allegations of sexual assault). Very commonly the character evidence that is being 
sought concerned the complainer’s use of alcohol or drugs in the past and/or at or around the 
time of the alleged offence.    
 
4.40 Questioning on the complainer’s sexual history other than a past relationship with the 
accused was also relatively common (20% of all evidence sought). This included questioning 
and evidence about the extent of the complainer’s previous sexual history, sexual practices 
(such as use of sex aids), virginity, contraceptive history and prostitution. 
 
4.41 Evidence of the complainer’s past history with the accused was also common (19%). 
For the most part this was past sexual history with the accused, but in some cases this 
concerned past non-sexual behaviour between the complainer and accused, in particular 
arguments, “fallings-out” and “bad” feeling, either in the past or around the time of the 
alleged offence.  
 
4.42 Evidence concerning behaviour with the accused on or around the same occasion of the 
alleged offence included: the complainer’s willingness to go somewhere alone with the 
accused (e.g. to his home, in a taxi with him, to a party); giving him a phone number or 
address; allegedly showing “sexual interest” in him (e.g. provocative dancing, sensual 
posturing, kissing, cuddling, showing breasts, unzipping accused’s trousers); or making 
sexually explicit remarks.  
 
4.43 For the most part, evidence concerning behaviour with someone else on or around the 
same occasion as the alleged offence concerned sexual contact, but also included “suggestive 
dancing” with, or showing sexual interest in another person.  
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4.44 Questions about the behaviour of the complainer after the offence included: showing 
no visible signs of distress; refusal/unwillingness to report matter to the police or undergo a 
medical examination; maintaining contact with accused (e.g. continuing to live in same house 
as accused despite having own home, allowing accused to look after children, giving gifts to 
accused, and/or writing to accused); withdrawal of allegation; and complainer’s alleged 
sexual behaviour after the alleged incidents (e.g. masturbation, touching other boys, looking 
at older men). 
 
4.45 When considering the distribution of types of questioning introduced by application, 
note that several of the categories of questions would not have featured in applications prior 
to the 2002 Act. This is the result of the wider scope of the legislation. This includes the 
general character of the complainer (24%), non-sexual past history with accused (3%), 
complainer’s current relationship status (4%) and behaviour of complainer after offence 
(11%). To introduce behaviour with accused on or around the same occasion (14%) of the 
offence would have required an application under the 1995 Act only if it were explicitly 
sexual behaviour and sexual behaviour that was not part of the subject matter of the charge.  
In other words, between two fifths (42%) and a half (56%) of the questioning sought in 
applications concerned matters which complainers were certainly exposed to prior to the 
2002 Act, but which were never or rarely the subject of applications. It can safely be said, 
therefore, that at least 40% of the questioning would not previously have required an 
application. 
 
4.46 The research findings in relation to both the volume and the level of detail concerning 
the questioning sought in applications runs contrary to both the intentions of the legislation, 
and the expectations of the reformers.  It has resulted in neither a decrease in the use of 
sexual history and character evidence overall, nor a tighter focus on the type of questioning 
that is allowed. Paradoxically, the requirement of making a written application goes some 
way to facilitate the introduction of a wider range of evidence and a greater level of detail of 
questioning than occurred prior to the 2002 Act.  
 
Crown only applications 
4.47 There were 4 cases in which only the Crown made an application (Crown-only 
applications) in the 32 trials examined in detail. Given the very small number of such 
instances, it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions, and so these cases should be 
considered illustrative rather than representative. Interviews with practitioners suggested that, 
by and large, the evidence sought in Crown applications concerned the sexual history of the 
complainer, rather than character evidence, and was introduced because it was context needed 
by the jury to make sense of events. This could apply, for example, to evidence of past sexual 
relationships between the complainer and accused and evidence that the complainer was 
working in prostitution at or around the time of the alleged offence. One of the Advocates 
Depute interviewed explained this general view: 
  
“Quite often we get allegations of rape and the parties have been involved in a 
sexual relationship in the past and it clearly makes sense for us to actually 
bring that context out.” (AD 2)  
 
4.48 For the most part, Crown applications sought to introduce evidence to assist in setting 
the context for the alleged assault, as Judge 4 said:   
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“Sometimes I think Crown make applications that are, that require to be 
refused … in most cases the Crown are leading evidence which is essential for 
the purpose of leading the evidence, for example, in the case of a rape of a 
prostitute.  In a case like that it's essential for them to be able to lead that.  … 
But I've had other cases where the Crown have made applications that I've 
refused.” (Judge 4) 
 
4.49 Whilst not backed up by the 4 cases with Crown only applications examined here, a 
small number of practitioners did however suggest that sexual history evidence introduced by 
the Crown was not always restricted to that which was essential to the narrative of events. 
 
4.50 In 3 of the Crown-only applications the Crown argued the proposed questioning was a 
necessary context for the narrative of events or other essential evidence. Of the 4 Crown-only 
applications, 3 involved a single rape charge; the fourth case involved one female and 2 
young male complainers and charges of lewd, indecent and libidinous practices, along with 
several charges of a non-sexual nature.  
 
4.51 In the latter case (078) the nature of evidence sought was in respect of one of the male 
complainer’s sexual history. The complainer was 4 years old at the time of the first indicted 
offence, and aged 9 years at trial. The evidence sought of his precocious sexual behaviour – 
masturbation; being seen to look at older men; and having been caught by a teacher in the 
toilets with 2 other boys – was said to be relevant for indicating the circumstances of the 
complainer’s foster mother’s enquiries which led to the disclosure of the sexual offences.  As 
discussed in the next chapter, this application was regarded as an unnecessary “voyage of 
discovery” by the Defence and refused by the court.   
 
4.52 In one of the rape cases in which a Crown application was granted, the evidence 
sought was that the complainer and accused had a long-term relationship, and had borne a 
child together. In a second rape case, the Crown sought to introduce evidence that the 
complainer was not a virgin before the offence. The accused’s defence was one of consent 
and the Prosecution argued that out of fairness to the accused it was necessary to lead 
evidence to show that the ruptured hymen of the complainer referred to in the medical report 
could not be attributed to the events which were the subject matter of the charge: “It is to lead 
evidence, out of fairness to the Defence, there is a background here which gives a possible 
explanation for certain medical findings and that is the only basis upon which this application 
has been brought.” This case involved previous analogous convictions by the accused and is 
discussed further in Chapter Six. In one case, the third rape case, the Crown sought to 
introduce evidence relevant to the credibility of the complainer. Rather than seeking to 
introduce sexual history evidence, the application sought to introduce evidence concerning a 
depressive illness, in order to demonstrate that despite this, she was a credible and reliable 
witness with adequate capacity to recollect the events in question. 
 
The nature of any questioning proposed  
4.53 This part of the applications tends to be brief. Usually, it is simply stated from whom 
the evidence sought is to be elicited (overwhelmingly this is the complainer), but occasionally 
it is to be elicited from other witnesses in the trial.  
 
4.54 Two Defence practitioners interviewed said they eschew specific lines of questioning, 
preferring instead to keep matters a little more general, as the following excerpt shows:  
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“The questions that I’m going to ask the complainer are quite general. I won’t 
list specific questions that I’m going to ask her but it’s questions of a nature 
which will elicit the information that we require to have brought out in 
evidence. That of course ties you to specific areas, but there’s nothing 
stopping you from making a fresh application further down the line at any 
stage.” (Defence 1)  
 
4.55 A small number of applications did provide specific questions, as the following 
examples show:  
• “To elicit whether complainer engaged in work as prostitute 
immediately after being with accused and whether complainer was 
then robbed by a client.” 
• “To ask complainer whether she was dressed only in underwear when 
she caused a member of the public to telephone police.”  
• “To ask the complainer if she was victim of assault immediately prior 
to the incident and if she stole drugs from her assailant.” 
• “To question the complainer as to her motive in seeking prescription 
of contraceptive pill.” 
 
Issues at trial to which evidence is considered relevant  
4.56 Under the 1995 Act reasons for questioning or introducing evidence were not always 
provided by Defence nor sought by the court, because the legislation did not specify this as a 
requirement. On the basis of the discussion that preceded a decision on an application by the 
court, the baseline study estimated that the key issues were as follows, where the numbers in 
brackets refer to the number of (verbal) applications in which these issues were referred to: 
 
• Consent or mistaken-belief-in-consent (20); 
• Credibility of complainer (35); 
• To suggest or show motive for false allegation (10); and, 
• Alternative explanation for physical or forensic evidence (5) 
 
4.57 In the current study, written applications detail the issues at trial to which the 
evidence or questioning sought was to be considered relevant. Typically, these issues were: 
consent and/or the complainer’s character or predisposition, which included the credibility 
and reliability of the complainer; the complainer’s character; predisposition towards sexual 
behaviour on the same occasion as the offence; mental state as an alternative explanation for 
distress; the complainer’s lifestyle; and motivations for false allegation.   
 
4.58 Consent was cited as an issue in two fifths of the 32 application cases, and character 
or predisposition was cited as an issue in two fifths of the cases. In just over a tenth of cases 
(12%) medical or forensic evidence was cited. This included the evidential significance of 
injuries, and medical evidence of a disrupted hymen.  
 
4.59 A small proportion of cases (5%) cited either the credibility or the guilt of the accused 
as the issue in the trial to which the evidence or questioning sought was relevant.  
 
The reasons why the evidence is considered relevant to the issues 
4.60 This section of the application also tends to be rather brief, although a wide range of 
reasons was put forward (see Appendix 4).  In the 32 trials, a single reason was put forward 
in a third of cases, with the majority involving 2 to 6 reasons why the evidence was 
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considered relevant to the issues. Some were fairly specific, linking the evidence sought, the 
nature of the questioning and the issues at trial together. Others were much more general and 
most commonly, consent, credibility and reliability of the complainer, past sexual relations 
between the complainer and accused, and to demonstrate motive for false allegation. 
 
The inferences which the applicant proposes to submit to the court that it should draw 
from that evidence 
4.61 As stated earlier, the written text in the last sections of applications often repeats the 
text of earlier sections. There is much overlap, particularly in the sections that list issues, 
reasons, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence or questioning sought. 
 
4.62 In terms of what is written under the heading of “inferences”, most commonly, this 
was again consent, credibility, complainer’s character, alternative explanation and motivation 
and reasons for false allegation (e.g. complainer sought to conceal true nature of her 
relationship with accused; jealousy; afraid partner would find out; to gain sympathy and 
become the centre of attention).   
 
Information sharing and the effect of disclosure on s.275 applications 
4.63 Interviewees held different views on the extent to which they might discuss s.275 
applications with the other party prior to lodging the applications. As one Defence agent said: 
 
“Absolutely, I’d speak to the Crown. It might not be in advance because 
sometimes you don’t have an Advocate Depute allocated. It might just be in 
the morning of the preliminary hearing.” 
 
 Researcher: “You’d discuss the substantive contents?” 
 
“Yes, and obviously if the Crown are going to make an application, if you’ve 
identified something for example in the transcript, then you might say “Is the 
Crown’s position that they’re going to make the application?” in which case 
you might not need to do yours.” (Defence 1)  
 
4.64 Similarly, the Advocates Depute interviewed spoke positively of information sharing 
with regard to s.275 applications:  
 
“Advocates Depute and Defence Counsel talk to each other a lot and if I 
receive a s.275 application from the Defence, it’s very probable that I will get 
in touch with the Defence Counsel and say “Right, I’ve had a look at your 
application, I’m quite happy with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 but one and 2, I’m not 
happy with and this is the reason why I’m not happy with them.”  And we can 
discuss these and it may be that they’ll decide “Right, okay, we’ll not insist on 
these paragraphs or, if we amend it, would that make a difference?” ” (AD 2) 
 
“Having this mechanism in place whereby in the normal scheme of things 
these matters should be flagged up, discussed and disputed if necessary at the 
earliest possible stage is a good thing.” (AD 5)  
 
“If I can get a position which is satisfactory to me hammered out with the 
Defence in advance I'm comfortable.”  (AD 1)  
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4.65 One issue raised by 2 Advocates Depute concerns the effect of disclosure on 
speculative “fishing expeditions” by the Defence in order to inform the contents of an s.275 
application. Both referred to instances of the Defence requesting the complainer’s past 
medical information: 
 
“With disclosure these days, we are quite often met with requests for medical 
records, and what I’m hearing at preliminary hearings [from Defence] is that 
we need the medical records because that may lead, in turn, to an s.275 
application. …. And generally our position is no.  We don’t consent to that.  
We will not produce them because, well, for a number of reasons, one we 
don’t have them;  2, the victim has a right under Article 8 to privacy and;3,  
the medical records, if you get them in their entirety, will contain things that 
are of no relevance whatsoever and you’re indulging in a fishing exercise.” 
(AD 2)  
 
“What's happening, and this troubles me very greatly, is that some Counsel 
more than others are very keen to have access to the medical records of the 
victim and the social work records of the victim.  … I refuse absolutely to use 
the Crown's powers to seize social work or medical records, unless I actually 
need them to prove the case, and insist that they make an Application to the 
court to recover these records so that the process is intimated to the 
complainer who can vindicate her position, and make the Judge take a 
decision.  That's about as far as I can take it.  And what we're getting is fairly 
wide ranging enquiry into the past with a view to promoting an s.275 
Application, and where's that coming from?  Why has that got any 
relevance?”  (AD 1)  
 
Informing the complainer about s.275 applications  
4.66 Judges noted that they did not know whether the Crown sought to, or had the time to, 
inform the complainer following notification of an s.275 application.  
 
4.67 Interviews with Advocates Depute indicated that, following the submission of a 
defence application, they do tend to try to ascertain the complainer’s position with regard to 
the evidence sought, for 2 main reasons. First, because it may inform the way in which the 
Crown deal with the defence application and, second, because of the high incidence of 
successful applications, the questioning or evidence sought will almost inevitably come up in 
trial.  Seeking to ascertain the position of the complainer on particular matters that are the 
subject of a defence application is not necessarily the same as informing the complainer that 
an application has been made. None of the complainers interviewed in this research were 
aware of whether or not an application had been made in the cases in which they were 
involved.  Interviewees said that whilst they would seek to have the subject of the application 
raised with the complainer to ascertain her position, there was a need to exercise care in the 
level of detail provided to the complainer to avoid the risk of improperly influencing the 
complainer’s answers.  
 
“One thing that we do if the application is raising issues that we haven't 
known about from the precognition, is get the precognoscer to ask the 
complainer just what the story is, and what's being said that mattered in the 
past.  Not what her attitude is to it being allowed in evidence, but tell us what 
else has happened.  Tell us your side of it.”  
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 Researcher: “And would that involve making the complainer aware of the fact that  
 there is an Application?” 
 
“It would depend on the practice of the individual precognoscer.  What we 
would do is say (to the precognoscer) “the Defence are now saying this, can 
you find out what the complainer says about it?”  If I were in receipt of such 
an instruction I suppose I would get the complainer in or “phone her and say, 
“We're being told this” - I wouldn't explain how or in what context - “can you 
tell me about that”?  ……It would be to try and avoid influencing the 
complainer in her answer that I would do it that way.” (AD 1) 
 
“Quite often in these applications they contain information like Defence 
witness so and so says that the complainer did a, b, c and d so clearly you 
want to go back to the complainer to find out, “Did you do a, b, c and d?  Is 
there any truth in that?”  It’s really an extension of the precognition 
process.”(AD 2)  
 
4.69 The Defence interviewees believed that the pre-trial submission of s.275 applications 
did offer the Crown the opportunity to inform the complainer that particular evidence or 
questioning may be led in the trial. Two Defence interviewees were generally rather wary of 
the effect on the defence case of communication between the Crown and the complainer on 
the subject of an s.275 application:   
 
“The detail we have to provide for the applications is horrendous and I take 
the view that a lot of is unnecessary and unfair.   We are required to disclose 
so much of the Defence now.  The Crown have the opportunity and are taking 
the opportunity to question their witnesses further and you can definitely see 
that complainers have had questions put to them and have come with their 
answers prepared .. They already know the line you are going down.” 
(Defence 5)  
 
“You have to disclose very fully what your line is going to be, the purpose of 
your questioning, what you’re seeking to elicit and again there’s sometimes a 
wee reservation in you to say well you know, this is setting out my whole case 
in paper beforehand and that’s not the way our system works.” (Defence 2)  
 
4.70 The question of informing the complainer about an application by the Defence was 
considered in the COPFS Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences 
(2006). The Report concluded that where the Crown receives notification of a Defence 
application, then Victim Information and Advice (VIA) should advise the victim accordingly. 
This is a positive recommendation which should go some way to ensuring that complainers are 
informed about the likelihood of questioning on sexual history and character.  
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CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
4.71 This chapter has focused on how s.275 applications are made, and the details of how 
the process operates.  
 
4.72 The majority of applications were made by the Defence, although Crown applications 
featured in one quarter of application trials.  Defence practitioners interviewed sought to 
establish at an early stage in sexual offence cases, particularly rape cases, whether any line of 
questioning or evidence requiring a s.275 application could be used to attack the credibility of 
the complainer or to otherwise have a bearing on the issue of consent, by actively exploring 
whether there were grounds for such an application from the point of first interview with their 
client.  
 
4.73 Scrutiny of written s.275 applications revealed questioning about a wide range of 
issues, at least 40% of which concerned matters that were likely to have been asked without 
an application prior to the 2005 Act. Questions that would previously have required an 
application – past sexual history with the accused, other forms of sexual history, sexual 
character evidence and sexual behaviour with others around the same occasion as the charge 
– made up 44 percent of the proposed questioning. Twenty four percent of the proposed 
questioning concerned the character of the complainer.  The reasons given for the proposed 
questioning were its relevance to the issue of consent, and the credibility of the complainer 
and sometimes, more specifically, to the complainer’s character and motivation or reasons for 
false allegation or to offer alternative explanations to particular events. 
 
4.74 Crown applications were typically made to introduce sexual history evidence that was 
required to enable a jury to make sense of subsequent evidence or to provide them with 
context for the alleged events.  
 
4.75 Exception provisions are rarely specified, and the Defence tend to take a “belt and 
braces” or “scatter-gun” approach to the contents of applications, in order to find a route that 
the court will accept for the evidence or questioning to be allowed.  
 
4.76 Advance notice of an s.275 application, like the advance notice of a defence of 
consent, was not typically translated by the Crown into explicit advanced warning to the 
complainer. One reason for this is that the provision of detailed information to the complainer 
could make the Crown case vulnerable to allegations of coaching. Such concerns were 
echoed by the Defence who expressed similar concern over the prospect of the Crown 
speaking to the complainer about the content of an application. However, it is standard 
practice for the Crown to re-precognosce a complainer to get “her side of the story” 
concerning any emergent events or issues raised in a defence application. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DECIDING S.275 APPLICATIONS  
 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
5.1 This chapter examines the process of deciding applications in order to address how 
the legislation is being applied in practice.   The chapter examines the position taken by the 
other party in relation to s.275 applications, and presents information on the approach of the 
court in weighing up the probative value and determining the relevance of the questioning or 
evidence sought. The chapter also presents data on the point in the process when applications 
are decided, and examines the reasons why some s.275 applications are continued across 
several hearings before a decision on whether to allow the evidence is reached.   
 
5.2 Like the previous chapter, this chapter draws on data from the 32 trials containing 
applications that were studied in detail.  It uses the transcripts of the taped court proceedings 
and the associated paperwork relating to the preliminary hearings where s.275 applications 
were discussed and decided.   
 
5.3 The chapter also draws on the interviews undertaken with the legal practitioners, in 
order to present their views on the process of deciding applications, and their perceptions of 
the challenges in determining relevance and admissibility of evidence sought to be admitted. 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter primarily concerns use and interpretation of the 
provisions of the 2002 Act during the pre-trial stage, although it does also include discussion 
of those applications which were lodged and/or decided at, and during, the trial itself.   
 
5.4 A notable difference between the 1995 Act and the 2002 Act is that under the latter 
the court has to determine the relevance of the proposed evidence of questioning.  In doing 
so, the court has to consider a broad test – the proper administration of justice – and to do so 
must weigh the comparative benefit to the accused in having such evidence against any 
impact it might have on the dignity and privacy of the complainer.  Section 275 sets up an 
explicit balancing exercise for the admissibility of evidence, where the court is required to 
take an evaluative approach.  
 
Prior agreement between the parties on contents of s.275 applications 
5.5 At the preliminary hearing, the party making the application starts proceedings by 
addressing the court on the contents of the written application. Thereafter, the other party will 
be given an opportunity by the court to give a view. When the other party is in agreement, 
application hearings are then generally brief. In many cases, the Defence simply informed the 
court that the Crown was not opposing the application.  In many, but not all cases, once it 
was established that there were no objections from the other party, the application was 
granted by the court “for the reasons stated therein.” 
 
5.6 Bearing in mind that fact that the Defence use a “belt and braces” approach to 
applications, then, there are likely to be cases in which the Crown will not oppose a Defence 
application.  
 
5.7 The following extract (from case 236), in which both the Crown and Defence 
submitted an application to question the complainer about her prostitution, illustrates the 
brevity of the type of exchange that often occurs when the parties agree:  
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Judge: “Right.  Now I read your s.275 application, Advocate Depute, and the 
Defence s.275 application in this case.  Is there any opposition to either of 
them?” 
 
Defence: “No my Lord.” 
 
AD: “There’s no opposition my Lord from the Crown to the Defence 
application.” 
 
Judge: “Well, I’ll grant both s.275 applications for the reasons therein stated.”  
 
5.8 Agreement that evidence should be introduced does not, of course, necessarily mean 
agreement concerning the interpretation of that evidence. The agreement between Crown and 
Defence in case 236 reflected very different reasons for seeking to ask about prostitution. The 
Crown referred to enabling the complainer to give her evidence in “a full and credible 
manner as to the nature of her movements, actions and line of work on the date libelled”. The 
inferences the Crown wished to draw from the questioning were listed as “employment as 
prostitute does not mean the complainer consented to the conduct in the charge or is not a 
credible and reliable witness”. The Defence referred to relevance of the questioning to the 
central issue of consent and credibility and reliability of the complainer, giving rise to a 
reasonable doubt that the complainer was a rape victim and seeking the inference that the 
complainer consented. 
 
5.9 In some cases (039, 188, 237, 235) it was explicitly stated at the preliminary hearing 
that the parties had discussed and reached agreement on the nature of evidence sought in 
s.275 applications prior to the preliminary hearing.   
 
5.10 In case 188, involving a series of sexual offences alleged to have been committed 
against 2 complainers by their father, the Crown questioned whether an application was 
strictly necessary and made no objection to a delay requested by the Defence as to seek 
information from a foreign police force relevant to their application. The Defence application 
sought to introduce various pieces of evidence advanced as casting doubt on the credibility of 
one complainer: previous claimed reports of sexual abuse to teachers during her childhood, 
which the Defence sought to rebut by calling the teachers as witnesses; a previous report of 
alleged rape by the complainer against the accused when overseas, which the application said 
was not treated seriously by the relevant police force; and various non-sexual exchanges 
between the complainer and her father, which the Defence argued showed a degree of trust 
and friendliness inconsistent with the alleged charges. The application was decided at a 
second preliminary hearing where it was granted in the absence of opposition by the Crown.      
 
5.11 Interviews with Advocates Depute revealed that they do try to agree applications with 
the Defence in advance wherever possible. For example, AD 1 described a successful 
negotiation leading to agreement: 
 
“I conducted a trial … in which the victim had a 20 year history of … mental 
disorder, the nature of it fluctuated.  I … spoke to Counsel, because they'd put 
in a s.275 which sought to narrate her whole medical history from the time she 
was first diagnosed, including her suicide attempt ….  And what I said to …  
the Counsel then instructed was, “Look. Is this really necessary”?”  And we 
agreed that the initial diagnosis was going to be relevant, because the Defence 
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was going to be that there was a good deal of fantasy involved.  We agreed 
that the last couple of years of history would be relevant, under the head of “a 
condition to which she was subject”.  And that because there was material in 
the medical records that suggested that this lady had been in the habit of 
wandering around … scarcely dressed, shouting invitations to men, beckoning 
men in.  So one could see that in the context of a case in which the accused 
said that he was the subject of such an invitation, there was relevance in that.  
But [the Defence Counsel] was willing to take out the intervening 18 years of 
stuff.” (AD 1) 
 
5.12 In interview, Advocates Depute acknowledged that they often share the Defence view 
that the evidence or questioning sought is relevant, and should be heard by the jury: 
 
“I think it is proper of the Crown not to object if it feels that information is 
thrown up which, if true, the jury should know to be able to decide the case.  I 
think it may be a sign that the section is being effective and that the 
applications which are … bad applications are just not being made anymore.  I 
don’t think it’s the role of the Crown to oppose every Defence s.275 [s.275 
application].  I certainly don’t see that as my role and quite often I read one 
and think, this is suitable.”  (AD 3)  
 
 
CHALLENGING APPLICATIONS  
 
Crown opposition to Defence s.275 applications   
5.13 Objections to the Defence application were raised by the Crown in 10 of the 32 
applications studied in detail.27 In all instances the Advocate Depute questioned the relevance 
of the evidence sought to be admitted to the issues at trial. Most challenges by the Advocate 
Depute also specifically raised the issue of the protection of the “dignity and privacy of the 
complainer”, and a small number referred to a lack of specification in relation to the evidence 
or questioning sought by the Defence.  
 
5.14 Notably, Crown challenges to Defence applications were more likely to be made in 
relation to character evidence (in particular where the nature of the evidence sought 
concerned dishonesty). For example, in case 007 which involved 2 young complainers (one 
female and one male), the Defence sought to elicit character evidence from Defence 
witnesses, and a complainer’s former teachers, in relation to one complainer’s alleged 
predisposition to make up stories:  
 
Defence: “This is evidence that relates to behaviour referred to in s.275 (1a), 
behaviour demonstrating the complainers character.  It also demonstrates a 
predisposition to which he has been subject and indeed still is.  That the 
occurrences of that behaviour are in fact relevant in terms of s.275(1b) to 
establishing whether the accused is guilty of the offence with which he is 
charged and I also say that given that this case centres around the credibility 
and reliability of only 2 complainers, the Crown case cannot stand with just 
one complainer being accepted as credible and reliable but the probative value 
                                                 
27 Cases 007, 076, 099, 121, 128, 172, 231, 233, 234, 239. 
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of the evidence sought to be admitted or elicited is significant and is likely to 
outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.”  
 
5.15 The Advocate Depute’s concern was that the (character) evidence sought to be 
elicited was to be corroborated by school teachers (the Defence witnesses concerned) who 
were not professional psychologists, and so was “fundamentally inadmissible.” Following a 
lengthy debate, the Judge agreed with the Advocate Depute and refused to allow the 
application on the basis of the inadmissibility of evidence from non-professional witnesses: 
  
Judge: “Plainly the evidence on one view of [the teachers] might be thought to 
be significant however it has to be remembered that credibility and reliability 
in these areas is fundamentally a matter for the jury and in order to approach 
that topic what is required is objective evidence of a pathological or medical 
condition or possibly the fact that regard may be had to an objective reference 
from the witness that can then be examined along the same lines to see 
whether such a condition exists… It may be possible to acquire that… I 
cannot grant the application in its present terms.” 
 
5.16 In case 076, which involved a very lengthy application by the Defence, part of which 
sought to question the complainer on her investigation for employee theft, the Advocate 
Depute challenged that particular aspect on the grounds that such evidence was not relevant 
to determining the guilt of the accused.  The Judge repeatedly asked the Defence to explain 
the relevance of the fact that a complaint had been made, saying that it was not usual to go 
into past character unless there had been a conviction.  The Defence replied that it was “a 
material point” and would go towards the complainer’s reliability and credibility.” The Judge 
was not convinced, and allowed only part of the application, disallowing all references to the 
investigations for theft.  
 
5.17 In a third case, 231, the questioning sought to be admitted by the Defence, that X and 
Y, 2 of the 4 female complainers “are persons who are engaged in a sexual relationship” was 
considered too imprecise by the Crown who also disputed the claimed relevance to the 
credibility of the witnesses. The Judge upheld both critiques. The application in its original 
form was disallowed, although the Judge also left open the possibility that the Defence might 
return to the issue:   
 
Judge: “There does seem to me to be 2 major problems. First of all a possible 
lack of specification in the application itself, in the event because in view of 
the explanation tendered it’s not immediately clear why a close relationship, 
which included a sexual relationship, will reflect on the credibility of the 
witnesses, and secondly the existence of the close relationship, although it 
would justify the kind of questioning which seems to me to be sought in this 
case, and the factor that a sexual relationship appears to be something to 
which the act specifically is designed, rightly or wrongly, to give protection. 
So at this stage I’m not disposed to grant the application. However, that 
clearly is unsatisfactory in some respects because it doesn’t resolve the matter 
and it will be perhaps either for a further application or a matter for enquiry at 
the time of the trial as to what lengths cross-examination can possibly go in 
exploring the relationship between the 2 complainers in order to cast doubt on 
their credibility and reliability.” 
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5.18 Interviews with Advocates Depute indicated that what the Crown are considering 
when reading the Defence application is whether it is too imprecise or lacking in detail in 
terms of the requirements of the provisions, or the overall relevance is weak or 
unsubstantiated:  
 
“I look at the application, I look at each paragraph within it to decide is that 
something that would be admissible at common law, therefore is a s.275 
application necessary?  Is what is contained within the individual paragraphs 
specific and relevant?  Is it caught by s.274 and are the 3 requirements in 
terms of s.275 satisfied?  And that’s the process I go through with every 
paragraph to decide whether or not I’m going to oppose that paragraph or bits 
of the paragraph or just say yes, I agree with that.” (AD 2)  
 
Defence opposition to s.275 applications by the Crown  
5.19 Among the sample of 32 cases, there were 5 cases involving s.275 applications by 
both parties, and 4 cases in which the application was made only by the Crown. As stated 
earlier, Crown applications tended to focus on sexual history rather than character evidence,28 
and typically were allowed.  
 
5.20 Of all the Crown applications, just one was refused by the court and in this case the 
Defence objected to the nature of the evidence that the Crown wished to introduce.  Case 078 
involved a string of charges including 2 counts of lewd and libidinous practices towards a 
very young boy (aged 6 at trial). The application sought to introduce evidence about the boy’s 
behaviour after the offence, which concerned masturbation, being seen to “look at” older 
men, and having been found by a teacher in the school toilets with 2 other boys. Whilst the 
Crown’s reason for wishing to introduce this evidence could have been to lead evidence of 
the events which led to the disclosure of the allegation, this was not specified in the 
application.  The Defence objected to the application: 
 
Defence: “These sections are there to protect complainers to see that a voyage 
of discovery is not made into their sexual behaviour either before or after the 
event and what the Crown in this is attempting to do is to lead evidence 
relating to sexual episodes affecting a 6 year old boy after the event.  Now in 
my respectful submission, that is not a proper use of this section.  To ask a 6 
year old boy about his private sexual habits could do perhaps irretrievable 
damage to his psyche, we’re not in a position to know.”   
 
5.21 Although the Defence objection was on grounds of hearsay, inadmissibility and 
protecting the dignity and privacy of the complainer from a “voyage of discovery into his 
sexual behaviour”, the discussion that ensued primarily focused on the admissibility of such 
evidence. After lengthy debate, the Judge decided:   
 
Judge: “Gentlemen I have come to the view that the application on behalf of 
the Crown is to be refused. It seems to me that the evidence which is sought to 
be led is inadmissible on the ground that it is hearsay and not de recenti when 
the best evidence will be the evidence of the children in the witness box.  …  I 
have come to the view that the totality of the material contained in the 
                                                 
28 For example, case 138 concerned the fact that the complainer and accused had been involved in a long term 
relationship and had a child together; case 056 sought to elicit that the complainer was not a virgin prior to the 
alleged sexual incident. 
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application should not be allowed to be the subject of application and I refuse 
the application.” 
 
5.22 No challenges were raised in any of the other Crown applications, however in one 
(209), the Defence was unhappy about the wording in respect of the “inferences which the 
court should draw from the evidence” which were that, despite a psychotic illness the 
complainer was credible and reliable. The Defence supported the introduction of the evidence 
sought by the Crown but not the inference that the Crown indicated that the court should 
draw from the evidence.  After a brief discussion the Judge suggested that the Defence was 
“nitpicking” and granted the application.29  
 
 
DECIDING S.275 APPLICATIONS:  THE VIEW OF THE COURT   
 
5.23 Judges interviewed were very clear that it was their duty to ensure that the legislation 
was observed and would pay very careful attention to the wording of the legislation when 
deciding an application. Judges were also aware of exercising a degree of discretion in 
interpreting the legislation. 
 
5.24 Some Judges observed that carrying out their duties had involved them in reminding 
the Crown of their responsibilities under the 2002 legislation. This included reminding the 
Crown of the need to make an application.  When commenting on the extension of the 
requirement to make an application to the Crown, one Judge said, “if you don’t do that, you 
have no judicial control and the Crown will be asked by the Defence to lead evidence of 
something and they’ll do it. That’s what actually happens. So I think yes, judicial control over 
these matters is important” (Judge 2).   
 
5.25 It has already been emphasised that unsuccessful s.275 applications were rare; most 
applications were allowed in full or in part. Applications in which there was no disagreement 
were often allowed in full with little discussion. From the cases examined, it appears that 
Judges were more likely to restrict or disallow Defence s.275 applications where the 
Advocate Depute registered opposition.   
 
5.26 There were, however, 3 cases where the Crown did not oppose the Defence 
application but the Judge, nevertheless, disallowed or restricted the extent of the proposed 
questioning. In the following example (case 204) the Defence sought to introduce evidence 
that the complainer had asked the accused for payment for sex on a previous occasion, and 
that she claimed unemployment benefits whilst working. The Judge expressed some surprise 
that the Advocate Depute was not objecting to the application, as he or she considered it to be 
very loosely phrased, and not at all relevant to the determination of guilt. The Judge 
subsequently restricted the parameters of the application in the following way:  
 
Judge: “I will allow the s.275 application with the exception of the final part 
of paragraph [This paragraph stated: That throughout the period August 2002 
to January 2004, the complainer was working as a cleaner whilst also claiming 
unemployment benefit. Around January 2004, the complainer was informed 
that her benefit was being suspended and she was required to repay sums 
                                                 
29 The accused in this case had previous analogous convictions and there is some discussion in the preliminary 
hearing suggesting that the Crown section 275 application allowed the Defence to avoid incurring ‘certain 
consequences and penalties’ in this regard. This case is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
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claimed. Thereafter the parties continued to have intercourse fortnightly, but 
the complainer demanded £50 a week, which applicant gave her.]….. on the 
basis that I'm not satisfied that the requirements of s.275 are being made out in 
relation to that matter and in particular that these issues are irrelevant to proof 
of the charge and indeed that it would be in line with the provisions of the 
section in relation to the privacy and dignity of the complainer that these 
matters ought to be brought out in a trial of this sort.”  
 
5.27 In another case (211) both parties were seeking to introduce sexual activity, kissing 
and cuddling, between the complainer and the accused on the evening in question. The 
Defence also sought to put to the complainer that she was unwilling to tell the police about 
the alleged events and to ask “any other appropriate questions arising from examination in 
chief or cross exam” without objection from the Crown to this approach. However, the Judge 
refused this aspect of the application which the Defence then withdrew.  As well as stating 
objection to this part of the application, the Judge expressed the view that the rest was 
required unnecessarily by the legislation: 
 
Judge: “I wouldn’t be happy about ….[“any other appropriate questions 
arising from examination in chief or cross exam”].” 
 
Defence: “In that case I’m happy to delete [“any other appropriate questions 
arising from examination in chief or cross exam”] from the application at this 
stage.” 
 
Judge: “It’s just the extraordinary consequences of this Act that applications 
like this have to be made at all. But anyway, I certainly have no concern about 
them at all. What I’ll do is grant both applications. … and the interlocutor will 
formally state in both cases that I’m doing that because I’m satisfied that all 
the matters in s.275 1.(a),(b) and (c) are satisfied and that these questions 
relate to the question of consent and the credibility of the complainer.” 
 
5.28 In another case (168) in which the Judge disallowed the Defence application despite 
the lack of objections from the Crown, the proposed questioning to the complainer concerned 
2 alleged previous attempts to kiss the accused on the lips, one around a year previously and 
one some 3 years previously. The Judge’s reasons were as follows:  
1. There was a lack of specification in respect of the alleged occurrences;  
2. It was not clear that these demonstrate any predisposition of the complainer’s 
character:  
3. The latitude was too far separated from date of alleged offence; and, 
4. The probative value of “the attempts to kiss” is unlikely to be significant or outweigh 
risk of prejudice to a proper administration of justice (case 168).    
 
5.29 This application was re-submitted at a subsequent pre-trial hearing, but was again 
refused by the (different) Judge, who maintained that the application could only properly be 
considered at the trial, after the complainer’s examination-in-chief, when the evidence 
regarding prior statements had been conveyed to the jury. After establishing that the Crown 
would have no objection to the application being raised after the complainer’s examination-
in-chief, the Judge refused the application, but said that as he would also be the trial Judge he 
would scan the evidence for the application in mind, and allow the Defence to raise it again at 
trial.  
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5.30 During interview, Judge 3 observed that there were instances in which he had 
disallowed applications, not because the evidence was to be prohibited, but because they 
were the result of the Defence not understanding the legislation, and making an s.275 
application where none was required.  
 
5.31 In the 32 trials studied in detail, there were a small number of cases in which the court 
expressed the view that the application was unnecessary.  For example, in case 069, the Judge 
ruled that the Defence did not require an application in order to ask the complainer whether 
she was on the contraceptive pill or whether she had told the accused that she was on the pill.  
The Judge said: 
 
“I can well understand the extreme caution that has to be exercised in these 
cases but equally, I do have a concern that we are now seeing s.275 
applications asking for the court to approve questions that are really just 
ordinary questions that don’t carry the problems that the Act is trying to meet.  
If you want to cross examine the complainer to the effect that she said to him 
she was on the pill, I don’t see that that involves suggesting to her that she 
was engaged in other sexual activity at or about that time.”  
 
5.32 As in the case (188), in which the Crown expressed doubt about the necessity of an 
application, discussed above, the doubt concerning the necessity of the application seems to 
reflect the lack of explicit sexual material in the questioning sought by the applicant. 
However, the wording of the legislation is designed to capture more than explicit sexual 
material and it is not clear whether another Judge would have taken this view.  
 
Judicial views on the Crown’s approach to Defence applications  
5.33 During our interviews, Judges sometimes spontaneously offered their views on the 
approach taken by the Crown to Defence applications. Judge 1 complained that the application 
procedure rarely involved a proper debate, with the Crown often taking a neutral view, 
commenting that he sometimes says something about the inadequacy of this response. Judge 4 
also recalled instances of explaining to the Crown the reasons why he disagreed with the 
Crown’s lack of objection to Defence applications.   
 
5.34 In contrast to this, however, when discussing applications at the preliminary hearing, 
some Judges still saw the position of the Crown as decisive.  Judge 2, for example, indicated 
that the possibility of an appeal robbed the Judge of any ability to effectively object to 
Defence applications which were not opposed by the Crown:  
 
“If you are faced with a situation in which you make a decision and you know 
it’s capable of being appealed post trial, then your decision obviously is 
potentially going to jeopardise a conviction if it occurs, and if the Crown at 
the end of the day well, we’re not supporting this conviction because we 
didn’t oppose the s.275 application, that’s going to be the end of the case. The 
Appeal Court are unlikely to support the trial Judge in the face of a concession 
from the Crown. They don’t generally do that, although they can. The short 
answer is, if the Crown do not oppose these applications, and they often don’t, 
the trial Judge is put in a very difficult position because he is potentially 
jeopardising the rape conviction in advance.” (Judge 2) 
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THE TIMING OF S.275 APPLICATIONS  
 
5.35 In a little over half (18) of the 32 trials with s.275 applications, a single application 
was made. Thirteen trials involved 2 applications, and one trial involved 3 separate 
applications, totalling 47 applications in all.    
  
5.36 The timing of the applications are displayed in Table 5.1 which shows that 39 
applications were lodged with the other party in advance of the trial. Most of these were 
decided by the court at one preliminary hearing, although several were continued to 
subsequent hearings before the court’s final decision on the application was given. 
   
5.37 All of the Crown applications were lodged pre-trial and, with very few exceptions, 
were decided at a preliminary hearing in advance of trial.  
 
Table 5.1  s.275 applications by when application lodged (transcribed and attended 
trials) 
 
s.275 applications 
lodged 
Application 
#1 
Application 
# 2 
Application 
# 3 
All 
Applications 
 
Pre-trial 
 
  29 
 
  9 
 
  1 
 
39 
Start of trial 3 4 0 7 
During trial 0 1 0 1 
Total 32 14 1 47 
 
Point in process when s.275 applications are decided 
5.38 Table 5.1 showed that most applications were lodged pre-trial. Table 5.2 shows that of 
the 47 applications made, 33 were lodged pre-trial and decided at a preliminary hearing, 26 
were decided in a single preliminary hearing and 7 continued over 2 to 6 subsequent hearings 
before the application was decided. Eight applications were decided at the start of the trial, 
and 2 were lodged and decided during the trial. In 4 applications, some aspects of the 
application were decided at a preliminary hearing, with other aspects only decided at the trial 
itself. 
 
Table 5.2 Number of hearings involving s.275 applications by when applications decided 
(transcribed and attended trials) 
 
Application decided Application1 
Application 
2 
Application 
3 
All 
Applications
One pre-trial hearing   18    7    1   26 
2-6 pre-trial hearings 6 1 0 7   
Start of trial 4 4 0 8 
During trial 1 1 0 2 
Pre-trial & at trial 3 1 0 4 
Total 32 14 1 47 
 
5.39 Whilst, in the cases examined here, there were few instances of  s.275 applications 
being revisited during trial, several Defence interviewees referred to the disadvantages of 
applications being decided in advance of a trial, without being able to see the “lie of the land” 
in terms of the witnesses and the progress of evidence. For example, one Defence practitioner 
said:   
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“The disadvantages are that you are restrained into particular corridors or 
boxes of cross examination and you are ever conscious of the fact that you 
have certain boundaries as to where you can and cannot go, and if something 
occurs to you – as it can – in the course of a trial or evidence does not come 
across as expected, in theory, one would have to interrupt the trial to put in a 
further application. There’s also a tendency now to be – and I don’t have any 
difficulty with the concept – to be overly complainer friendly and to take the 
views of the complainer before the over riding interests of justice, which 
would be paramount in any other trial. As I say, it puts rape and sexual 
offences into a different category.” (Defence 4) 
 
5.40 While Judges and prosecutors sometimes also acknowledged this difficulty, they were 
more likely to stress the advantages of deciding s.275 applications in advance of the trial.  
 
5.41 Defence practitioners were also more likely to express disquiet that the Judge 
deciding the relevance of an s.275 application is almost certainly not the same person as the 
trial Judge. As Defence 1 said:  
 
“But even cases where you think you have a very strong point which is 
…prohibited by s.274, you might get a Judge who is particularly brutal with 
applications and not give it to you and then that leaves you in the situation 
where you’re coming before a trial Judge and the sense of the application is 
[relevant] – you can’t put it forward again in the same terms, but you might 
still strongly feel that you ought to have been able to ask that question. But 
you’re hampered – the trial Judge might even agree with you, because had it 
been him at a preliminary hearing he may well have granted it. That has 
happened to me.” (Defence 1)  
  
Continuations of applications beyond one preliminary hearing 
5.42 There was a range of circumstances in which applications were continued over more 
than one preliminary hearing. Sometimes this was because it was not possible to have a full 
discussion of the application due to lack of time, or the applicant requested more time 
because the relevant information or evidence was unavailable. For example, in case 128, the 
Defence application was continued 3 times due to medical and telephone records being 
unavailable, before finally being decided at a fourth pre-trial hearing. In case 204, the 
Defence requested more time for preparation and their application was continued across 4 
pre-trial hearings before being heard at the start of the trial. In case 188, the initial Defence 
s.275 application was withdrawn pending further information from foreign police authorities, 
and the trial postponed. This application was subsequently re-submitted and granted at a later 
preliminary hearing. 
 
5.43 Another set of circumstances involved the applicant creating an opportunity to have a 
second chance, resubmitting an application or a part thereof after it had been partially or 
entirely refused by the court. From the 32 cases studied in detail, there were 2 examples of 
this occurring with Crown applications, and 5 examples of Defence applications. For 
example, in case 044 the Crown application sought to lead evidence that the (young) 
complainer had previously engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, thus explaining a 
disrupted hymen identified in the medical examination which the Prosecution did not seek to 
attribute to the alleged rape. This was deemed not to be specific enough by the Judge, since it 
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did not specify the previous occurrence of consensual sexual intercourse30 and the application 
was withdrawn. This application was subsequently amended to offer a more precise date and 
resubmitted with “special cause shown” at a further hearing, where the application was then 
allowed. 
  
5.44 In case 212, which involved an application by both parties, the questioning sought 
concerned kissing between the complainer and the accused on the evening in question and the 
possession and handling by the complainer of a condom.  The Judge ruled that an application 
was not necessary with respect to these details since they concerned events “shortly before, at 
the same time as or shortly after the acts which form the subject matter of the charge”. The 
applications were repeated and allowed at the start of the trial. The trial Judge, however, 
stated that: “It is not entirely clear to me that the evidence and questioning to which these 
applications relate is strictly speaking, struck at by the prohibition in s.274.”  
 
5.45 In 3 Defence applications continued beyond one preliminary hearing, the original 
application was partially or fully refused and then re-submitted in front of a different Judge. 
In case 007, already referred to in some detail earlier in this chapter, the application sought to 
lead evidence which questioned the credibility of a young complainer based on the report of a 
teacher which indicated that the child had a tendency to tell “elaborate lies”. This was refused 
due to concern about the admissibility of evidence from teachers in relation to “a pathological 
or medical condition”. However, the Judge did grant leave to appeal this decision.  
 
5.46 In an attempted rape case (234) the original Defence application, which sought to 
introduce evidence about the complainer’s “confused sexuality” and challenge her claim that 
she had not had a sexual relationship, was refused outright by the court in a preliminary 
hearing. Leave to appeal this decision was also refused, although the Defence re-submitted 
the same application at the start of the trial to a different Judge. This was partially allowed in 
respect of the complainer’s virginity, however a third attempt to submit during the trial was 
refused (See Appendix 3). 
    
5.47 Similarly, in case 231 which involved 4 complainers, and several charges of rape and 
indecent assault, an application by the Defence to elicit that 2 of the complainers were 
involved in an “intimate lesbian relationship” and were, therefore, not credible or reliable 
witnesses, was refused at the initial preliminary hearing and resubmitted at a subsequent 
preliminary hearing, and again disallowed by the court.  
 
Late applications and “special cause shown”   
5.48 Seven applications were introduced for the first time at the start of the trial, that is, 
before any evidence was led. The second application in one trial (case 099) was lodged 
during the trial itself. 
 
5.49 In all but one of the 8 applications the court accepted that there was “special cause 
shown” for the lodging of the late application and generally, lateness was not, in itself, a 
barrier to the success of an application as the Judge made clear in case 56: 
 
                                                 
30 Section 275 (1)(a) of the 2002 Act stipulates that the court may admit questioning or evidence contained 
within a s.275 application if it is satisfied that: “the evidence or questioning will relate only to a specific 
occurrence or occurrences of sexual or other behaviour or to specific facts demonstrating (i.) the complainer’s 
character; or (ii.) any condition or predisposition to which the complainer is or has been subject.” 
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Judge: “Well obviously I’ll hear what (Defence) has got to say about the 
lateness of the application but unless persuaded otherwise I think you can take 
it that, if I take the view that its in the interests of justice to grant the 
application, on its merits then that in itself would seem to me to justify my 
considering it at this stage.” 
 
5.50 In case 117, the late Defence application consisted of a long list of the Defence 
narrative of events leading up to the alleged incident including, among the many details, 
alleged consensual sex between the complainer and the accused, prior to the subject matter of 
the charge. The Judge quickly agreed the application, noting that it was not opposed by the 
Crown, and commenting on the long and detailed list of proposed questioning, concluding   
“Well I’ve read it and I can’t see that all of it would be likely to be asked or would need to be 
asked but I’ll allow it to save time.”  
 
Practitioner’s views about s.275 continuations  
5.51 Discussion with interviewees about the shift from the verbal applications at trial that 
characterised the 1995 Act, to a process of written submissions at preliminary hearings, 
indicated a range of views and experiences concerning 2 procedural issues: the practice of 
continuing preliminary hearings across more than one pre-trial diet in order to allow more 
time for applications to be made in advance of the trial; and deferring decisions about 
applications from the pre-trial diet to the trial.   
 
5.52 Interviewees held mixed views about the desirability of continuations of s.275 
applications. Some Defence practitioners referred to the inevitability of continuations, 
resulting from the need to submit a written application in advance:  
 
“The only reason for additional pre-trial procedure is if the case has not yet 
been prepared at preliminary hearing. Previously if it wasn’t prepared, no one 
would have bothered with the s.275 application in advance and sought to 
postpone the trial in advance. If there was no trial, there was no need for the 
s.275 application. Following the High Court reforms, there is a mindset now 
that bits of paper are everything and one is completing a preliminary hearing 
form for the court. It will ask if there are to be any s.275 applications; it would 
be unusual to say yes there are but we’re not sending it in at the moment. And 
it’s almost a waste of resources of applications going in almost in skeletal 
form because the information is not there, simply so as the diet can be 
continued until all the information is available. And that is unnecessary.” 
(Defence 4)  
 
“Additional applications become necessary if further information becomes 
available. Obviously in a trial situation you have got all the information to 
hand then but if its being addressed in advance that’s not the case.  It’s maybe 
a little artificial, you know, what we are doing just now, doing it in advance.” 
(Defence 3) 
 
5.53 Some Judges spoke of the practice of continuing preliminary hearings across more 
than one pre-trial diet in order to allow more time for applications to be made in advance of 
the trial, and deferring decisions about applications to the trial, as related issues. Judge 2 
thought both stemmed from the general unwillingness of Judges to make decisions about the 
admissibility of evidence outside of the context of the trial:   
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“Deciding admissibility of evidence in advance of a trial is a relatively alien 
concept. … We’re asking to decide matters of relevancy … in a vacuum; 
that’s a problem for us. No question that that’s a difficulty for us. That’s not to 
say that the thing should not be dealt with in advance.  …I think the idea that 
these things are dealt with in advance is a laudable one. … I know that a 
number of Counsel [ask] that these matters be continued to the trial diet and I 
know that a lot of my colleagues do that as … that as I understand it is 
contrary to the spirit of the Act. It is not what is intended. … I think you’ll 
find that it’s not infrequent for all sorts of different applications to be 
repeatedly continued from one preliminary hearing to another.” (Judge 2). 
 
5.55 Judge 4 had adopted a practical strategy which sought to address the difficulty of 
judging the admissibility of evidence prior to the context of the trial in which the detail of 
evidence unfolds.  This Judge routinely read interview statements in advance of the trial, 
particularly police interviews with the complainer and the accused which were likely to flag 
up issues that might fall under the legislation and be the subject of applications. He was of the 
view that written applications assist in understanding beforehand the limits of the issue, 
because otherwise the Judge wouldn’t know the scope of the material that the Defence sought 
to introduce: 
 
“A lot of it will be in statements that they have rather than in anything that's 
lodged in court.  The most that the court really ever, I would think, has a 
notion of beforehand is stuff that's in the Statement made by the accused to 
the police. … I think so far as Interview Statements in sexual offences cases, 
particularly rapes, I think most Judges do read those in advance.  Because that 
can help the Judge identify whether there is a risk of a prohibition being 
broken, because the responsibility is on the Judge.   …I do always read the 
Interview Statements in those kind of cases, because I think that's the only 
way I can tell in advance if there might be an issue.  And sometimes the 
Crown and the Defence don't pick them up.  Sometimes the Crown, 
particularly, are a bit relaxed about it, or perhaps just haven't taken enough 
care in looking through it.  And you suddenly read something and you think 
you can't possibly allow that.“ (Judge 4). 
 
5.56 Judge 3 was also concerned by the practice of continuing preliminary hearings across 
several pre-trial diets but saw this in terms of Judges responding to pressure from Defence 
Counsel for more time to prepare or consider whether to submit an application.  He thought 
that the provisions caused both parties to give more detailed consideration as to what 
evidence could be elicited about the complainer’s behaviour and character, from the 
complainer, the accused and, possibly, other witnesses in the case. Requests for continuations 
of preliminary hearings because the parties are not yet in a position to decide whether they 
are going to lodge an application, can have the unwelcome practical effect of delaying the 
start of a trial.     
 
5.57 It seems unlikely that a Judge would allow hearings to be continued knowing that the 
Defence was conducting enquiries simply hoping to find sexual history or “bad character” 
evidence rather than having any specific reason for pursuing a line of enquiry.  However, 
some Defence practitioners reported variation in the closeness of questioning by Judges about 
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the nature of their enquiries and suggested that they were, on occasions, conducting general 
enquiries in the hope of finding something rather than following a specific line of enquiry.   
 
5.58 In Chapter Four it was noted that some Advocates Depute were concerned about the 
practice of some Defence Counsel attempting to obtain past medical records or social work 
records of complainer’s in sexual offence cases, as part of a “fishing expedition” to uncover 
character evidence that may inform a  s.275 application:  
 
“What's happening, and this troubles me very greatly, is that some Counsel 
more than others are very keen to have access to the medical records of the 
victim and the social work records of the victim.  … But it means that 
whereas I refuse absolutely to use the Crown's powers to seize social work or 
medical records, unless I actually need them to prove the case, and insist that 
they make an application to the court to recover these records so that the 
process is intimated to the complainer who can vindicate her position, and 
make the Judge take a decision.”  (AD 1).  
 
5.59 While Judge 2 spoke against the practice of deferring decisions about an application 
to the trial, Judge 3 believed that matters were best left to the trial Judge if issues which 
would have to be revisited during the trial were involved. When asked to elaborate, Judge 3 
referred to contested issues that would continue to “rumble on” or evidence involving events 
taking place within the hours leading up to the time of the alleged offence where excluding 
the prohibited evidence might cause difficulties with respect to admissible evidence:  
 
“. … in that event I think I would incline to the view that it’s better to leave it 
to the trial Judge.  And a lot may also depend on the attitude of the parties, 
you know. If they consent that it should be dealt with now or if they consent 
that it should be granted now that’s one thing.  If they are vehemently, if one 
side is vehemently opposing the other side then and you can see the issue 
rumbling on then I think I would, in that event be more inclined to defer it.” 
(Judge 3) 
 
WEIGHING RELEVANCE AND PREJUDICE 
 
5.60 As the application cases indicate, there was some variation in the extent to which 
Judges questioned the parties making applications about the factual basis for the application.  
This has some bearing on Judges’ views about weighing the probative value and relevance of 
evidence to the key issues in the case against the possible prejudice that it might cause to the 
proper administration of justice, including harm to the privacy and dignity of the complainer.   
 
5.61 The interviews with Judges were informative in this regard. Judge 3 was not inclined 
to question the nature of the evidence underpinning an application, but rather suggested that 
if evidence is relevant, then there is typically little room for its exclusion, even if the 
probative value is weak. 
 
“You can only proceed upon the basis that the Defence have, are in a position 
to elicit evidence of the factual matters set out in the application. And if they 
are in a position to elicit that evidence then you must proceed on the basis that 
the, a jury could accept the evidence as being credible and reliable evidence. 
Or at least evidence which causes them to have a reasonable doubt.  … if you 
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thought about it yourself you might take a view that it is extremely unlikely 
that a jury would believe that evidence.  But your own personal view as to 
credibility and reliability of it, I don’t think would really come into it very 
much.  It’s more, its relationship to the, to the, the allegations and the charge 
and proximity and time obviously being a relevant consideration. And you’ve 
just got to go through the statutory scheme that’s played out.” (Judge 3) 
 
5.62 Indeed, Judges generally had difficulty imagining situations in which the need to 
protect the dignity and privacy of the complainer would result in evidence of some relevance 
being excluded. Judge 1 noted that it was always going to be better to give the accused 
leeway even if it means embarrassing and upsetting the witness.  Judge 4 thought that if the 
evidence was relevant to the reliability or credibility of the complainer then it was almost 
impossible to exclude that evidence.  This was partly because of this Judge’s reading of what 
he referred to as “the slight dichotomy” between the restrictions under s.274 and the 
exceptions to those restrictions under s.275 of the legislation. In particular, he thought that 
s.274 (1) (c)31 was very wide, potentially “covering everything:”  
 
“ And then you go to the provisions of s.275 it says “the court is satisfied that 
the question will relate only to specific occurrences demonstrating the 
complainer's character or any condition or disposition to which the complainer 
is or has been subject, the occurrence or those occurrences are relevant to 
establish whether the accused is guilty of the offence with which he's charged, 
and the probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted or elicited is 
significantly likely to outweigh any prejudice.” … So once you've got 
something relating to the question of whether she's a credible and reliable 
witness I suppose on one view means that automatically the probative value of 
it is significant and likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper 
administration of justice.”  (Judge 4)  
 
5.63 Note, however, that whilst most maintained that credibility is central to probative 
value, Judges did not generally accept that any issue of relevance to the complainer’s 
credibility and reliability should be admitted: 
 
“I’d be disappointed in myself if I’d took the view that every fact in a life’s 
occurrence that could have some bearing on complainer’s credibility required 
to be admitted.  That, I would have thought, to hold that view I think would be 
difficult to reconcile with the proper construction of s.275 (1) (c).” (Judge 3) 
 
5.64 Judge 3 went on to complain that this aspect of the legislation was particularly and 
unnecessarily complicated and difficult to interpret, observing that “it’s the sort of legislation 
where you have to go right back to the detail of it every time there is a contested application.  
And in particular you have to go to the definition of a proper administration of justice.”  
 
5.65 Judge 4 also thought this part of the legislation was problematic and may be drafted in 
such a way as to contain a contradiction between sections s.274 and s.275 as noted above.  
 
                                                 
31 s.274(1) (c) prohibits evidence which shows or tends to show that the complainer has, at any time, (other than 
shortly before, at the same time as or as shortly after the acts which form part of the  subject matter of the 
charge), engaged in such behaviour, as might found the inference that  the complainer (i) is likely to have 
consented to those acts; or (ii) is not a credible or reliable witness. 
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The relevance of a past sexual relationship between complainer and accused 
5.66 All of the Judges interviewed would allow an application to establish a past sexual 
relationship between a complainer and an accused, accepting that this would normally be 
relevant background context that the jury would need to be able to understand the events. As 
Judge 1 put it, “in order to explain the reality or context of the whole transaction you have to 
go into some history. It would be ridiculous to keep that from the jury.”  When specifically 
asked whether evidence of a single sexual encounter a year or more ago should be admitted, 
most Judges thought there was some possible relevance.  Judge 1, for example went on to 
suggest that “possibly the significance of the accused putting a hand on shoulder or arm round 
waist would be different. The jury needs to know to have context.”  
 
5.67 The possible relevance of the evidence to an honest belief in consent was 
spontaneously raised by Judge 4: 
 
“I think it could be relevant to the question of whether he had a genuine 
belief, an honest belief rather in consent.  Because on one view of it you think 
“well what relevance can that possibly have”?  But because these things are so 
much a matter of degree, yes you could say if it's a situation where they 
haven't seen each other during that period, it could go either way. If, since that 
time they had seen each other regularly and there had not been any further 
sexual encounters, then it might be less influential in forming a view that there 
might be consent.  Whereas, if they hadn't seen each other for a year and on 
the last time there had been a sexual encounter, then it might be more likely to 
lead to the belief.  I think it would be quite difficult for that to be kept out.” 
(Judge 4) 
 
5.68 Whilst some Judges stated that they would seek to limit questions or evidence, others 
added additional qualifications, for example, the need to check whether or not the issue was a 
matter of dispute between the Defence and the Crown, with greater wariness if it was 
disputed. Some would be less inclined to admit evidence that was many years previously. 
 
5.69 Defence practitioners also maintained that previous sexual relations between the 
complainer and accused would almost always be relevant in a sexual offence case, as it is 
demonstrative of a predisposition to engage in sexual behaviour in the future. 
   
“I think in order to give the jury a picture that these are people that have had a 
relationship, and are not just people who have just met on a first date; it’s 
going to always be relevant because of the nature of the offence. It’s about 
human interaction, and if they don’t have that information to base what’s 
going on in a specific incident, then they’re not getting the full picture.” 
(Defence 1). 
  
5.70 However, some Defence practitioners were not optimistic that evidence about a single 
episode a number of years before would be allowed by the court, although they would be 
inclined to put in into an application. 
  
5.71 Advocates Depute varied in their attitude to past sexual history between the 
complainer and the accused with some agreeing that it had some relevance and some denying 
this position. For example, AD 1 saw no relevance in a previous sexual encounter between a 
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complainer and an accused a year previously, whereas AD 4 was more inclined to the view 
that this was relevant. 
 
“In deciding the Lord Advocate's reference on rape, …  the then Lord Justice 
General said explicitly, that a women is entitled to consent or not consent at 
any time, and her position may change differently from man to man, or with 
the same man from time to time.  That's got to be right.  So why does the fact 
that she was willing to have intercourse with him a year ago make a 
difference. …. I find it very difficult to see how leading evidence of previous 
sexual conduct actually bears on the question of whether or not there was 
consent on this occasion.” (AD 1) 
 
“It’s a difficult one because without any evidence of history then from a jury 
point of view these 2 are strangers and that might not accurately reflect what 
the situation was but of course the fact that they are not strangers doesn’t 
mean there is some licence to have intercourse and that’s why it would need 
to be very recent, it would need to be really part of a relationship almost as a 
course of conduct, an encounter a year before on a single occasion because 
they met after a disco or something and then something a year later I don’t see 
as being relevant at all and wouldn’t agree to that.” (AD 4) 
 
The relevance of sexual behaviour between the complainer and third parties 
5.72 On the issue of sexual behaviour with third parties, that is someone other than the 
accused, Judges gave examples of evidence that they would exclude and some that they 
would include. Sexual intercourse with a third party at the same time and place as the alleged 
incident was the most common example of evidence that should be admitted, but then it was 
generally acknowledged that this would not need a  s.275 application because it would be 
allowed by the wording of the provision at s.274 (1) (c) .  
 
5.73 Judge 3 further extended admissibility from the same place and time to include events 
leading up to the incident that were close in place and time:  
 
“If you had a party and there was, it was going on for several hours and there 
was clear evidence that the complainer had been consent[ing] to have sex with 
various other people in other rooms and then I think in that event you would 
envisage it would be admitted.” (Judge 3) 
 
5.74 However, Judge 4 and Judge 2 would agree in excluding the following: 
 
“If there’s an allegation of rape happening in someone’s flat and it’s a rape by 
“A” and there’s evidence or the proposed line is that she had sex with “B” in 
the pub an hour before, I would disallow that as wholly irrelevant. So what? 
Because that is exactly the kind of situation which, it’s purely prejudicial 
material. It has no bearing on her credibility, the fact that she chooses to have 
sex with someone else an hour, a day, 2 days, a week, a month. I have 
disallowed that type of evidence.” (Judge 2) 
 
5.75 Defence practitioners interviewed considered that applications to introduce sexual 
history evidence with someone other than the accused were rare and would be considered 
irrelevant by the court unless, as Defence 3 put it, “you were to have a situation where a 
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complainer was absolutely, outrageously promiscuous, you really can't from a practical point 
of view see how it's ever going to rear its head.”  
 
5.76 Sexual behaviour between the complainer and someone other than the accused was 
considered relevant by Defence in those circumstances where the sexual behaviour took place 
close in time to the alleged incident. 
 
Excluding general character evidence  
5.77 In Chapter Four, it was stated that evidence or questioning concerning the character of 
the complainer was sought in approximately one quarter of cases. Most commonly, the 
character evidence related to the complainer’s (alleged) mental instability, dishonesty 
(including past unproven allegations of sexual assault), or use of alcohol or drugs in the past 
and/or at, or around the time of the alleged offence. 
 
5.78 On the issue of excluding character evidence, several Judges returned to the point that 
general character evidence was always largely excluded by existing law, and the 2002 Act 
widened the restrictions on evidence unnecessarily.  This view was shared by most Advocates 
Depute and Defence practitioners interviewed. Consequently, they did not view the 2002 
legislation as improving on the existing legal situation in this respect.   
 
5.79 As far as Judges were concerned, the most pertinent form of relevant and therefore 
admissible character evidence identified was dishonesty on the part of the complainer and, in 
particular, previous unproven allegations of rape.  
 
5.80 Yet some Defence practitioners believed that Judges would not easily admit such 
evidence. As Defence 3 said: 
 
“I've seen applications going in and people trying to argue them in which 
somebody said, “She's claimed she's been raped before”, and I think that's 
extremely weak and judges have always seen through them and said, “So 
what?” because it's a ludicrous argument that that means that the second 
allegation must be false, or something like that.” (Defence 3)  
 
5.81 Judge 1 cited a different kind of example of evidence of dishonesty in reporting 
sexual behaviour, recalling an s.275 application to lead evidence that the complainer had 
gone to the accused’s flat and engaged in intimate sexual conduct which she had denied to the 
police because she didn’t want to get somebody into trouble, and then changed her story. The 
Judge noted that the important thing was her dishonesty about the sexual behaviour, and not 
the sexual behaviour itself.   
 
5.82 The same Judge gave another example of dishonesty becoming relevant evidence 
because it was cited as a motive for an unproven allegation, referring to a case in which it 
was alleged the complainer had made an allegation of rape to elicit sympathy in a situation in 
which she had been the subject of an allegation of theft.   
 
5.83 Judges typically had no difficulty in imagining forms of dishonesty that would not be 
relevant and did not generally take the view that simply anything which had a bearing on the 
credibility of the complainer was of relevance. For example, Judge 1 noted that he or she 
would not allow questioning to show that a complainer lied, saying: “I’m just going to my 
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friend’s” when in fact she was going to a night club. However, Judge 4 thought there was 
some lack of clarity in the legislation with respect to this issue.  
 
Comparison with the baseline study 
5.84 It is possible to use the baseline study to compare the dialogue around applications 
before and after the legislation, in order to further consider whether the 2002 legislation has 
refocused discussion.  This is done here by looking at attempts to introduce similar sorts of 
sexual character evidence in applications before and after the 2002 legislation.  Three similar 
cases are discussed:  2 from the baseline study and one from the current study. A fuller 
description of each is given in Appendix Five. These are all cases involving rape (and/or, in 
the earlier period, clandestine injury) and attempted rape in which the Defence claimed that 
whatever had happened was consensual and sought to introduce evidence about the 
complainer’s sexual behaviour which blended into claims about her sexual character.   
 
5.85 Case 1110 is an example from the baseline study, in which the Crown accepted the 
arguments of the Defence who sought to introduce questioning about the complainer about 
alleged incidents involving “naked dancing” witnessed by someone other than the accused, 
and her “offers of oral sex.” The Defence suggested that this demonstrated the complainer’s 
propensity to “promiscuously consent to sex” and that she was not a credible witness. The 
Judge allowed the questioning after a short dialogue with the Defence.  
 
5.86 In a second baseline case, 1202, involving an application to introduce a similar sort of 
proposed evidence, of alleged “exhibitionist, sexually provocative behaviour”, the Crown did 
object arguing that the Defence were seeking to put evidence before the jury of sexual 
occasions which were prejudicial to the complainer and had little bearing on the night of the 
alleged offence. Although the Judge permitted some of the proposed questioning, other 
aspects were disallowed, and restrictions were placed on the questioning.   
 
5.87 The most similar case among the sample of cases studied in depth post 2002 was case 
121 in which the Defence sought to establish that the complainer had “a practice of making 
sexual advances to others when she had been drinking.”  The Advocate Depute argued that 
this line by the Defence was against the purpose of the legislation and was a general attempt 
to undermine the complainer’s credibility without showing relevance to the charge. The 
Judge was similarly not satisfied that the proposed evidence was relevant to establishing guilt 
nor was he satisfied that the probative value of the evidence was likely to outweigh any risk 
of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.  The Judge made explicit reference to “the 
need to protect the complainer’s privacy and dignity and to ensure that the facts and 
circumstances put before the jury are commensurate to the importance of the issue of the 
jury’s verdict.”   
 
5.88 This comparison suggests that it may be that the way in which the new legislation 
orients the discussion during an application makes the introduction of sexual character 
evidence more difficult to argue and more likely to be opposed by the Crown.    
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
5.89 While the written nature and required format of s.275 applications rendered them 
much more transparent than applications under the previous legislation, prior agreement 
between the parties typically meant relatively little discussion of any aspect of s.275 
applications at preliminary hearings.   
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5.90 Advocates Depute tend to take a neutral view on Defence s.275 applications, and the 
majority of applications to introduce sexual history and character evidence were not opposed 
by either party. 
 
5.91 Where s.275 applications were opposed by the Crown, this was most often in relation 
to general character evidence and in particular to allegations of dishonesty on the part of the 
complainer. Judges revealed that they considered the most relevant form of dishonesty 
admissible to be previous “false allegations” of rape on the part of the complainer. Some 
examples were also found of Advocates Depute challenging aspects of applications that were 
poorly specified. 
 
5.92  S.275 applications by the Crown were less common, typically unopposed by the 
Defence and accepted by the court. However, the 4 Crown only application cases included 
one in which the Defence objected to a Crown application as a potentially damaging 
exploration of a complainer’s private sexual habits, a view upheld by the court which refused 
the application.   
 
5.93 Some Judges were clear that it was their duty to ensure that the legislation was 
observed and would pay very careful attention to the wording of the legislation when 
deciding a s.275 application. However, by their own admission, Judges were also more likely 
to restrict or disallow Defence applications where the Advocate Depute opposed.  Some 
Judges also said they would refuse Defence applications whether or not the Crown objected, 
particularly those that were poorly specified or of weak relevance. However, some Judges 
said the position of the Crown was decisive. One indicated that the threat of appeal denied the 
Judge the ability to effectively object to Defence applications unopposed by the Crown.  
 
5.94 Two Judges described the drafting of the legislation as unnecessarily complicated and 
detailed, rendering some sections, in particular the need to take account of the “proper 
administration of justice”, rather difficult to interpret.  
 
5.95 Examination of s.275 applications and interviews revealed that there was often a 
shared presumption of relevance by Crown and Defence and, arguably Judges, concerning 
sexual history evidence, particularly where there was a past history between the complainer 
and accused.  All Judges interviewed would allow evidence to establish a past sexual 
relationship between a complainer and an accused, accepting that this would normally be 
relevant background context that the jury would need to understand the events. 
 
5.96 Most applications were decided at one preliminary hearing, although several were 
continued to subsequent hearings before a final decision. Continuations were for 2 main 
reasons: when it was not possible to have a full discussion due to lack of time or 
unavailability of relevant information; or where an applicant was trying again at a subsequent 
hearing or at the trial itself after an application had been partially or entirely refused by the 
court.  
 
5.97 The Judge at preliminary hearings is rarely the same as the trial Judge and, moreover, 
different Advocates Depute can be involved at different points in the process. Defence 
practitioners were the most likely to refer to the disadvantages of applications being decided 
in advance of a trial.  
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5.98 On the issue of excluding general and sexual character evidence, interviewees 
emphasised that general character evidence was always largely excluded by law, and 
considered the widening of the restrictions unnecessary in this regard.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  S.275 APPLICATIONS AND PREVIOUS 
CONVICTIONS OF THE ACCUSED 
 
6.1  This Chapter addresses one of the key research objectives, that is, to establish the 
extent to which previous convictions of the accused are disclosed, the circumstances under 
which they are disclosed and any impact this has on proceedings. 
6.2 Information about any previous convictions of the accused is normally withheld from 
the jury, as it is considered prejudicial. Under section 270 of the 1995 Act, where the 
character of the prosecutor, the complainer or any other witness for the prosecutor is attacked, 
it was open to the Prosecution to retaliate by attacking the character of the accused. Where 
the Defence sought to undermine the credibility of the witness by attacking her character or 
sexual morals, it would be open to the Crown to apply to the court to examine the accused as 
to his own character and reveal his own previous convictions, if he has any, to the jury. In 
practice this did not appear to happen to any great extent (Burman et al, 2005).  
6.3 Redressing the Balance (2000) argued that it is difficult to distinguish the logic of a 
Defence argument that, because the complainer has slept with other men in the past, or has 
engaged with the accused in sexual behaviour in the past, she is more likely to have 
consented on the occasion in question, from the logic of saying that if the accused has 
committed a sexual offence in the past, then he is likely to have done so on the occasion of 
the index charge. It was therefore proposed that where an application to admit evidence about 
the complainer’s sexual history or character is granted, there should be an automatic 
disclosure of any convictions which the accused has for sexual offences within the offence 
categories covered by the legislation:  
“Where the accused does have such previous convictions, he will therefore be 
aware that seeking to attack the character of the witness is going to result in 
disclosure of his previous convictions. Clearly where he had no previous 
convictions he would have nothing to fear (2000: 10) “ 
6.4 Chapter One described how under sections 275A (1) and (2) of the 2002 Act, where 
the Defence, following a s.275 application, does succeed in convincing the court that 
character or sexual history evidence should be introduced, the Judge and Prosecution are no 
longer prohibited from asking questions relating to offences other than the one with which the 
accused is charged.   
6.5 Following a successful s.275 application by the Defence, and unless the accused 
objects, the Crown is required to place any relevant previous convictions of the accused 
before the judge. Once the relevant convictions are before the judge, they will automatically 
be admitted as part of the evidence in the case and disclosed to the jury, unless the accused 
objects. The various grounds for objecting are set out at s.275 (4). An accused may object on 
the basis that: the offence did not involve a substantial sexual element; that disclosure would 
be contrary to the interests of justice; or that the conviction did not relate to the accused.  
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6.6 Relevant convictions include a conviction for an offence to which section 288C of the 
2002 Act applies,32 or where a substantial sexual element was present in the commission of 
any other offence of which the accused has been convicted. These convictions will then 
automatically be admitted as part of the evidence in the case and disclosed to the Judge and, 
potentially, to the jury. Where s.275 applications are made by the Crown, then the 
requirement to disclose previous convictions does not apply.   
 
NO DISCLOSURE 
 
6.7 There was no information in any of the available data sources to indicate that an 
accused’s previous convictions had ever been disclosed as a result of a s.275 application by 
the Defence, but it was unclear whether this was because such disclosure had never occurred, 
or it had simply not been recorded in the data sources to which the research team had access.  
 
6.8 To check this out further, information about the presence or absence of previous 
convictions of the accused was obtained from the Sitting Papers at the Justiciary Office in 
Edinburgh High Court (this information is not available from the High Court Case 
Management System).33 
 
6.9 Within the total sample of 231 mapped sexual offence cases, all of the 162 cases 
which include at least one charge of rape, were examined for the presence of previous 
convictions. In 14 of these cases, no information to confirm whether the accused had previous 
convictions was available. The information presented in this chapter is based on the 148 cases 
where relevant information about previous convictions was available. 
 
6.10 Case Sitting Papers were used to confirm whether the accused had previous 
convictions in relation to the following categories of cases: 
• Rape cases with  s.275 applications made by the Crown only; 
• Rape cases with s.275 applications made by the Defence alone, and by both the 
Defence and Crown; and   
• Rape cases without s.275 applications. 
 
6.11 Table 6.1 shows the presence or absence of previous convictions in the mapped rape 
cases.  It can be seen that whilst in 93 of the 162 cases, the accused had some sort of previous 
conviction: this was for a sexual crime in just 20 cases (or 12%). In 55 cases, the accused had 
                                                 
32 Section 288C applies to the following sexual offences: rape; sodomy; abduction of a woman or girl with intent 
to rape; assault with intent to rape; indecent assault; indecent behaviour (including any lewd, indecent or 
libidinous practice or behaviour); an offence under section 106(1)(a) or 107 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 
1984 (c.36) (unlawful sexual intercourse with mentally handicapped female or with patient); an offence under 
ss. 1,2,3,5,67(2) and (3), 8, 10 and 13(5) (b) or (c) of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 
(c.39) 
33 In the initial sweep of data collection, the Books of Adjournal (BOA) were used as the primary data source. 
However, the individual case Sitting Papers were the only reliable data source available to us about previous 
convictions since the BOA only provided information in some cases. Information about previous convictions of 
the accused was found in the papers titled the ‘History of the Accused’, which stated whether the accused had 
previous convictions, allowing this information to be positively identified, rather than relying on finding an 
actual schedule of previous convictions in the BOA.  Some papers had been removed from the BOA (for 
example, because they were required for appeal proceedings).  Further information about the existence and 
nature of any previous convictions can also be found in Social Enquiry Reports pertaining to the accused.  The 
level of information available in Social Enquiry Reports, however, can vary. 
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no previous convictions, and in 14 cases it was not known whether there were any previous 
convictions. 
 
Table 6.1 Previous convictions of accused in rape cases with and without s.275 
applications (June 2004 to May 2005) mapped cases  
 
Status regarding 
Previous 
Convictions 
Cases without 
s.275 
application 
Cases with 
Crown only 
applications  
Cases with 
Defence 
applications** 
All Rape 
cases 
n            % 
Analogous 9 4 7 20 12 
Non-analogous 36 0 37  73 45 
None  32 2 21 55 34 
Unknown 2 1 11 14 9 
Total cases 79 7 76 162 100 
** Includes cases with Defence only s.275 applications, and cases with both Crown & Defence s.275 
applications. 
 
6.12 Of the total of 20 rape cases where the accused had an analogous previous conviction, 
an application was made by the Defence in 7 cases, and in 4 cases the s.275 application was 
made by the Crown alone.  In the remaining 9 cases where the accused had an analogous 
previous conviction there was no s.275 application made by either party.  
 
6.13 Forty nine of the 162 rape cases did not proceed to trial, as Table 6.2 shows, and a 
quarter of the 20 rape cases where the accused had an analogous previous conviction did not 
proceed to trial.  Although the numbers are extremely small and should therefore be treated 
with caution, this does tentatively suggest that cases where the accused had an analogous 
previous conviction were less likely to result in a guilty plea than rape cases where the 
accused had non-analogous or no previous convictions. This is interesting in that, during 
fieldwork, it was informally suggested by those involved in cases where the 2002 Act would 
potentially apply, that the possibility of disclosure of previous convictions might be a factor 
in deciding to plead guilty.  
 
Table 6.2 Previous convictions in cases which do, and do not proceed to trial (June 2004 
to May 2005)  
 
Status of previous 
convictions 
Guilty/ mixed 
plea (no trial) 
Not guilty/ mixed plea 
(going to trial) Other 
(a) All rape cases 
Analogous 5 12 3 20 
Non-analogous 23 46 4 73 
None  21 32 2 55 
Unknown* 0 12 2 14 
Total cases 49 102 11 162 
(a) Includes cases that were deserted pro loco et tempore, and non-appearance by the accused 
 
Previous convictions and Crown only s.275 applications 
6.14 It has already been established that cases in which the Crown only make applications 
are rare;34 just 7 out of the 162 mapped rape cases involved Crown only applications.  With 
the caveat that numbers are very small here, the research nevertheless found that a relatively 
                                                 
34 In all of the mapped cases, there were just 11 Crown only 275 application cases.  
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high proportion of Crown only applications (i.e. 4 out of the 7) involve previous analogous 
convictions on the part of the accused.  
 
6.15 One of the 4 cases (209) formed part of the sample for more detailed analysis, and 
was transcribed.  The following extract is from the preliminary hearing where the application 
was discussed, and suggests that the Crown offered to lodge an application in order to allow 
certain evidence to be introduced at the trial:   
 
Defence: “...in order to place that evidence before the jury, there has to be a 
s.275 application. And this was discussed with the Crown and with a view to 
ensuring a fair trial the Crown very helpfully and properly offered to present 
the s.275 minute themselves because for us to present the s.275 minute has 
certain consequences and penalties at this stage which the Crown do not face.” 
(case 209)  
 
6.16 This raises the question of whether the Defence might seek to avoid the penalty of 
lodging an s.275 application by negotiation over the lodging of a Crown s.275 application to 
introduce similar questioning or evidence to that which the Defence would otherwise seek to 
introduce. However, no practitioner interviewed fully endorsed the view that this was likely 
to become a common practice. Defence 1 refers to pre-trial discussion with the Crown but 
does not say anything to indicate pre-trial negotiation designed to avoid the penalty of 
disclosure.  
 
 Researcher: “You’d discuss the substantive contents of the s.275 application [with  
 the Crown]?” 
 
Defence: “Yes, and obviously if the Crown are going to make an application, 
if you’ve identified something for example in the transcript, then you might 
say “ is the Crown’s position that they’re going to make the application?” in 
which case you might not need to do yours.” (Defence 1) 
 
6.17 Defence 3 expressed clear doubts: 
  
“I’ve never come across a situation where that has happened in practice and I 
think it’s perhaps unlikely that it would in some ways because I think Crown 
application, as I’ll come on to, are a wee bit rare and seldom go as far as the 
Defence would want them to.” (Defence 3)  
 
Previous convictions and s.275 applications made by the Defence 
6.18 In 3 of the 7 rape cases where the Defence made a s.275 application, it was allowed 
either in full or partially, and the case went to trial. From the available information (case 
minutes for all 3 cases, and a transcript for one case), there was no evidence to indicate that 
the analogous previous convictions were placed before the judge, or the jury, as the 
legislation intended. 
 
6.19 In the first case (044, one of the transcribed trials) which involved a single rape 
charge and the submission of s.275 applications by both the Defence and the Crown, both 
applications were allowed in full. The previous conviction in this case related to s.4(1) of the 
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 1976 (sexual intercourse with a girl of or above 13 years and 
under 16 years). The preliminary hearing dealt only with the Crown application, as the 
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Defence at that stage had not lodged an application. At the preliminary hearing, following a 
question from the court as to whether there was an intention to make an application, the 
Defence referred to the potential for the accused’s previous convictions to be disclosed as a 
reason for not doing so, although the court was not convinced that a s.275 application was 
necessary:  
 
Judge: “It’s perhaps possible that the matter you are addressing is actually not 
excluded by virtue of s.274 (1)(c).” 
 
Defence: “well, that certainly would be the basis upon which I would be 
proceeding because, as [judge] well knows, had I or those instructing me 
made an application and that application succeeded, then that has 
consequential difficulties in terms of previous convictions.” 
 
Judge: “Yes.” 
 
Defence: “It is for that reason that clearly much thought has to be given to 
these things but with respect, I share [judges’] view that that kind of evidence 
may well be allowed in another way.” 
 
Judge: “Yes, given the likelihood of the material remaining there for any 
length of time it would appear to be something that might well be not 
excluded by s.274(1c), so no doubt you could approach it on that basis at the 
trial.” 
 
Defence: “Indeed, I just in fact flagged that up in fairness to the Crown.  In 
fact I’ve spoken to the learned depute who is doing the trial.  I have raised this 
matter with him and I think possibly during the trial we can reach an 
accommodation.” (Case 044) 
 
6.20 However, the Defence did go on to submit a s.275 application at the commencement 
of the trial (under “special cause shown”) which was allowed in full.  There was no evidence 
in the transcript of the trial or the case minutes to show that the accused’s previous analogous 
convictions were disclosed, or raised in any way, other than the reference made by the 
Defence in the excerpt above. The verdict was not proven.  
 
6.21 In the second case (205), which involved a charge of rape along with one other (non-
sexual) charge, a previous conviction for rape was listed in the schedule in the case Sitting 
Papers.  From the case minutes, it seems that the previous conviction of the accused was 
raised only when the Advocate Depute moved for sentence after the jury had reached their 
verdict.  At an earlier stage in proceedings, there was a Defence motion to desert the case 
since a tape of the accused’s interview with the police was played to the jury, wherein the 
accused refers to having been in prison.  The Crown did not object to this, the first jury was 
discharged and the trial went ahead before a second jury. In this case, it should be noted that 
the offence which resulted in the previous conviction for rape, occurred after the offences 
listed on the current indictment.  
 
6.22 In the third case, with a successful s.275 application made by the Defence (136), there 
was no reference in the minutes to the accused’s convictions relating to rape, lewd and 
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libidinous practices and behaviour, and unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl between 13 
years and 16 years, being raised in the case. The verdict in this trial was not guilty.  
 
6.23 There was a fourth case (084) which involved rape along with several other charges, 
and the Defence application was allowed in full. However, whilst the lengthy schedule of 
previous convictions included “Assault: agg: sexual”, this took place when the accused was a 
juvenile and was dealt with by the Children Hearing System, which imposed a supervision 
requirement. This would not count as an analogous previous conviction. The verdict was not 
guilty.  
 
Crown discretion? 
6.24 One reason why the relevant previous convictions were not disclosed in these cases 
may be that some discretion was used concerning such disclosure, as the following extracts 
indicate:  
 
“Sometimes the s.274/5 you need the evidence in, you need to make these 
questions, so you would approach the Crown and ask them if they would 
withhold. I know it says shall disclose rather than may, but sometimes the 
Crown are quite reasonable.” (Defence 5)  
 
“An awful lot of the job we do and Judges do is obviously a question of 
balance at all stages and I would have thought it would only be the most 
extreme cases that the Crown would seek to go about trying to get previous 
convictions in.” (Defence 2)  
 
Impact of disclosure of past analogous convictions on proceedings in sexual offence 
trials  
6.25 On the basis of these findings, it seems unlikely that the prospect of having to disclose 
analogous convictions following a successful s.275 application by the Defence to introduce 
sexual history or character evidence, might prompt the accused to consider pleading guilty in 
advance of trial, despite the fact that this was a common impression relayed informally to us 
by legal practitioners during fieldwork periods in the courts.  Interviewees spoke about the 
general unwillingness of those accused of rape to consider pleading guilty in advance of trial. 
This can be summed up by the following:   
 
“… I don’t think the legislation has absolutely any effect as to whether an 
accused will plead or not – it’s very difficult. I’m thinking specifically at the 
moment of rape cases and especially ones where consent is an issue; that’s 
usually something that has to go to trial. If consent is an issue, it’s just simply 
not going to happen that the accused is going to plead.” (Defence 1)  
 
6.26 It is very difficult to gauge the effect of the requirement to disclose analogous 
previous convictions on proceedings when, first, so few cases where the accused had 
analogous previous convictions and which involved a s.275 application by the Defence were 
both successful and proceeded to trial. Second, even where such cases did proceed to trial, it 
seems as if the previous analogous convictions were not being disclosed to the Judge and jury 
in the way that the legislators intended.  Although the numbers are small, we remain sceptical 
that practice follows legislative intent.  The outcomes of various strands of legal practice 
have combined to protect the accused from having potentially damaging information 
disclosed.  
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Presence of previous convictions acting as a deterrent to making s.275 applications 
6.27 There were 9 cases where the accused had analogous previous convictions, and which 
did not involve a s.275 application by the Defence. Given that there are relatively few cases 
where applications are not made, is there a possibility that the requirement that analogous 
convictions will be disclosed following a successful Defence application deter the making of 
an application in the first place?  
 
6.28 Whilst informal discussion with legal professionals during fieldwork suggested that it 
does, when this was pursued in interviews, there was no clear consensus. Two Defence 
interviewees felt that Defence lawyers would choose “not to make” applications where there 
was a possibility that previous convictions would be disclosed to the jury. As Defence 3 said:   
 
“I think there are few cases in which people would choose to do that.  I think 
you would really have to say that the evidence that you were trying to adduce 
would have to be really in itself of huge importance to outweigh the likely 
prejudice of disclosing a previous conviction in front of a jury.” (Defence 3)  
 
6.29 This interviewee went on to say that Defence lawyers would consider previous 
convictions in front of a jury to be “pretty catastrophic”: 
“I suppose with perhaps a minor previous conviction from some time ago 
against a lengthy record for dishonesty from the complainer, or something like 
that.  It would be a balancing act but as a generality I think people would be 
very slow to do that.” (Defence 3) 
 
6.30 Similarly, none of the Judges interviewed could imagine situations where the Defence 
would be advising the accused to make a s.275 application to introduce otherwise prohibited 
evidence about the complainer where there was a risk that the past analogous convictions of 
the accused would be disclosed to the jury.  
 
6.31 However, not all interviewees believed that the risk of previous convictions being 
disclosed would have a “chilling” effect on applications. The response from Defence 2 would 
suggest that the possibility of the accused’s previous convictions being disclosed did not act 
as a deterrent to submitting a s.275 application, since the Crown were unlikely to seek to 
disclose previous convictions. He said:  
 
“It’s not been used as far as I’ve seen, as some sort of disincentive to the 
Defence. Unless the s.275 is clearly lacking, and this might be viewed as just 
an old fashioned attack on character for the sake of it, then I think then it 
would be something that the Crown would bring into play. But I think if the 
Defence is responsible in their framing of their s.275s then I think by and 
large you meet the requirements, its specifics and it’s clear that you have a 
line and there is a relevance, then the Crown are still very conscious of the 
general rules about presumption of innocence and things of that nature not 
being compromised unless it’s absolutely and utterly necessary.” (Defence 2) 
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Previous convictions in the context of domestic abuse 
6.32 In the rape cases examined for the presence of previous convictions on behalf of the 
accused, 8 rape cases were identified where the accused had a previous conviction for an 
offence which occurred in the context of domestic abuse, but which did not contain a sexual 
element. This information was obtained from the case Sitting Papers, where it was variously 
documented under “History of the Accused”, in the Social Enquiry Report prepared by a 
social worker, or in the schedule of previous convictions, although the level of background 
information available in each case varied. 
 
6.33 In 3 rape cases with a Defence application, and 2 rape cases with both a Defence and 
a Crown application, there was a previous conviction for assault, assault to injury, or assault 
to severe injury perpetrated against the partner or wife of the accused. In one rape case where 
a Defence application was submitted (and allowed in part), the previous conviction for assault 
to severe injury was against the accused’s ex-partner, who was also the complainer in the 
index offence. The verdict in this case was not guilty.  
 
6.34 In a further 3 cases with no applications made by either party, there was a conviction 
for assault in the context of domestic abuse, although it was not clear from the documentation 
whether this was against the same complainer as in the index offence. 
 
6.35 Although these are not strictly relevant previous convictions in terms of the 2002 Act, 
as they do not involve a “substantial sexual element”, they are indeed relevant in the context 
of the accused having a past history of violence against women. Prior convictions relating to 
domestic abuse on the part of the accused may be relevant in any rape or sexual assault case, 
in that they show a previous history of violence against women. Even more so where the 
history of violence evidenced through the previous convictions is against the same woman as 
in the current trial (as it was in at least one of the 8 cases identified here). This is as much a 
part of the facts of the case as the previous relationship itself.  
 
6.36 It is worth noting in this regard that Redressing the Balance sought views on whether 
previous convictions for assault could be included under the terms of the 2002 Act, on the 
basis that assault is a crime of violence and might be considered just as relevant as previous 
convictions for shameless indecency. However, in the final formulation of the 2002 Act, 
disclosure of previous convictions did not extend as far as assault.  
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
6.37  S.275A of the 2002 Act allows disclosure of the accused’s relevant previous 
convictions where the court allows questioning or evidence about the complainers past sexual 
history or character. Relevant convictions are those for sexual offences, or offences where 
there was a substantial sexual element in the commission of the offence. An accused may 
only object to relevant convictions being admitted as evidence in the case where the offence 
did not involve a substantial sexual element, the disclosure would be contrary to the interests 
of justice, or the conviction did not relate to the accused. 
 
6.38 In order to assess the extent to which previous convictions of the accused were 
disclosed, and the impact that this has on proceedings, all rape cases (n=162) over the 12 
month period studied were examined for the presence of previous convictions. In 20 cases 
(12%), the accused had an analogous previous conviction. In 7 of these a s.275 application to 
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introduce prohibited evidence was made by the Defence, 3 of which were successful. There 
was no evidence to demonstrate that relevant previous convictions of the accused had been 
placed before the court as the legislation intended. 
 
6.39 In 4 of the 7 rape cases in which an application was made by the Crown only, and not 
by the Defence, the accused had previous convictions. Although caution should be exercised 
in drawing conclusions from such a small number of cases, there is nevertheless some 
evidence from transcripts of preliminary hearings where the consequences of a Defence 
application were discussed, where it was acknowledged that submission of an application by 
the Crown allows the introduction of sexual history evidence into the trial, without the need 
for a Defence application, which could result in the accused’s relevant previous convictions 
being disclosed to the court. It should be noted, however, that this was not a view fully 
endorsed by the legal practitioners interviewed. 
 
6.40 With regard to the impact of the potential disclosure of the accused’s previous 
convictions on case proceedings, the presence of analogous previous convictions did not 
result in the accused pleading guilty as seemed to have been anticipated by some of the 
practitioners interviewed. Nor, importantly, has the possibility of disclosure of previous 
convictions had a “chilling” effect on applications. Bearing in mind the caveat about small 
numbers of cases, the data suggests that not only has this not happened, but also a range of 
practices ensure that in virtually no cases is this information introduced as intended. In sum, 
the potential disclosure of previous convictions appears to have had little impact upon case 
proceedings. This may, in part, be a reflection of the fact that previous convictions did not 
appear to have been disclosed to the court.  
 
6.41 Finally, in 8 of the rape cases, the accused had a previous conviction for assault, 
assault to injury, or assault to severe injury in the context of domestic abuse. Under the 2002 
Act, these convictions are not defined as relevant convictions since they do not involve a 
substantial sexual element. Yet the fact that the accused had prior convictions relating to 
domestic abuse is relevant in sexual offence cases, in that they show a previous history of 
violence against women. Where the past assault was perpetrated on the same woman as in the 
index offence, as it was in at least one of the 8 cases identified here, then this is surely as 
much a part of the facts of the case as the previous relationship itself.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  THE USE OF SEXUAL HISTORY AND 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL 
 
7.1  This chapter focuses on the use of sexual history and character evidence in the trial, 
following a s.275 application to do so, in order to address how the 2002 Act works in 
practice. The chapter draws on data from the 32 trials in which s.275 applications were made, 
and from interviews with legal practitioners.  
 
7.2 Primarily, the chapter considers the ways in which the evidence or questioning sought 
in applications was introduced and used in the trial and, specifically, the extent to which the 
questioning adhered to the parameters set by the court in the preliminary hearing.  It also 
examines, where appropriate, the role taken by the other party, and by the court when 
questioning or evidence strayed beyond the boundaries set for the application.  The last part 
of the chapter compares both the extent and the use of sexual history and character evidence 
introduced under the 2002 Act with that identified by the baseline study.  
 
 
INTRODUCING SEXUAL HISTORY OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE ALLOWED 
THROUGH S.275 APPLICATIONS  
 
7.3 It has already been established that a very high proportion of sexual offence trials 
contained s.275 applications and, for the most part, the evidence or questioning sought was 
allowed by the court. Interviews with Defence practitioners suggested that they tried to 
ensure that s.275 applications were as full and detailed as possible, sometimes referring to 
including everything that they might possibly wish to pursue as a “belt and braces” approach, 
although they may not ask some of the questions or pursue all of the evidence sought during 
the trial itself. Detailed examination of trial data, however, revealed that it was rare that all 
evidence allowed under s.275 applications was not pursued by the Defence at some time 
during the course of the trial, but particularly during the complainer’s cross-examination. The 
“belt and braces” approach to drafting s.275 applications therefore resulted in detailed and 
often lengthy questioning of the complainer on sexual or character matters.  
 
7.4 It was stated in Chapter Four that s.275 applications can be very detailed and lengthy. 
For example, the written application in case 172, which involved 2 charges of assault with 
intent to rape and attempted rape, listed 14 separate aspects relating to both sexual history and 
character matters under “nature of evidence or questioning sought”, all of which were 
considered relevant and allowed in full by the court:  
 
(i) That applicant and complainer formed a relationship in [date]. They lived together [soon 
after] and purchased property together;  
(ii) That the relationship was characterised by aggressive arguments especially if complainer 
had been drinking; 
(iii) That complainer frequently used illicit drugs particularly ecstasy and cocaine. On 
occasion of charge 1, complainer drank alcohol to excess and abused cocaine; 
(iv) That a physical confrontation occurred [charge 1: assault with intent to rape] which 
involved complainer slapping and scratching the applicant on face and body and kicking 
him; 
(v) That complainer denied to police that incident had any sexual element; 
(vi) That a few days after the incident complainer called the applicant and said “come and 
take me away”; 
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(vii) That on [date 2 weeks after incident in charge 1] complainer phoned applicant.  
Complainer and applicant met and had sexual intercourse; 
(viii) Thereafter for several months, complainer and applicant met once or twice a week and 
regularly had sexual intercourse in complainer’s flat, accused’s house or at hotels; 
(ix) On [date one year later] complainer asked applicant for £1000 to help pay for a flat. 
Applicant declined whereupon complainer stated “I’ve got photos to show police, maybe 
police will help me get a mortgage”; 
(x) That applicant attended a party in [place] with complainer in [following year] where 
complainer performed a “striptease” type dance directed towards the applicant; 
(xi) In early hours [same date] during phone call complainer asked applicant to meet at her 
flat; 
(xii) After arrival at the flat complainer performed a sexually suggestive dance in front of 
applicant; 
(xiii) That a physical confrontation occurred [charge 2 – attempted rape] involving the 
complainer grabbing the applicant and attempting to slap and scratch him; and 
(xiv) That since [date of charge 2] complainer has attempted to contact the applicant by phone.  
 
7.5 All evidence was pursued during the trial, in much more detail than is conveyed in the 
written application, which in turn led to a very lengthy cross-examination. For example, in 
relation to establishing (i) above, the Defence tried to show that the complainer and accused 
embarked on a sexual relationship very shortly after they first met, that they had sex very 
frequently, that they had sex in public places including parks, that they had sex in a public 
place shortly after charge one, and that throughout their relationship sex was often 
accompanied by excessive drinking and drug-taking.   
 
Breaching s.275 applications  
7.6 Of the 32 trials which included applications, approximately one half introduced some 
evidence or questioning during the trial, which had not been explicitly agreed to by the court. 
This was evidence which had been either specifically disallowed by the court, or which 
strayed over the boundaries of questioning set by the court in the preliminary hearing, and 
included the following types of occurrences:   
 
• s.275 application made by Defence and allowed by court but sexual history evidence 
introduced by Crown;  
• s.275 application made by Crown, and allowed by court but sexual history and/or 
character evidence introduced or pursued by Defence without s.275 application;  
• s.275 application allowed, but questioning strayed over the parameters set by the 
court; and,  
• s.275 application disallowed by the court, but questioning or evidence sought was 
introduced.  
 
7.7 So in some cases, this was a clear breach of the agreement reached by the court, or 
otherwise an obvious disregard for the provisions, but in other cases there was more room for 
debate. 
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OBJECTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS  
 
7.8 Following the introduction of restricted or specifically prohibited evidence, objections 
by the other party and/or interventions by the court occurred infrequently, in just 7 cases in 
all. The Crown objected in 4 cases, and the trial Judge intervened in one case. In the sixth 
case (039), notably, the Defence objected to the line of questioning pursued by the Advocate 
Depute regarding details of the complainer’s sexual history with the accused, due to a 
concern that the evidence elicited disclosed a sexual encounter between the complainer and 
accused outwith the period covered by the indictment.  Following a brief discussion in the 
absence of the jury the court allowed some limited questioning to continue. 
 
7.9 In a seventh case (188), which involved an objection from the Crown, the accused 
was the complainer’s father, and the Defence application sought to elicit evidence concerning 
the manner in which the complainer reported the abuse and on the continued contact between 
the complainer and her father following the charge. During cross-examination however, the 
Defence began to question the complainer about her “stormy” relationship with her husband 
and mother, suggesting that she had a particularly volatile and malicious personality and was 
prone to violent temper outbreaks. The Defence tried to suggest that the complainer had 
sustained a black eye in an argument with her husband, and had a major fall-out with her 
mother on the eve of her wedding. The Advocate Depute interjected at this point, alluding to 
the need for this to be argued outwith the presence of the jury. There followed some 
discussion concerning whether this constituted character evidence that required an 
application, but one was not made.  The Defence then moved on to another set of questions 
but, later during cross-examination, continued to question the complainer on the argument 
with her mother, building on the picture of her as argumentative and unpredictable. This time 
there was no objection, and the Defence continued:   
 
Defence: “Yes. I think the reason your parents didn’t attend the wedding is 
because they didn’t like [partner] and you’d fallen out with your mother.” 
 
Complainer: “Yes.  Well I fell out with my mum after the wedding not before 
it.  I was upset that she wasn’t coming to the wedding but we hadn’t fallen out 
then.” 
 
Defence: “And some days after the wedding you telephoned your mum.” 
 
Complainer: “It was the night after the wedding.” 
 
Defence: “And you were screaming at her over the phone.” 
 
Complainer: “Well the conversation was fine to begin with and ended up in an 
argument over the phone.” 
 
Defence: “You’ve got a bad temper haven’t you?” 
 
Complainer: “Not really no.” 
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Evidence or questioning sought under s.275 by Defence but introduced by the Crown  
7.10 In some cases only the Defence made an application, but sexual history evidence was 
first introduced by the Crown. In case 108, for example, an application was made by the 
Defence to question the complainer about her relationship with her boyfriend, although it was 
the Crown that commenced questioning during examination-in-chief:  
 
AD: “Now at the time back in [month /year] you’ve told the ladies and 
gentlemen you had a boyfriend.” 
 
Complainer: “Yes.” 
 
AD: “Prior to the night we’ve been talking about, when was the last time 
you’d had sexual intercourse.” 
 
Complainer: “Two, 3 maybe even 4 weeks before, not sure.” 
 
7.11 This was then picked up by the Defence during cross-examination: 
 
Defence: “I don’t mean to cause you any embarrassment but you were asked 
by [AD] about [boyfriend] and when you would have last had intercourse with 
him, and I think if I’ve noted your answer correctly you said it would have 
been between 2 and 4 weeks.”  
 
Complainer: “I think so.  I’m not sure how long it was.  I hadn’t seen him for 
a wee while before it.” 
 
Defence: “But to be clear, I just want to be clear, I’m not suggesting you’re 
lying about that, just simply asking you your recollection is that it was 2 to 4 
weeks.”  
 
7.12 In case 232, which involved 2 complainers, an application was made by the Defence, 
and sought to question the first complainer on previous allegations of abuse made against 
another person when she was younger, and a criminal injuries claim, and also sought to elicit 
contraceptive history in respect of the second complainer.  During examination-in-chief of 
the first complainer, the Advocate Depute elicited what might arguably be called “bad” 
character evidence in the context of establishing where and how she had divulged the 
previous allegation:  
 
AD: “I want to ask about your conduct as a child, were you unruly?” 
 
Complainer: “Don’t understand.” 
 
AD:  “Were you as a young person, did you misbehave, ever get drunk?” 
 
Complainer: “Yes …got drunk and that….” 
 
AD: “You were drunk on one occasion the police lifted you.” 
 
Complainer: “Yes.” 
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AD:  “And you said something?” 
 
Complainer: “Yes I was drunk and I said, “he’s paying me for sex”.” 
 
AD: “To anyone in particular?” 
 
Complainer: “Just announcing it…in the street where we lived.” 
 
7.13 The Defence followed this up in cross-examination, saying she missed an opportunity 
to report the alleged abuse and suggesting it was a “false allegation.” The Defence then went 
on to introduce sexual history evidence by way of a question about the presence of love-bites:  
 
Defence: “Did it not seem like another opportunity when police lifted you 
about your behaviour and were saying things about accused, not opportunity 
for you to tell them then?” 
 
Complainer: “Yes it was a good opportunity but I was scared.” 
 
Defence: “On one occasion your mum saw love bites on your breast?” 
 
Complainer: “Quite a few occasions.” 
 
Defence: “What age were you at that time?” 
 
Complainer: “…16 or something, can’t remember.” 
 
Defence: “Did you say to her it was none of her business or that it was to do 
with your boyfriend?” 
 
7.14 There had been no reference to these issues in the Defence application, although it is 
interesting to note that, during the discussion of the Defence application, the Crown stated 
that they had intended to submit a s.275 application in respect of the contraceptive history of 
the second complainer, but it was an oversight and so sought to rely on the Defence 
application in this matter:  
 
AD: “It may well be that the terms of the Defence s.275 are going to be 
sufficient to allow the Crown to ask the same questions unless your lordship 
takes a different view.  … Of course one of the differences between the 
Crown and the Defence application would be that the inference sought to be 
drawn would not be the same.  …But it may well be that the Defence 
application turns out to be sufficient.  I know it is a matter the court has to be 
satisfied on but I take the view that if there is an application outstanding 
which the Defence covers I don’t see that the Crown should simultaneously 
cover the same thing.  Maybe your lordship takes a different view?” 
 
Judge: “I have not heard any authority on this where 2 different inferences are 
to be drawn.” 
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AD: “So long as the point is somewhere in a s.275 application somewhere, I 
have certainly never from the Crown’s point of view followed a line of 
questioning under s.275 and then raised an objection to any Defence line 
which sought to raise issues that I raised so I wouldn’t have thought 2 were 
necessary.  However it may be that when I go back to the office and read the 
precognition then if anything further is required in so far as it goes beyond 
what the Defence have given notice of.” 
 
Judge: “So you are just reverting to the position that the Crown will make an 
application under s.275 at a later stage if it feels something outside of the 
Defence’s application is required.” 
 
AD: “Yes.” (preliminary hearing case 232)  
 
7.15 Interviews with Advocates Depute suggested that the Crown are not always mindful 
of the need to make a s.275 application, partly because of the relative newness of the 
requirement to do so.   
 
 
STRAYING BEYOND THE PARAMETERS OF QUESTIONING SET BY THE 
COURT   
 
7.16 In case 044 the Crown application sought solely to elicit evidence that the complainer 
had had sexual intercourse with another male 5 or 6 months before the alleged offence.  The 
court restricted the questioning thus: “subject to the condition that it is for the purpose solely 
of ascertaining whether the girl had on a previous occasion had sexual intercourse and no 
more than that.” (Judge in case 044)  
 
7.17 The Defence also sought to elicit the same evidence on the basis that the complainer 
feared she was pregnant by someone other than her boyfriend. The Defence application, 
however, was made at a different preliminary hearing, before a different Judge, and the 
questioning was not restricted in the same way. At trial, the Defence questioned the 
complainer at length about how and when she lost her virginity, and also introduced evidence 
about her alleged predisposition to lying, delay in reporting the allegation to the police and 
refusing to undergo a medical examination, arguing that this was evidence of a “false 
allegation”, lack of credibility, and consent.   
 
7.18 In case 204, the court restricted the Defence application by specifically disallowing 
questioning to elicit that the complainer had been working whilst also claiming 
unemployment benefit.  In the trial, the Defence subsequently questioned the complainer on 
her “trouble with the DSS” at some length, the transcript of which extends to 3 pages.  
 
7.19 In case 233, the Defence sought to elicit evidence about the young complainer’s 
“sexual maturity” based on the contents of the medical report, and also asked about her 
sexual relationship with another witness in the case, whose child she was carrying. During the 
preliminary hearing, the Judge expressed reservations about the evidence sought in relation to 
the relationship and set restrictions thus: 
 
Judge: “I think what I’ll do is refuse that [part of] application “in hoc statu” 
because I suspect, particularly as the AD says, that the relationship between 
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the complainer and witness may very well emerge in the course of the 
evidence in chief … it doesn’t emerge that enables you the opportunity to 
come back and renew your application outwith the jury before you cross 
examine.” 
 
7.20 The relationship did not surface during the examination in chief of the complainer, 
and the Defence did not submit a s.275 application at trial, but did go on to question the 
complainer about her relationship with the witness, establishing that they currently live 
together, although they did not cohabit at the time of the alleged offence, and that she was 
currently pregnant with his child. The evidence concerning the complainer’s physical “sexual 
maturity” was also pursued. 
 
Evidence or questioning sought under s.275 by Crown but introduced or pursued by the 
Defence  
7.21 In a small number of cases where the Crown made a successful application, the 
evidence introduced by the Crown was subsequently expanded upon by the Defence. In case 
138, for example, the Crown sought to elicit that the complainer and the accused had engaged 
in consensual sexual intercourse during a long-term relationship.  The Defence had not 
submitted an application at all in this case but questioned the complainer further on the nature 
of her sexual relationship with the accused that had been elicited by the Crown: 
 
Defence: “During the course of your relationship with the accused you would 
have intercourse on a number of occasions.”  
 
Complainer: “During my relationship with him, yes.” 
 
Defence: “During the time you were staying together as a couple.” 
 
Complainer: “Yes.” 
 
Defence: “And during that time the fact that you were menstruating was never 
a bother to having intercourse was it?” 
 
Complainer: “Sometimes it wasn’t, no.  I was very comfortable with it.” 
 
7.22 A little later on in cross-examination, the Defence questioned the complainer on the 
“volatility” of her relationship with the accused, as well as alleged sexual behaviour with 
someone other than the accused.   
 
7.23 In case 210, which involved a charge of rape, the Defence sought to elicit information 
concerning the complainer’s contraceptive history, her behaviour towards the accused on the 
occasion of the alleged offence and that she had had an argument with her boyfriend the day 
before. During cross-examination the Defence began to question the complainer about her 
alcohol consumption in general, and an argument that she had with a friend in the street, 
some of which was captured on CCTV:  
 
Defence: “Okay. What we do know that you had a good going argument 
going, did you not, with [female friend]?” 
 
Complainer: “I remember having an argument with [female friend], yeah.” 
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Defence: “And that involved your, perhaps again to be fair to you influenced 
by what you’d had to drink, that involved you shouting and swearing at her 
and such like in the High Street at the time. Do you remember that?” 
 
Complainer: “She would have been shouting and swearing back, we were just 
playing about like. It was nothing serious.” 
 
Defence: “Okay. Were you shouting and swearing and calling her a “fucking 
bitch”?” 
 
Complainer: “I don’t know.”   
 
7.24 The Defence asked the complainer several more questions in respect of this 
suggesting that the fight eventually became physical, at which point the Advocate Depute 
intervened on the basis that the questioning is not covered by the s.275 application, although 
the Defence argued that, as this incident and the drinking took place around the same time as 
the alleged offence it was covered by s.274 (1) (c) and therefore exempted from the 
prohibitions in this section of the legislation. The court was cleared and there followed 
protracted discussions on the restrictions in s.274. Whilst the Judge was not entirely 
convinced of this, he nevertheless allowed the line of questioning to continue: 
 
Judge: “Well I will repel the objection … it seems to me that a lot of this 
material is already out.  There is the fact, I think you’re right to say there is 
some indication on the video of something like this.  I have considerable 
reservations about the “shortly before” point, that seems to be a matter of 
judgment in each case.  But on the whole matter I think it inappropriate to 
sustain the objection when the matter has gone as far as it has so I’ll allow the 
question.” 
 
Defence views about straying beyond parameter set in s.275 applications 
7.25 Defence practitioners interviewed emphasized that they were very wary of straying 
beyond the parameters set by the court in an s.275 application, not least because the trial 
Judge has a copy of the application and the evidence or questioning that has been allowed:   
 
“I think you have to be very, very careful because this is something which 
is… it has been written down, the judge has a copy and knows in advance of 
the trial what has been allowed and what has not been allowed, the 
Prosecution know that as well and I think it would be very bad practice for 
somebody to stray outwith that, and really I think somebody would be acting 
in a quite appalling way if they carried on a cross examination on matters 
which had actually been refused in an application.”  (Defence 3)  
 
7.26 But then later in the interview the issue was returned to, with the interviewee noting 
that there was a temptation to carry on with a fruitful line of questioning, particularly if there 
was no objection from the other party:   
 
 
“Having said that, we know what trials are like, sometimes if cross 
examination was going well and going down a particular route then there's 
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always, it's human nature, there's a temptation to carry on and carry on, I think 
you can easily see situations where you are tempted to carry on, and 
sometimes you ask a question and half your eye is on the other side to see are 
they going to say anything about this or not.”  (Defence 3)  
 
Disallowed s.275 applications where evidence is subsequently elicited 
7.27 In 4 cases where Defence applications had been refused the Defence went on to elicit 
sexual history or character evidence during the trial (this evidence was sometimes different to 
that sought in the s.275 application).  
 
7.28 In case 007, discussed in Chapters Four and Five, which involved a young boy, the 
application sought to lead evidence from his teachers to the effect that he was known to tell 
frequent lies to an unusual degree. This application was refused by the court.  However, the 
evidence elicited during cross-examination related to bullying experienced by the boy and, in 
particular, that he had seen a social worker and spoken to a support counsellor about being 
bullied by other children, but did not use this as an opportunity to mention the alleged abuse 
which was the subject of the charge.  Following an intervention by the Advocate Depute, the 
Defence justified the questioning in terms of eliciting that the complainer had failed to report 
the allegations to either of these people, to whom he had been referred in connection with the 
bullying. The following extract conveys the reasoning behind the Advocates Depute 
objection:  
 
AD: “I’m quite sure that my friend wouldn’t for a moment intentionally go 
anywhere near the subject matter which was sought to be raised in the s.275 
Application but nevertheless there is always the danger that no matter how 
careful my learned friend is with her questioning that might be the case.…I 
don’t think my objection has been premature because in my submission my 
Lord I don’t think that there is any relevance in exploring the bullying aspect. 
It doesn’t form part of this case and there is no relevance in exploring this 
matter any further.”  
 
Defence: “M’Lord I’m well aware of the restrictions on me in relation to what 
I can and cannot ask. The matter of bullying was actually mentioned by the 
boy himself, first of all this morning not in response to any specific question 
from me. The line that I’m pursuing just now in relation to the people he has 
spoken to in the matters in issue here and the question I was about to ask and 
had started asking was “Did he get any help in relation to the bullying? That is 
all I’m interested in and the relevance of that has got nothing to do with 
bullying or linking that to sexual abuse or not. It has to do with opportunities 
to tell people about anything. I have no intentions of taking it any further than 
“Did he get any help and who it was that gave him help about the bullying?” 
…given that the allegations against [accused] did not emerge until at least 2 
years after he last had contact with the family that it is entirely relevant to 
ascertain whether there was contact with other persons in authority who were 
helping this boy with any particular issue that he had. That’s as far as I 
propose to take it and the relevance of it is in relation to his general credibility 
and failure to mention anything to anybody including his parents until this 
particular time.” 
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7.29 In light of this explanation the AD withdrew his objection and the Defence continued 
to question the complainer along the same lines.  
 
Evidence of complainer’s alcohol consumption at or around the time of the alleged 
offence  
7.30 It is notable that in a high proportion of cases, including those where objections were 
made by the Advocate Depute, the Defence attempted to introduce evidence of the 
complainer’s alcohol consumption at or around the time of the alleged offence, in the absence 
of any application, in addition to other kinds of character or sexual history evidence.  
 
7.31 Several cases sparked debate on one or both of the following matters: first, whether 
evidence of drinking constituted character evidence and therefore required an application; 
and second, whether or not evidence of drinking around the time of an alleged offence could 
be considered to have taken place “shortly before, at the same time as, or shortly after the acts 
which form part of the subject matter of the charge” and was therefore exempted from the 
prohibitions by s.274 (1) (c). Whereas some Judges took the view that alcohol consumption 
on the same evening could be considered so, others were more dubious. It is clearly an area 
of some dispute.  
 
7.32 In case 099, the Defence made 2 separate s.275 applications. The first, concerning 2 
complainers, was very extensive, although much of it was disallowed by the Judge. An aspect 
of the application which was allowed concerned the alcohol consumption and alleged 
drunkenness of one of the complainers at the time of the alleged incident, although in the 
trial, both were asked about their alcohol use on the occasion and the second complainer, in 
particular, was questioned in detail about her use of a “bottle bomb” in order to consume a 
large amount of alcohol very quickly.   
 
7.33 In case 121, 2 out of 3 applications submitted by the Defence were refused by the 
court.  The successful application sought to introduce evidence of a history of alcohol 
consumption and drunkenness on the night in question, but in the trial the Defence also 
pursued questioning about recreational drug use, which was not objected to.  
 
7.34 Case 231 involved s.275 applications by both the Crown and Defence, neither of 
which sought to introduce evidence of drinking. During the trial, the Judge intervened in 
Defence questioning about the complainer’s drinking, as he considered it required a s.275 
application, although it was eventually decided not to do so, as the evidence had already been 
disclosed to the jury. 
 
Intervening to restrict sexual history or character evidence: views of practitioners 
7.35  Judges took the view that they would always intervene if the Defence strayed beyond 
the questioning or evidence and limits agreed with respect to an application.  Judge 1 noted 
that the Act had made a difference in practice with respect to judicial intervention   
 
“That would be a clear difference that the [2002] Act has introduced because 
previously you would take silence as agreement, but assuming I recognised it 
as an issue of sexual history or bad character I would intervene.” 
 
“The legislation says the court shall not allow. That’s what s.274 says 
therefore you should not allow it unless it’s been granted. And even if the 
Crown, if the Crown, even if the Crown didn’t object, I would probably say to 
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the Defence, well you will have to make an application under s.275, albeit 
late, and I will then consider it. I would probably do that partly because again, 
not so much looking over one’s shoulder etc. but at the appeal stage. I mean I 
know if I was sitting as an appeal Judge and something was just allowed or 
not objected to, I would want to know why that happened, because it 
shouldn’t. We are supposed to consider these things in writing and so on and 
so forth.” (Judge 2) 
 
“I take the view…and I make it clear that I think I’m entitled to take the view 
that…the terms of s.274 require me to intervene.  The duty is placed in me not 
to admit or allow the question. So I, that is the way I interpret it.  I do not 
know whether other colleagues take that view.  There is a difference of view 
in general amongst Judges and sheriffs as to whether they should intervene 
when objectionable evidence is being elicited. Or questioning this on 
objectionable terms. And I don’t shrink from saying there are many instances 
where I and other Judges would welcome objections being taken. Because you 
think they should have been taken. Now in some instances you have to sit and 
bite your tongue.  But in this area I’m in no doubt at all that there is a statutory 
duty in me to intervene.  And I will intervene.”  (Judge 3) 
 
“I think it probably has made me more interventionist on this, I'm not 
particularly interventionist, especially in criminal trials, I just let them get on 
with it.  But I'm very … I'm just very alert to the duty that is placed on the 
court by s.274, and feel that it's necessary for me to make sure that the Section 
is properly implemented.” (Judge 4) 
 
7.36 Advocates Depute acknowledged the “temptation” for the Defence to follow up 
fruitful lines of evidence, but maintained they do object when they consider it necessary to do 
so: 
“If I’m doing one of these trials, I will have read the s.275 application and I 
will know which bits of it have been granted, they may have all been granted, 
and I’m alert to that so that if the Defence Counsel does try to deviate I will 
stand up to object.  The Judges, I have to say, are also very aware of this as 
well and they will stop people too.” (AD 2)  
 
Comparisons with baseline study  
7.37 Two of the key differences between the 2002 Act and the 1995 Act, which concern, 
first, the fact that the Crown now need to make a written s.275 application in advance in 
order to introduce otherwise restricted evidence, and second, the fact that the scope of the 
otherwise restricted evidence is now much wider, extending to the complainer’s general 
character or credit, rather than specifically sexual character, makes direct comparison 
between the 2 pieces of legislation on the use of sexual history and character evidence 
somewhat problematic.  
  
7.38 An obvious area for comparison is the extent of sexual history and character evidence 
introduced by the Crown. A key difference between the 2 Acts concerns the requirement that 
the Crown now need to make s.275 applications.  The baseline study found that first, “good” 
sexual character evidence (for example that the complainer had only ever had one sexual 
partner, was a faithful wife, was a virgin, etc.), was introduced by the Crown in only a small 
number of cases (in 5 of the 66 sexual offence trials with applications heard at the High 
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Court).  Second, in an equally small number of trials, it was the evidence led by the Crown 
during the complainer’s evidence-in-chief that precipitated or became the starting point for an 
s.275 application made by the Defence.35 For the most part, this was evidence concerning 
prostitution introduced by the Crown in order to establish the context and antecedents to the 
alleged offence. 
 
7.39 The current study shows that the Crown are introducing sexual history and character 
evidence to a much greater extent than previously, although Crown applications occur far less 
frequently than those made by the Defence. Whilst much of the increase can be accounted for 
by the Crown requirement to make a s.275 application, examination of Crown applications 
reveal that they are more likely to seek to introduce evidence of a sexual history between the 
complainer and accused, rather than general character evidence. It is also likely to be the case 
that, where the Defence make a successful application, the Crown will seek to pre-empt the 
Defence line by leading evidence on that point, evidence which it might not have elicited in 
the absence of an application.  
 
7.40 The baseline study found instances in which sexual evidence was introduced in the 
absence of an s.275 application. For the most part this concerned sexual history of the 
complainer, most commonly relations between the complainer and accused.  It also found 
instances in which questioning permitted by a s.275 application strayed beyond the 
boundaries set in the application discussion, as well as a very small number of cases where 
the Defence managed to introduce sexual evidence without any objection, following an 
unsuccessful verbal application to do so.  
  
7.41 The fact that the 2002 Act has resulted in the introduction of more sexual history 
evidence and more character evidence has not gone unrecognized. Most of the practitioners 
interviewed believed this to be a consequence of the Act. As Advocate Depute 1 said:  
 
“I was looking back at what it said in the annotations, in which I looked at the 
policy intention, and the Justice Minister said “that it was believed that it was 
unacceptable for victims to be subjected to unnecessary and irrelevant 
questioning about their sexual history or character”.  I think he was right 
about that, but I think that the legislation has certainly not improved the 
position, and indeed, has almost guaranteed the victims will be asked about 
their sexual character.  And the reason for that is really 2 fold.  First of all, it 
seems to me to be relatively easy to construct a case to demonstrate, that 
whatever it is the Defence want to put, has some relevance.  And most judges 
seem to take the view that where what is put can be demonstrated to have 
some relevance to the question of the trial, that fair trial considerations 
outweigh, what I would regard as the…rights of the complainer.  … And so 
it's fairly easy provided you go through the hoops and s.275 in the right order.  
It's fairly easy to persuade a Judge to grant a s.275.”    
 
7.42 However, whilst direct comparisons are difficult, some things are clear. Given the 
significant increase in numbers of applications being made under the 2002 Act, and the very 
high rate of success of such applications, there is a significant increase in the amount of 
sexual history evidence being elicited and admitted in sexual offence trials than was 
                                                 
35 Under the 1995 Act, s.275 (1) (a) afforded the Defence the opportunity to pick up on evidence or questioning 
led by the Crown 
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previously the case. Scrutiny of application cases also reveals that much more detailed 
evidence than specified in the written application is pursued by the Defence in the trial.  
 
Comparison of the use of character evidence under the 1995 and 2002 Acts   
7.43 Given the widening of the scope of the legislation to include general character 
evidence, direct comparison with the baseline findings in relation to the inclusion of this type 
of evidence in trials pre- and post-2002 is not possible. There are, nevertheless, ways of using 
the baseline study to try to understand the impact of the new legislation on the use of 
character evidence.   
 
7.44 Drawing on cases which were examined by listening to tapes of the complainer’s 
evidence, it is possible to estimate the frequency of use of character evidence before and after 
the 2002 Act.  For this particular comparative task, however, it does not make sense to 
separate trials involving s.275 applications from those that did not, since general character 
evidence did not fall within the scope of the 1995 Act. Rather, we matched the 40 cases 
scrutinised in detail in the current study, (that is, the 30 retrospective cases and 10 observed 
trials) with 30 cases from the baseline study. The baseline cases included 20 application 
cases36 from one year 1999, and 18 rape or clandestine injury cases without applications from 
the 3 year period of the baseline research. This yielded a set of cases broadly similar in 
composition of charges as well as a similar number of cases. The balance between application 
cases and non-application cases is different, but this is appropriate given the increase in 
applications under the 2002 legislation.   
 
7.45 Putting questions to the complainer in cross-examination which raised issues 
concerning her character was very common in the baseline study and occurred in 65% of the 
application cases scrutinised, and 55% of the non-application case.  Appendix 4 lists the kind 
of evidence that was introduced as character evidence in the current study under the heading 
General Character of Complainer.  This list is fairly comprehensive and covers the kinds of 
character evidence that was previously being introduced without application.   
 
7.46 As in the current study, questions about drug and alcohol use were very common in 
the baseline sample. It is important to stress that Defence questioning was not simply 
establishing memory of events, but rather suggesting a person with a particular lifestyle (e.g. 
somebody who regularly drinks to excess, somebody who drinks but is under age and gets 
others to buy drink on their behalf), or more explicitly suggesting somebody who is morally 
lessened as person because of their consumption of drink or drugs (e.g. being a neglectful 
mother or a tendency to volatility or violence or some form of sexual or inappropriate 
behaviour when under the influence of drink or drugs).    
 
7.47 There were also examples of all of the other broad categories of kinds of character 
evidence listed in Appendix 4.  Questions suggesting violence and disorderly conduct 
included putting to a complainer that she was volatile and asking if she was violent (case 
1108), or suggesting she had been a disruptive child. Questions suggesting mental instability 
included questions about depression and forgetting to take prescribed medication for mental 
illness.  Questions about dishonesty included accusations of lying about issues other than the 
subject matter of the charge.  Dishonesty, drugs and relationships with stigmatised others 
were all raised in one case when it was put to the complainer that she stole and lied for heroin 
and that her friends were prison inmates. There were also suggestions about possible reasons 
                                                 
36 There were 21 applications cases in that year but the tapes from one case were unable to be located. 
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for making a false allegation such as wishing to financially “neuter” a former husband and 
reference to having received compensation for a past incident of abuse creating the alleged 
incentive to make a false allegation for further financial reward. The only category listed in 
Appendix 4 not found in this particular set of cases was “rootlessness”.  In addition, however, 
the Defence also suggested “bad” character through questions about body tattoos in 2 cases. 
In one of these this also involved questioning the complainer about body piercings, and 
shaving her pubic hair.  
 
7.48 In the current study, questioning about character evidence was the most commonly 
sought type of questioning in applications, accounting for approximately a quarter (24%) of 
all evidence sought (see Table 4.3 in Chapter Four). More applications sought to introduce 
character evidence than sexual history evidence, which accounted for 20 percent of all 
evidence sought.  Although direct comparisons about the incidence of “character” evidence 
are not possible, the introduction of the 2002 Act does not seem to have reduced the 
incidence of questioning about character, although character is now a subject of applications. 
Moreover, the requirement of an advance written application in combination with other 
changes in the legal context mean that more systematic effort is now being made by the 
Defence to obtain evidence with a bearing on the complainer’s character at an early stage of 
case preparation. In addition, questions about alcohol which allude to a particular type of 
character, or take on suggestions about lifestyle and morality, continue to be introduced 
without a s.275 application, and remain common.  
 
7.49 Several interviewees remarked upon the consequences of the widening brought by the 
provisions of the 2002 Act, believing that there are more applications simply because the 
scope is wider and both parties are now required to make an application for evidence or 
questioning that they did not have to make an application for in the past.  
 
7.50 As one Advocate Depute explained, the rather “scatter gun” approach taken by some 
Defence to ensure that they include all possibly relevant evidence, combined with the need to 
seek permission to lead character evidence has had 2 major implications: a marked increase 
in applications, and a potentially more extensive range of character evidence being 
introduced in the trial:  
  
“I think from a Defence perspective, there have been no real guidelines in 
case law as yet as to what sort of matters should be covered and what 
shouldn’t and we all live in a back covering age these days, including Defence 
Counsel, so I think that’s part of the reason why they take this, what I describe 
as scatter gun approach, because they don’t want to miss something out and, 
okay, if a Judge says no, that’s unnecessary well, that’s fine.  They can’t then 
be criticised by their client at a later stage for not having raised something in a 
s.275 application and then not being allowed to raise something at trial.  So I 
think that’s part of the reason for the slightly wide approach that they’re 
taking.” (AD 2) 
 
7.51 Some interviewees saw some advantages for the Crown in the widening of scope, but 
also registered concern that, in evidential terms, character evidence tends to be collateral 
material that is not generally admissible: 
 
“It probably operates to the advantage of the Crown.  Whether that is 
necessarily a good thing I’m not entirely convinced.  I can understand the 
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purpose of all this is to stop a routine dragging up of sexual history of usually 
a woman because that’s not relevant in terms of deciding guilt or innocence 
neither is a more general attack on character I mean ignoring this legislation 
just looking at the laws of evidence this is collateral material and collateral 
material has never been admissible as proof of something directly in issue so 
that the fact that someone has a propensity to lie about things in the past 
doesn’t mean that they are necessarily lying here and the trouble with that is it 
creates for the fact finder whether it is a Sheriff sitting alone or a jury it 
creates a diversion which is presumably the purpose behind the Defence 
seeking this so from an advantage point of view it works better I think for the 
Crown, the Defence would want to rubbish the credibility of a witness but 
there are examples where that might be brought to mind with a relevant aspect 
but its kind of hard to see.” (AD 4)  
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
7.52 In all but a few exceptions, all evidence allowed in the s.275 application was 
introduced in the trial, usually during cross-examination of the complainer. Scrutiny of cases 
also revealed that the evidence or questioning tended to be in more detail than outlined in the 
written application.  
 
7.53 The “belt and braces” approach to drafting s.275 applications, referred to by some 
Defence interviewees, whereby every possible aspect of questioning or evidence was 
included in an application, inevitably meant that complainers were cross-examined in detail 
and extensively on a range of sexual history and character matters.  
  
7.54 Defence practitioners emphasized that they were wary of straying beyond the 
parameters set by the court in an s.275 application, not least because the trial Judge had a 
copy of the application and the evidence or questioning that had been allowed. Judges took 
the view that they would always intervene if the Defence strayed beyond the questioning or 
evidence and limits agreed with respect to an application.  
 
7.55 Just under half (14) of the 32 observed trials with s.275 applications involved some 
evidence or questioning being led during the trial which had not been explicitly agreed in the 
s.275 application. This included cases where the evidence that was subsequently elicited had 
been either specifically disallowed or strayed over the boundaries of questioning or evidence 
set by the court in the preliminary hearing. Moreover, following the introduction of restricted 
or specifically prohibited evidence, objections by the other party and/or interventions by the 
court occurred infrequently. There is clearly a disjunction between what the Judges and 
Defence lawyers believe to be the case, and the research findings on these points. That 
practitioner accounts are belied by the research data is important on several levels, not least 
that what practitioners believe to be the case may turn out not to be.  
 
7.56 The issue of alcohol consumption by the complainer was commonly raised by the 
Defence, both in cases where this was the subject of a s.275 application and also in cases 
where it was not. This sparked debate in some trials about 2 issues relating to alcohol 
consumption. First, whether evidence of a history of drinking on the part of the complainer 
constituted character evidence that required a s.275 application, or whether it was to be 
considered collateral material.  Second, whether or not evidence of drinking around the time 
of an alleged offence could be considered to have taken place “shortly before, at the same 
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time as or shortly after the acts which form part of the subject matter of the charge” and is 
struck at by s.274 (1) (c). Whereas some Judges took the view that alcohol consumption on 
the same evening could be considered as occurring at the same time, others disagreed.  
 
7.57 Given the significant increase in numbers of applications being made under the 2002 
Act, and the very high rate of success of such applications, there was a significant 
increase in the amount of sexual history evidence being elicited and admitted in 
sexual offence trials than was previously the case under the 1995 Act.  Furthermore, 
the widening of the scope of the Act may have led to more character evidence than 
previously, although this is difficult to quantify as a like for like comparison under the 
2 pieces of legislation is not possible. In comparison with the baseline study, the 
Crown was introducing sexual history and character evidence to a much greater extent 
than previously, possibly due to the requirement of making a s.275 application.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CASES WITHOUT S.275 APPLICATIONS 
 
8.1 This chapter is concerned with High Court sexual offence cases that did not involve a 
s.275 application. It considers what leads to the absence of an application in these cases and 
whether, when such cases go to trial, questioning about sexual history and sexual character 
evidence was indeed entirely absent.  
 
8.2 Chapter Three has already shown the distribution of cases without and with s.275 
applications and their flow through the criminal justice system. Of all High Court sexual 
offence cases between 1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005, slightly more than half, (128 or 55%) 
did not involve an application.  The majority of these cases ended in a “guilty” plea, a small 
number did not result in a trial for other reasons and only 35 cases (27%) involved a “not 
guilty” plea and proceeded to a trial. This contrasts with the 88 percent of cases with an 
application that did go to trial.  
 
8.3 Because the submission of a s.275 application is now part of the pre-trial process, it is 
possible for a case to involve the lodging of an application without a subsequent trial taking 
place, because the accused subsequently pled guilty, failed to appear or the case was deserted.  
In fact this was relatively unusual and only happened in 12 of the 103 cases with applications.  
 
WHY APPLICATIONS ARE AND ARE NOT MADE 
 
8.4 Chapter Three has also shown that the likelihood of an application varies by the 
charges involved and by the plea. One reason why the rate of applications varies with the 
charges is because particular charges create more or less reason for Defence interest in 
attacking the credibility of a complainer through her or his sexual history or character. A 
higher incidence of applications in rape cases than in other sexual offences could be 
anticipated because of the particular weight placed by the Defence on testing the credibility 
of the complainer in these cases.  In Scots law, rape is also one of the “pleas of the Crown” 
and therefore one of the most serious charges that can be brought.  
 
8.5 Sexual history evidence is often presented as directly relevant to contradicting the 
complainer’s account of absence of consent to sexual intercourse, a key element in the crime 
of rape, simultaneously attacking her credibility. Eighty one percent of the rape cases in 
which a defence of consent was lodged also involved a s.275 application.  In comparison, 
only 40 percent of rape cases involved an application when no defence of consent was 
lodged. However, it is not clear why applications should also be relatively high in cases that 
involved charges not of rape but indecent assault, attempted rape, or assault with intent to 
ravish. Consent cannot be an issue in the same way in these cases and while the credibility of 
the complainer is always potentially at issue when he or she is a key witness, it is likely to 
carry less weight than in rape cases. It seems surprising therefore that the rate of s.275 
applications was close to that of rape in cases of indecent assault rather than being relatively 
rare as they were in cases of sodomy, incest and lewd and libidinous practices.  
 
8.6 Further analysis of the relatively low rate of s.275 applications in cases with charges 
of incest, sodomy and lewd and libidinous practices suggests that this is influenced by the 
fact that such cases typically involve children. It was possible to identify the ages of 
complainers in a total of 136 cases, 97 of which involved charges of rape. There were no 
applications in four fifths of the small number of cases (39) in which the complainer was 
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under 12 years of age, none in almost two thirds of all cases in which a complainer was aged 
12 to16 years, and none in over half of rape cases in which the complainer was aged 12-16 
years. Note that in the case of rape, being a teenager afforded little protection against sexual 
history or character evidence. 
 
8.7 It was noted in the introduction that the majority of cases indicted in the High Court, 
in which there was no application, ended in a guilty plea rather than going to trial.  
Nevertheless, in almost a quarter of rape trials (24%) and almost half of trials that did not 
involve charges of rape (48%), there was no s.275 application to introduce sexual history or 
character evidence.   
 
Table 8.1 High Court Sexual Offence Trials, 1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005: Charges by 
the absence or presence of a s.275 application. 
 
 All cases involving a 
charge or rape 
Other (non-rape) 
sexual charges Total 
No Application 24 (24%) 12 (48%) 35 (28%)
Application 74 (76%) 13 (52%) 88 (72%)
Total  98 (100%) 25 (100%) 123 (100%)
 
8.8 It is not possible to say with certainty whether in some or all of these cases the 
Defence actively sought possible evidence to make an application but found none. However, 
interviews with legal practitioners suggest that this is likely, at least in cases of rape and 
perhaps also in the case of other charges. Many of the legal practitioners interviewed agreed 
that the Defence routinely consider whether there is sexual history or character evidence they 
may wish to introduce and often make active enquiries to seek such possible evidence.   
 
8.9 It is likely then that in the majority of trials in which there was no application, nothing 
was known to the Defence concerning the complainer’s sexual history or character which 
could be used to question credibility or to suggest consent to sexual intercourse in the case of 
rape. The only likely exception concerns the small number of cases in which the accused had 
a previous conviction for an analogous sexual offence.  In such cases it was possible that the 
Defence was deterred from making an application by the possibility that the accused’s 
previous convictions would then be put before the court.  
 
Previous convictions deterring s.275 applications 
8.10 The circumstance that was consistently suggested in interviews with legal 
practitioners as one in which the Defence might choose not to make an application, despite 
being aware of past sexual history or character evidence, was when there were analogous 
previous convictions. Data on actual practice in cases with analogous convictions, however, 
suggested at most a very modest effect on whether or not an application was made, which 
rather contradicts the views of those practitioners who argued that it was a very significant 
deterrent.  This was discussed at length in Chapter Six. In order to reiterate the point, the 
table presented in Chapter Six is represented here, formatted to show percentages, despite the 
small numbers and so it is necessary, therefore, to read these with caution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 116
 
Table 8.2 All Rape Cases (whether going to trial or not) 1st June 2004 to 31st May 2005: 
Previous Convictions by s.275 applications 
 
s.275 
application 
Analogous 
PCs 
Non-
analogous 
PCs 
No PCs PCs not known Total PCs 
By Defence* 7   (35%) 37   (51%) 21   (38%) 11   (79%) 76     (47%) 
By Crown only 4   (20%) 0 2     (4%) 1      (7%) 7       (4%) 
None 9   (45%) 36   (49%) 32   (58%) 2    (14%) 79     (49%) 
Total 20 (100%) 73 (100%) 55 (100%) 14 (100%) 162 (100%) 
* Includes cases with Defence only and Crown & Defence applications. 
 
Does the absence of a s.275 application from a trial mean no sexual history or character 
evidence? 
8.11 Twenty five rape trials (over the course of the case mapping period) did not involve 
an application. Eight of these were included in the in-depth sample of cases, and so it was 
possible to check whether or not complainers were questioned about their sexual history or 
character during the trial and to consider whether inferences might be made from these 8 
trials to the larger group.  
 
8.12 In case 012, the Advocate Depute established that the complainer and the accused 
were ex-partners who had previously lived together for a number of years and had had 
children together. Because this involved establishing a past sexual relationship, some 
practitioners might have made an  application, but none was made in this case, perhaps 
because the Advocate Depute did not intend to ask about sexual matters. He simply began 
with the question “Were you in a relationship with [the accused] for a number of years?” In 
cross-examination, the Defence asked the complainer if she had “consensual intimacy” on a 
particular night approximately 3 weeks before the alleged event. This was a clear breach of 
the procedures. However, the pattern of decision-making in cases with applications studied 
suggests that it is very likely that if the procedures had been followed and a s.275 application 
had been made, then it would have been allowed.  This was the only case that involved 
questions about sexual history that should have involved a Defence application under both 
the current legislation and the previous legislation. There was no judicial objection.  In the 
same case, the Defence also put questions to the complainer that implied that she was of a 
certain character: “you were going to discos all the time, you were going out to get drunk all 
the time and you were having a great old time” (case 012). 
 
8.13 In one other case, 240, the Defence asked the complainer a question which bordered 
on sexual history and character evidence: “Have you ever dated somebody from the Middle 
East?” but this line was not developed into any more explicitly sexual questioning or detail 
which unequivocally required an application.  The Defence also asked very detailed questions 
about not only how much she had to drink on the evening but about her “student” drinking 
practices which bordered on an attack on her character, as well as developing the suggestion 
that drink may have made her behave in unusual ways, through a series of questions 
culminating in directly asking: 
 
Defence: “Do you think having a drink affects your sex drive in any way?” 
 
Complainer: “No not really.” 
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Defence: “Have you ever heard of the expression beer goggles? Making you 
look at people you would not otherwise look at?” 
 
Complainer: “Yes.” 
 
Defence: “So would you agree with me that having a drink might make some 
people more foolish with the opposite sex?” 
 
Complainer: “Yes.” (Case 240) 
 
8.14 Suggestions about drunkenness that border on character attacks were also made by the 
Defence in other cases. For example, suggestions about “loud and drunken behaviour” were 
put to the complainer in case 192. In case 094 both the Crown and the Defence asked very 
detailed questions about drinking habits. The Crown also asked the complainer if she had 
taken drugs and the Defence made similar suggestions about the possible consequences of 
alcohol to those put to the complainer in case 240. 
 
8.15 In 2 cases the Crown asked explicit questions about sexual history, which should have 
involved an application under the current legislation, and again these cases involved a breach 
of procedure, although they may have been allowed if an application had been made.  
 
8.16 In case 214, the Advocate Depute asked: 
 
AD: “Had you had sex with [accused] before?” 
 
Complainer: “No.” 
 
AD: “Had you had sex with other boys before this incident?” 
 
And at this point the Defence intervened: 
 
Defence: “Don’t answer that question. I shouldn’t be jumping to the defence 
of a Crown witness, my Lord, but there’s no s.275 application.” 
 
Judge: “Yes, indeed.  I think you should withdraw that question.” 
 
AD: “Yes, sorry my lord.  Did you want to have sex with [accused]?” 
 
Complainer: “No.” 
 
8.17 In case 241, the Advocate Depute asked the complainer fairly detailed questions about 
her sexual history in the context of her relationship with her boyfriend, who was not the 
accused. 
 
AD: “Was he your first sexual partner?” 
 
Complainer: “Yes.” 
 
AD: “Did you often stay at (boyfriend’s) house?” 
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Complainer: “Yes, a few times a week.” 
 
AD: “And did he stay at your parents’?” 
 
Complainer: “Yes 2 or 3 times a week.” 
 
AD: “Before this happened when had you last had intercourse?” 
 
Complainer: “About a month before.” 
 
AD: “Have you ever had anal intercourse?” 
 
Complainer: “Never.” 
 
8.18 On the one hand, some of the evidence led by the Crown in case 125 can be read as 
evidence suggesting “bad” character and, as such, perhaps it should have involved an 
application. On the other hand, some questions were necessary to provide a jury with 
background context to the alleged events. These included asking the complainer who was 14 
years old at the time of the offence: “Did you smoke in May of last year? Did you ever drink 
alcohol? Being 14 did you ever buy alcohol?” The narrative of events involved the 
complainer asking the much older accused to buy drink and cigarettes for her and her friend. 
Had they been included as proposed questions in an application, it would either have been 
allowed or judged as an unnecessary aspect of the application. However, some of the 
questioning that could be read as suggesting “bad” character went beyond the requirements of 
providing context for the jury.  For example, the Advocate Depute also asked: “When was the 
first time you had an alcoholic drink? Had you ever been drunk?”   
 
8.19 In sum, out of 8 cases, questions that required an application were introduced by the 
Defence and arguably also the Crown in one case (012), and by the Crown in at least 2 (214, 
241) other cases.  
 
8.20 In addition, questions about alcohol use and its effects, which bordered on character 
attacks were asked by the Defence in 4 cases. The sequences of questioning in clear breach of 
the legislation were typically short and in several cases their subject matter, involving sexual 
events between the complainer and the accused, was likely to have been allowed if the 
procedures had been followed. Nevertheless, some questioning asked by the Crown may have 
been experienced as an invasion of the dignity and privacy of the complainer and was not 
immediately obviously relevant to the guilt of the accused.  
 
Objections to sexual history and character evidence without application 
8.21 Judges took the view that they would always intervene if prohibited evidence was 
introduced by the Defence without an application, even if the Crown did not object. Several 
drew attention to the fact that this was a different situation than under the previous legislation 
when silence from the Crown would be interpreted as agreement and therefore a reason not to 
intervene. They also spoke of the need to be alert to potential breaches by the Crown. 
 
Comparison with the baseline study 
8.22 In both the baseline study and the current study, trials without s.275 applications were 
examined to check whether the prohibited evidence was indeed absent. In making a 
comparison between breaches of the procedures before and after the current legislation, it is 
very important to remember that only the Defence was previously prohibited from 
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introducing sexual history and sexual character evidence concerning a complainer, and also 
that the exclusion did not encompass general character.  
 
8.23 Comparison of cross-examination of complainers before and after the current 
legislation suggests a decline in breaches of the procedure by the Defence with respect to 
sexual history and sexual character evidence being introduced without application. Among 
the sample of such cases without applications examined in detail in the baseline study, half 
involved some breach by the Defence during cross-examination of the complainer.  In the 
current study, only one in 8 cases clearly involved such a breach. Yet this must be placed 
alongside the finding that most trials now involve an application, and that the contents of 
applications in terms of the evidence sought are much more extensive than previously.  
 
8.24 The Judges interviewed stressed that they would actively intervene if the Defence 
introduced such questioning without an application and acknowledged that this was different 
from the situation under the previous legislation. Some also spoke of needing to be alert to 
breaches by the Crown. However, examination of cases indicates that breaches can still occur 
with no judicial intervention. This is another example of a disjuncture between practitioner 
beliefs about court practice, and the research findings.   
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
8.25 This chapter has sought to further clarify whether cases without s.275 applications are 
distinctive in other respects and to examine whether sexual history and character evidence 
was indeed absent from cases without applications. 
 
8.26 The likelihood of a sexual offence case having or not having a s.275 application 
varied by charges and not surprisingly, with rates of “not guilty” pleas.  The effort involved 
in preparing a s.275 application is not likely to take place if early indications suggest an 
accused will plead guilty. A higher incidence of applications in rape cases reflects the 
centrality of the issue of consent to sexual intercourse and the particular weight placed by the 
Defence on testing the credibility of the complainer. Rape cases in which a defence of 
consent was lodged were twice as likely to involve an application as those without such a 
defence. However, it has to be noted that applications were also relatively high in non-rape 
cases involving indecent assault, attempted rape or assault with intent to ravish in which 
consent was not an issue. An absence of applications characterised the majority of cases 
involving children under 12. The modest nature of the effect of the accused’s previous 
convictions on deterring the Defence from pursuing a s.275 application discussed in Chapter 
Six was reiterated.  
 
8.27 Eight rape cases in which there was no s.275 application were studied in detail. The 
Crown was rather more likely than the Defence to introduce prohibited questioning about 
sexual history in the absence of an application. Where this occurred, the sequences of 
questioning in breach of the legislation were short, concerning sexual events between the 
complainer and the accused. These questions were likely to have been allowed if the 
procedures had been followed. Nevertheless, some questioning asked by the Crown may have 
been experienced as an invasion of the dignity and privacy of the complainer and was not 
immediately obviously relevant to the guilt of the accused. For example: “Had you had sex 
with other boys before this incident?” and “Have you ever had anal intercourse?”  In one of 
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the 8 cases, the Defence asked about sexual history of the complainer in the absence of an 
application.   
 
8.28 In 4 of the 8 cases, the Defence attacked the character of the complainer by asking 
very detailed questions about the complainer’s alcohol use. Questions about alcohol use were 
also pursued by the Crown in 2 of the cases. 
 
8.29 Comparison with the baseline study suggests a marked decline in one particular 
breach of the procedure by the Defence, that is, it indicates a decline in the introduction of 
sexual history or sexual character evidence without an application. Questioning that bordered 
on a character attack that was non-sexual remained quite common and was frequently 
introduced through sequences of questions about alcohol consumption.  
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CHAPTER NINE: COMPLAINERS’ EXPERIENCES OF THE COURT 
PROCESS 
 
9.1 Examination of complainers’ experiences of the court process is one of the key 
objectives of this study. This chapter presents the findings of 4 interviews conducted with 
women who experienced going to court as complainers in sexual offence trials, since the 
inception of the 2002 Act. Although the number of women interviewed is relatively small, the 
interviews provide valuable insights about the experience of being a complainer in a sexual 
offence trial, which could not have been gleaned from any other data source. Further 
information regarding the methodological approach used, and the specific characteristics of 
the cases which complainers were involved in, is provided in Chapter Two. 
 
9.2 Complainers were asked questions in respect of 3 broad areas: their views and 
experiences in the period leading up to the date of trial; their experience of the trial itself; and 
their current reflections on the process as a whole. Questioning in respect of these 3 broad 
areas centred upon understanding and awareness of the process of giving evidence in a sexual 
offence trial including the provisions contained within the 2002 Act, the nature and impact of 
questioning during evidence in chief and cross-examination, and recommendations for future 
policy and practice. 
 
9.3 A number of common themes emerged from the interviews. Key issues identified by 
complainers relate to their lack of preparation for giving evidence, their understanding of this 
process and the respective roles of criminal justice personnel. These themes are illustrated 
here, in the complainers’ own words, by using excerpts from the interviews. The evidence 
unearthed here also contributes to, and resonates with, the limited existing research evidence 
which documents the experiences of complainers in sexual offence cases in Scotland, and 
elsewhere.  
 
Awareness or knowledge of the 2002 legislation  
9.4 At the time of the trial none of the women interviewed were aware of the 2002 Act, or 
the way in which this legislation may impact on the nature of questioning or evidence 
introduced in sexual offence trials. As previously stated, a written application to introduce 
sexual history or character evidence is now required in advance of the trial. Similarly, 
advance notification must be given to the Prosecution if the defence to be used is one of 
consent.  
 
9.5 The nature and level of information given to complainers regarding these issues 
merits particular attention. Informing complainers that an application to lead sexual history or 
character evidence has been made, or that a defence of consent is to be used, allows the 
Prosecution to explore the complainer’s position on these issues, and allows the complainer, 
to some extent, to be mentally prepared for questioning of this nature.  
 
9.6 Interviews with legal practitioners indicate that while the Crown ascertains a 
complainer’s position on matters raised by a Defence application, this does not necessarily 
mean that complainers are informed that a s.275 application has been made. Some Defence 
practitioners expressed concern about the level of information they are required to provide 
about their “line” in advance of the trial, particularly in terms of the preparation which this 
may afford the complainer (see Chapter Four for further detail about practitioner’s views). 
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9.7 However, none of the women interviewed were made aware of the defence to be used 
in their case, or the likelihood of being questioned on sexual history or character. Yet, across 
the 4 cases, there were identifiable examples of a defence of consent, and past sexual history 
and character evidence being used during cross-examination. 
 
9.8 One complainer was aware that she could be asked questions about her sexual history 
because “it’s what you see on TV”, and expressed her anxiety about this prior to the trial: 
 
“I think for weeks leading up to it, I was thinking if I get the opportunity to 
speak, I would say this, this and this, not actually thinking that that would be 
the case, worrying for weeks beforehand about my past being dragged up and 
then obviously that not happening. Just literally no preparation, speaking to 
the PF once about 6 months beforehand and then that just being it, you just 
turn up in court and that was it.” (Complainer 1) 
 
9.9 In this instance, past sexual history was not used and the complainer might have been 
reassured to know that restrictions on the introduction of sexual history and character 
evidence are in place, or that an application to lead such evidence had either not been made or 
granted in her case. This complainer also indicated that knowing what the defence would be 
would have helped her feel more prepared for going to court: 
 
 “I definitely think [complainers] should be given some indication of what 
will happen in court. For example the fact that I didn’t know that sexual 
history wouldn’t be dragged up, you know, they couldn’t belittle your 
character – things like that. They’re the things I think I worried about and I 
think they should advise you of things like that. Even just, not, you know, 
these are the questions you’re definitely going to be asked, but at least I think 
you should have some indication of what the defence is. I had absolutely no 
idea of what his defence was. And I don’t know if they can do that, but I felt 
like he knew everything that I had said. He had a full year to get a defence 
together, a pack of lies together to get me into court and I didn’t have that.”  
(Complainer 1) 
 
9.10 Complainer 4 also said she might have felt better if she had known about the 
measures to limit questioning around sexual history and character evidence: 
 
“I didn’t know any of this, see if I had known this, it would probably have 
made me feel a bit better about, I don’t know, but just knowing the fact that 
that law was actually out and I was still made to answer these personal 
questions, it’s quite frustrating.” (Complainer 4) 
 
9.11 The nature of questioning required in a sexual offence trial, combined with the 
limitations of the legislation, compromises any guarantee that questions of a personal or 
sensitive nature will not be asked of a complainer. However, responses from complainers in 
this study suggest that having an awareness of the legislation, particularly in relation to the 
implications that it may have for their own case, would ease some of the distress and 
uncertainty involved in the process of giving evidence. In another case, for example, the 
complainer reported being completely unprepared for her previous convictions dating from 
when she was a teenager (she was in her late 30s at trial) being brought out at the trial:  
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“They never told us about any of the paperwork lying anywhere and then 
maybe I’d have said to myself, right, that’s the notes probably from [support 
organisation]. They never said I’d get hit maybe with my criminal 
convictions, nothing like that, it was a total … I walked in blindfolded.”(Complainer 3) 
  
9.12 Two other complainers described questioning around character issues, the purpose of 
which they were puzzled about:  
 
“I was asked if I was married. “Well, I believe you have children? Two 
different partners?” This was all brought up as well. They tried to bring up 
about [son]………..To me it was as if I’d neglected my son and allowed him 
to be abused. I don’t know why they asked me those questions. They asked 
me about my marital status – I was single then. Before this all came out, about 
6 weeks before, that’s when I split up with my partner and it took [son] 4 
weeks to tell me what had happened. I don’t know. Was it to make out 
because I was a single parent or something that … I don’t know, I honestly 
don’t know why they asked.” (Complainer 2) 
 
9.13 Complainer 4 had a history of self-harming behaviour which she was unaware was 
known to the Defence:  
 
“Just basically because I self-harm …, they actually used that against me, like 
you self-harm and stuff like that and I was like well what’s that actually got to 
do with this court room today? I’m not here because I self-harm, I’m here 
because something bad happened to me. I was really, really angry about that.”  
(Complainer 4) 
 
9.14 These complainers were unprepared for these issues being raised, and as a result of 
their perceived irrelevance to the case, they expressed feelings of anger and confusion about 
evidence of this nature being used in court. 
 
9.15 The level of information to be given to complainers in relation to s.275 applications, 
in their case, has recently been examined in the COPFS Review (2006). As previously stated, 
the review recommends that the Crown (through Victim Information and Advice) should 
advise complainers of an application by the Defence to lead sexual history or character 
evidence, and its subsequent outcome. Where there is evidence that the Defence intends to 
lead sexual history or character evidence, the procognoscer should explore the complainers 
position with sensitivity and re-precognosce the complainers if previously unexplored issues 
come to light following a s.275 application. It is also recommended that the precognoscer 
explain to complainers why potentially distressing questions are to be asked. In view of the 
responses made by complainers interviewed in this study, these recommendations have the 
potential to alleviate some of the distress associated with giving evidence in a sexual offence 
trial. However, it has not been possible within the timescales of this study to evaluate the 
impact of this guidance. 
  
Information about what the trial involved 
9.16 The nature and level of information provided to complainers prior to the trial about 
the process that they would be expected to go through varied, although all of the complainers 
described this preparation in limited terms: 
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“I did go to visit the court, but that was it, I never talked to anybody.” 
(Complainer 1) 
 
“Really just where everybody would sit: where he (the accused) would be, 
where I would be; where if it was public or family, where they would be; 
where the Judge would be. Who would be sitting where basically. That was 
really all.” (Complainer 2) 
 
“When we got our citations we were just told that there would be a witness 
protection person on the day that would tell us, basically, when we would 
probably get to go into court, which I thought, well, I should only be in  
court for so long because I was basically thinking things myself without 
anybody saying, oh no, you could be in this long or this could happen.  
Nothing prepared me for what actually happened on the day, you know.” 
(Complainer 3) 
     
9.17 Although they had received some practical information about going to court, all 
reported feeling inadequately prepared for the process of giving evidence and, in particular, 
what the process of examination and cross-examination would entail: 
 
“And, I just had absolutely no idea what was going to happen when I got 
there, and I think that, I had no idea, no doubt he was prepped by his people 
saying you know, act this way, look this way, you know this sort of thing, and 
I didn’t have any of that I just had to turn up, I didn’t know what his defence 
was, I didn’t know anything, and I just, to walk into something and not 
entirely be sure how to react, how to even speak, I just could have done with 
more. Just, you know, just somebody to tell me a little bit about the best way 
to be, or the questions that might be asked, and the best way to answer 
them.”(Complainer 1) 
 
9.18 For this complainer, her lack of preparation for giving evidence left her with a sense 
of imbalance compared with the preparation which the Defence may have had. Another 
complainer was particularly unprepared for the extent of the evidence she would be required 
to give: 
  
“So, to me, I think that’s a main thing that people should do is get them 
involved with either somebody from the witness protection coming out and 
seeing the person and letting them know exactly what they’re gonna be going 
through before they even agree to anything.  Because the only reason I kinda 
knew, basically, myself what I was gonna be going through is because I’d 
been through a trial just before [as a witness] but it wasn’t … I thought, right, 
it’ll be the defence will stand up … the PF will stand up and then the defence 
will stand up and then I’ll be away in about an hour or so and totally 
flabbergasted when the day actually came, you know.”  (Complainer 3) 
 
9.19 Based on her own experience, this complainer expressed a clear desire for more 
support and information to be given to complainers in future:  
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“...But I just think that things with court, they’ve got to change.  More 
information, even a support person being there, contacting you, like saying to 
you, right, I’m gonna … I’ve been assigned to you until this trial is over.  This 
is my number, make an appointment and come and see me … because it was 
originally supposed to be at Glasgow High and then it got moved to 
Edinburgh but even then they could have got somebody from Glasgow to 
work with us and tell us, right, you’re gonna be going in here, there’s a lot of 
reports in there, there’s a lot of stuff [relating to the case] sitting there,  
they could bring out your criminal convictions but just let them go on with 
that, you say your piece.  But we never got anything like that either.”  
(Complainer 3) 
 
Delays in the case going to trial 
9.20 All women reported experiencing delay and uncertainty concerning when and, 
sometimes, where the case would be calling to court. This is something which complainers 
highlighted as being particularly distressing: 
  
“That going to court was an absolute atrocity.  I was told that, we had a due 
date for court, I was told that, something like, one of my witnesses wasn’t 
available – I think it was one of the policewomen, she was away on her 
honeymoon or on holiday – the Defence wanted to put the trial back because 
of that and the prosecutor said well we don’t need her anyway, we’ve got all 
these other people. But he wanted to put it back and so I was told that we 
weren’t going to court on that day and it would actually be a month or so later 
they would get in contact with me. Then I was contacted on a Friday, this was 
like the Wednesday or something, then I was contacted on the Friday and they 
said, “oh can you go to court on Monday” and I was like “oh I don’t see how, 
when you had put it back by at least a month, I don’t understand how I can go 
to court on Monday.” “Just leave it with me, leave it with me.” Eventually at 
about 4 o’clock, I spoke to somebody saying “look, you haven’t come back to 
me, I don’t even know what’s going on, if I’m going to court on Monday, if 
I’m going to court on Wednesday or if it’s going to be a month. You need to 
come back to me.” And nobody phoned me back. So I sat all weekend 
thinking I could be going to court on Monday and they just couldn’t be 
bothered to phone me back. On the Monday, eventually someone did phone 
me and say “No you’re going to court on Wednesday, but that’s just your 
opening start date so it might be later than that but we’ll let you know.” By 
this point, I mean I was literally, I just couldn’t believe that, certainly that 
someone hadn’t even bothered to phone me back on Friday, so I was sitting all 
weekend. I thought the way that it was handled with people contacting me as 
regards with my dates was just atrocious, it was appalling.” (Complainer 1) 
 
“And I thought, oh, I’ll not maybe be up today, like the police were saying to 
me, oh, you probably won’t get called on the day that you’re actually at court, 
you’ll probably be there for a couple of days and then what will happen is … 
and you … a couple of days will pass and then it’ll be your time to go in.  So, 
I thought going to court that day I was like, right, okay, I’m probably not 
gonna even get shouted today so, it was quite dramatic.” (Complainer 3) 
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“I had waited 2 years for it to go to trial, so like 2 and a half years so it was 
dead upsetting having to wait that long and then also when it came to court on 
my birthday and stuff like that, then it getting cancelled, I got more uptight 
about it, so it was, I don’t know, it was just dead like stressful should I say.” 
(Complainer 4) 
 
 
IN THE WITNESS BOX  
 
Complainers’ experience of examination-in-chief 
9.21 All 4 complainers expressed a belief that the role of the Advocate Depute was 
somehow to be “on their side” or that the Advocate Depute was “their lawyer”. This displays 
a lack of information and understanding about the role of the Crown. Only 2 of the 
complainers had met the Advocate Depute prosecuting their case prior to the trial, despite 
recognition within the Crown Office that it is good practice for prosecutors to meet child or 
adult vulnerable witnesses before they give evidence. The Crown Office and Procurator 
Fiscal Service Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006) 
acknowledges that differing perspectives around what constitutes professional practice for 
Advocates in this regard have been in existence. This position is clarified by the review, 
which suggests that: “an introductory meeting is an essential part of preparing the victim for 
trial” (COPFS, 2006: 169). 
 
9.22 The 2 complainers who had met the prosecutor prior to giving their evidence reported 
differing experiences of this process. For one complainer, this meeting seemed to go some 
way in allowing her to understand the approach taken during the evidence-in-chief: 
 
“ [Prosecution] actually grilled me more than his lawyer did because she told 
me “I’ll do this so they don’t have anything to ask.” They only had very little 
questions, so she said “I’ll ask you everything that I know that the jury need to 
hear and the judge” so that when it comes to his lawyer, she only had so much 
to ask me. I knew what [Prosecution] – I didn’t know exactly what she was 
going to ask me – but I had an idea, so I knew what answers I had for her. I 
stumbled and everything because your nerves get the better, so some of the 
time, you were getting everything mixed up, so when it came to his lawyer, 
most of the hard questions had come out.” (Complainer 2) 
 
9.23 For the second complainer, the extent to which this meeting prepared her for giving 
evidence was more limited: 
 
“But when I had first went into court it was like the [Prosecution], before I’d 
went into court he came round and told me right, just answer yes, no and any 
questions.  I’m here to help you, basically, and I was like right, okay.  Nobody 
told me that their lawyers were quite rough.” (Complainer 3) 
 
9.24 One of the complainers who did not have the opportunity for such a meeting indicated 
that it would have been helpful to have met the Advocate Depute before and after giving 
evidence: 
 
“I think they [complainers] should be given more opportunity to speak to the 
Prosecution either before or after. I haven’t spoken to the Prosecution at all 
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afterwards and I still haven’t been told that that is a possibility or I don’t know 
maybe it is. I think the opportunity to speak with, or at least meet the person 
who is going to be asking the questions for the Prosecution, would be 
helpful.”  (Complainer 1) 
 
9.25 With regard to the experience of the evidence-in-chief itself, complainers indicated 
that although this was less distressing than the cross-examination, it remained a difficult 
process. One of the main feelings expressed by complainers was that of embarrassment: 
 
 “I think I knew that he was sort of on my side if you like, but there to help 
me. I’ve never been in a situation like that before so it was quite intimidating. 
I remember at one point coming over really hot and feeling quite unwell and 
asking to sit down; I didn’t feel majorly uncomfortable - a bit embarrassed - 
but mostly all right. I felt a bit intimidated by the amount of people that were 
there and the questions that they asked.” (Complainer 1) 
 
“Well there was one question – obviously I can talk about it now: it’s still 
upsetting a wee bit, but I don’t mind – and it was a question that, how can I put 
it, they asked me and it was something in the means of, how can I put it, it was 
a “blow job” but I actually had to say that sort of word in the court room. I had 
to say that word but I was trying to say it in another way so I didn’t… but I had 
to actually say that for them to understand and it was quite … honestly, it was 
dead embarrassing to stand in front of all those people and say that. I felt “oh 
my God, I can’t…” I did it but I just wanted to run away from the whole 
thing.”  (Complainer 4) 
 
9.26 In response to a question about whether the evidence in chief had allowed her to 
explain what happened, in a way which she thought was a fair recollection of events, this 
complainer made the following comment: 
 
“How can I put it, no, not really actually; I didn’t feel as if I did because 
although he was the bad party, I felt as if I was, as if it was me that was on 
trial for something when it wasn’t.” (Complainer 4) 
      
Complainers’ experience of cross-examination by Defence  
9.27 All 4 complainers reported feeling very distressed during cross-examination. This 
included feeling sick, angry, frustrated, embarrassed, nervous, shaky, stupid and confused. 
Distress was most heightened at the times when the Defence mounted attacks on their 
credibility, by introducing “bad” character evidence suggesting they were liars, that the 
allegations were false, and that they were dishonest in character. Two broke down in tears 
during cross-examination and the trial had to be stopped temporarily.  
 
“But she basically was calling me a liar and I was roaring back at her. I know 
I was roaring at her because in that courtroom, you came from this door and 
right down by where the public would have sat, come past and it was him and 
2 of his Reliance – I don’t know – police officers with him, and this was my 
box here. My police escort– he was a nice big guy – he was behind me in case 
I collapsed or fainted. I actually held on to it there and my knuckles were red 
raw by the time I came out. The more she shouted at me – she wouldn’t have 
called it shouting – but the more she put her point across, the more determined 
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I was to, I actually roared back at her because she wasn’t there, she didn’t 
know.”  (Complainer 2) 
 
“………..It was very, very embarrassing, upsetting mostly … I think I cried 
all the way through the trial when I was giving evidence.  I managed to stop 
myself but then they would say something and it would kick me off again and, 
as I said, I marched out and then I got a break and then I went back in and 
then they were saying would you like another break and I was like that, no, I 
just want to get this over with and God man, I just wouldn’t wish that on 
anybody.”     (Complainer 3) 
 
“And they also used the fact against me that I was staying in a bed and 
breakfast. So because I’m homeless and I self-harm, that gives someone the 
right to do what they did to me? I don’t think so. So at the same time I was 
obviously upset but I was actually angry at the way they were like speaking to 
me as if I was a piece of dirt. That’s the way it felt honestly, and I was really 
angry, really angry. . .  Then plus the fact – and I’m not ashamed to admit it – 
I actually used to prostitute myself, so that was another thing they used against 
me. It was all those things they were trying to use against me to make me look 
as if I’m just a down and out basically.” (Complainer 4) 
 
“… if that was me say, 3 year ago, I’d have collapsed in that court, I’d have 
clamped up and … but because I’d been to confidence building classes, 
building on my skills and all that, I managed to fight back.  When he said 
something cheeky to me I said something cheeky back, you know.  I didn’t 
hide who I really was but I also didn’t hide the fact that I was still paying for 
all the things that they had done to me.  But some poor person could walk in 
there and God, it hit me like a ton of bricks, and there’s got to be something 
changed.”  (Complainer 3) 
 
9.28 Distress during the cross-examination related, in part, to difficulty in understanding 
the questions which were put to them by the Defence, and to their sense of embarrassment in 
answering questions of a sexual nature: 
 
“But I just got such a fright because he was saying a question and I couldn’t 
understand the meaning of it so instead of me answering yes or no to a 
question I didn’t understand I’d asked him to repeat it in a different way and 
he said it the same way and I looked at the Judge and I said “excuse me, I feel 
silly but I don’t understand what he’s actually meaning.”  And she said, “can 
you phrase it another way for her to understand.”  And he said it another high 
tech way and he made me feel … I felt so stupid.   (Complainer 3) 
 
 “…the questions they were asking me were quite, I thought, were quite 
dramatic the way they were treating me in that court room. It was disgusting 
and dreadful. I had actually to use some words of a sexual nature that quite 
embarrassed me in front of all those people in that courtroom and I was quite 
nervous as it was and I was awful shaky, so that didn’t help me any more, that 
didn’t help me. It was horrible.”     (Complainer 4)   
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9.29 On the whole, complainers did not report intervention or objection to Defence 
questioning by the Prosecution or the trial Judge. However one complainer did report 
intervention by the judge during particular points during the cross-examination: 
 
“She intervened a couple of times and it was when … especially when he was 
coming out with this … he kept asking me this specific question but he was 
using these big words and I’d said to the Judge, “I feel as if he’s trying to 
make me look silly” and I don’t want to answer yes or no to a question that 
might be the opposite to what I say and I don’t mean to say it but he’s over the 
moon that I’ve said it so can he phrase it in another way.  He would shout and 
she would go, “excuse me, I don’t think you have to raise your voice” and 
then when he was going on about I was a constant liar, isn’t it true you’re just 
a constant liar and the Judge would go … and he would go on and on about 
being a constant liar and she would step in then.  But she was a really good 
Judge, I’ve got to say that, she was.”   (Complainer 3) 
       
Reflections on giving evidence as a complainer in a sexual offence trial  
9.30 When asked to reflect on the experience of being a complainer in a sexual offence 
trial, all 4 complainers questioned whether the process had been worthwhile, or said that they 
would not contemplate going through the process again. Further, if someone they knew was 
sexually assaulted, they would recommend that they do not pursue the complaint: 
 
“I would never do it again. If I knew this is what would happen, my advice to 
anybody would be, you know obviously who hasn’t been dragged off the 
street and beaten to within half an inch of their life, I would tell them to do 
their very best just to forget about it. It’s something I would, if, God forbid, if 
it ever happened again to somebody you know, I would say just get on with it. 
The only good thing that I know has come out of this is the fact that I’ll 
probably never see him again and that he’ll never contact me again, but I 
would never recommend that anybody should do it, never.” (Complainer1) 
 
“But I mean, I’m not being funny, but see the whole thing about trials and 
rapes, I think it’s a big joke. It’s just as if … it’s horrible. It’s really horrible as 
well when you think nobody believes you, to go through that whole thing and 
then go through all that in the court room and you just think – what was the 
point?” (Complainer 4) 
 
9.31 With regard to alleviating the distress involved in giving evidence as a complainer in 
a sexual offence trial, all complainers identified special measures such as the use of screens 
and live television links while giving evidence as important and positive provisions, even 
although not all complainers were offered, or accepted, these measures. The presence of a 
support person in court was identified as a particularly positive measure for complainers. 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
9.32 Due to the small number of interviews with complainers, the views expressed here are 
illustrative rather than representative of complainers’ experiences of giving evidence in a 
sexual offence trial since the inception of the 2002 Act. Nonetheless, a number of important 
common themes emerged from these interviews.  
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9.33 Key issues identified by complainers were that they felt inadequately prepared for the 
process of giving evidence, in that they had a lack of information about what this would 
entail in both general terms, and in terms of specific issues which were raised while they 
were giving evidence. Complainers indicated that it would be helpful to be aware of these 
issues, and to meet the Advocate Depute prior to giving their evidence. 
 
9.34 Complainers identified questioning around “bad” character evidence during cross-
examination as particularly distressing, and some complainers had further difficultly in 
understanding the relevance of specific issues which had been raised (e.g. marital status, self-
harming behaviour). 
 
9.35 The level of relevant information provided to complainers about the provisions 
contained within the 2002 Act has been highlighted as an area of particular concern. The 
COPFS Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006) has made a 
number of positive recommendations in this regard. However, as yet, it is too early to 
evaluate the implementation of these recommendations, and the subsequent impact they may 
have on complainers’ experiences of preparing to go to court, and giving evidence in a sexual 
offence trial. 
 
9.36 Since complainers in this particular study were only interviewed in respect of cases 
that went to trial, it is not possible to determine whether concerns about the possibility of past 
sexual history or character evidence act as a deterrent to making a sexual offence complaint, 
or pursuing this complaint within the legal system. This is an area which would benefit from 
further research.  
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CHAPTER TEN:   CONCLUSION  
 
INCREASE IN SEXUAL HISTORY AND CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
 
10.1 The research has shown first, a marked increase in the numbers of s.275 applications. 
Almost three quarters (72%) of High Court sexual offence trials now include an application 
to introduce sexual history or character evidence. The research has also shown that 
applications were invariably allowed by the court. The extent to which sexual history and 
character issues were permitted to be present in trials following an application has therefore 
grown significantly.  
 
10.2 At the same time, the research also found that sexual history and character evidence 
was being introduced without an application to do so, and where evidence or questioning had 
been allowed by the court following an application, the subsequent questioning could stray 
beyond the boundaries set at the preliminary hearing.  Once evidence was before the jury, 
trial Judges tended to allow it, even if the nature of the evidence was such that it did require 
an application.   
 
10.3 Previously, about half of rape trials without s.275 applications, involved some sexual 
history or sexual character evidence introduced without an application to do so. A 
comparison of cross-examination of complainers before and after the current legislation 
suggests a slight decline in breaches of the procedure by the Defence with respect to sexual 
history and sexual character evidence being introduced without application. Yet this must be 
placed alongside the findings that most sexual offence trials now involve an application to 
introduce sexual history and sexual character evidence, and these are almost always 
successful at least in part.  
 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE   
 
10.4 The impact of the legislation is relatively difficult to assess with respect to more 
general character evidence.  There is some variation in practice among practitioners 
concerning whether some evidence actually requires a s.275 application. Examples were 
found of the same type of questioning concerning alcohol consumption by the complainer 
being proposed in applications and being introduced without application.  Although non-
sexual character evidence was a feature of about a quarter of the questioning proposed in 
s.275 applications, interviews with practitioners suggested that the Defence may be more 
vigorous in seeking out character evidence than previously. This may again be partly due to 
the necessity of the wider scope of the Act, and the need to make an application in advance.  
Instances where the Defence strayed over the boundaries of questioning set by the court were 
characterised by attacks on the complainer’s character, as noted in Chapter Seven. In 
addition, general character attacks by the Defence were possibly the most common forms of 
evidence or questioning introduced in cases where there had been no application made at all.  
It seems clear, therefore, that evidence of “bad” character has not been curtailed or reduced 
by the 2002 legislation. 
 
10.5 There are a number of pertinent factors contributing to this paradox.  First, against the 
background context of “Anderson Appeals”, the requirement to produce a written s.275 
application in advance, compels the Defence to apply their mind to the construction of an 
argument in which relevance is claimed for questions concerning some aspect of the sexual 
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history or character of the complainer. Conversely, under the 1995 Act, a claim about the 
form, nature and value of such evidence or questioning was made in the course of the trial, as 
the case unfolded. 
 
10.6 Second, the 2002 Act broadened the scope of restricted evidence to include all 
questions about the complainer’s character.  It is important to remember that not all of the 
applications in the current study involved proposed questioning that would previously have 
required an application. Many applications involved a relatively extensive mix of types of 
questioning and evidence sought and overall, as Chapter Four noted, at least 40 percent of the 
questioning would not have involved an application under the previous legislation. When 
considering the distribution of the nature and types of evidence or questioning sought and 
introduced by means of an application, as listed in Appendix 4 and discussed in Chapters 
Four and Five, it is important to note that much of the evidence introduced was as a result of 
this wider scope of the legislation, and would not have figured in applications prior to the 
2002 Act. This includes: evidence or questioning sought about the general character of the 
complainer; non-sexual past history with the accused; and the behaviour of the complainer 
after the offence. Whilst these matters were certainly pursued by the Defence during the trial 
prior to the 2002 Act, they were not required to be the subject of an application. S.275 
applications now encompass several types of questioning and evidence that complainers were 
previously exposed to in the course of trials but without any prior s.275 application. 
 
10.7 Third, the Crown are now required to make a  s.275 application to introduce restricted 
evidence when they were not previously required to do so, and were responsible for a quarter 
of the applications made. 
 
10.8 Fourth, in recent years, Scotland has seen some far-reaching developments, in terms 
of a set of wider reforms that have streamlined procedure for serious prosecutions. These  
have quite considerably changed the legal landscape in which sexual offences trials are 
conducted. The greater emphasis placed on early preparation for preliminary hearings, more 
extensive and earlier disclosure by the Crown of material and evidence that may be pertinent 
to the decision of whether or not to lodge a s.275 application and the effect of “Anderson 
Appeals” and other influential Appeal Court decisions, along with the requirement of the 
2002 Act that the application be made in advance and in writing, have combined to heighten 
early consideration of the possibility of a s.275 application by the Defence.  There is little 
doubt that, taken together, these wider developments have contributed to the increase in s.275 
applications. 
 
10.9 Certainly sexual history and character evidence have now become much more visible. 
The more formalised procedure requiring written submissions seems, perversely, to make the 
Defence even more skilled at its introduction, whilst simultaneously giving more leeway for a 
greater range of matters to be introduced into cross-examination, as well as more attuned to 
its potential at a much earlier stage in the proceedings.  
 
A SHARPER FOCUS ON RELEVANCE?  
 
10.10 The changes in procedures introduced under the provisions of the 2002 Act, and in 
particular, the requirement that the court take an evaluative approach to determining the 
relevance of the evidence sought, weighing the comparative benefit to the accused in 
admitting such evidence against any impact it might have on the dignity and privacy of the 
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complainer, has provided both the means and the justification for a much sharper focus on 
relevance.    
 
10.11 The requirement to make a written application to the court and for this to be discussed 
and decided at a preliminary hearing provides the opportunity for much closer attention to be 
paid both to the probative value and possible prejudicial effects of any evidence sought. 
Written applications list the evidence or questioning sought, often in great detail, and 
invariably state simply that the evidence is relevant to consent or the credibility of the 
complainer.  Despite the opportunity afforded by the legislation for a sharper focus on the 
relevance of sexual history and character evidence, this has not resulted in very much 
discussion in court, as might have been anticipated. 
 
10.12 A key question is whether the 2002 legislation has indeed led to a closer assessment 
of the relevance of sexual history and character evidence.  A factor to consider here is the 
extent to which prior agreement between parties concerning the contents of applications 
influences the deliberations of the court. The research has shown that commonly there is 
discussion and exchange between the parties prior to the preliminary hearing and that 
consequently, this enhances the likelihood of agreement. However, there is little detailed 
discussion between the judge and the parties during preliminary hearings to decide 
applications as to the relevance of the proposed evidence.  
 
10.13 While the written nature and required format of applications rendered them much 
more transparent than applications under the previous legislation, prior agreement between 
the Crown and Defence quite often meant minimal debate or discussion at preliminary 
hearings. In terms of the recommendations of the Bonomy Report (2002) to streamline court 
business, this can be read as a positive effect of the 2002 legislation.  
  
10.14 It has been stated throughout the report that the position taken by the Crown is a key 
determining factor of whether or not an application is allowed by the court. Where the Crown 
supported the application, the court typically endorsed it without airing in any discussion the 
relevance of the evidence.  Moreover, virtually all of the Crown applications were allowed.   
 
10.15 Whilst most preliminary hearings were characterised by a lack of discussion of 
relevance, some cases have produced lengthy and lively discussions. For the most part, these 
are the cases where the relevance of questioning has been challenged by the Crown, although 
there were Defence applications in which the Crown acquiesced, but where the judge was not 
satisfied that the probative value outweighed the possibly prejudicial effects. The research 
has shown that the court disallowed some questioning or evidence which it considered to be 
too loosely phrased, too wide-ranging, lacking in specificity, or simply too speculative. There 
is little doubt that, if duly enforced, this procedure can, and does, remove some of the 
excesses of questioning on sexual and character matters that characterised many sexual 
offence trials pre-2002.  However this has to be weighed against the fact that applications are 
almost always allowed, and there is relatively little discussion in court about the relevance of 
the evidence.  
 
10.16 Another influential factor in undermining the anticipated rebalancing of the probative 
value of weakly relevant evidence against respect for the dignity and privacy of a complainer 
is the ease with which a “case” for relevance can be constructed. Several interviewees 
considered it relatively easy to construct a case demonstrating that any sexual history or 
sexual character evidence has some relevance to issues in the trial, in particular credibility or 
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consent. This can again be attested to by the high incidence of applications that were allowed 
on these grounds. The research has shown that the court tended to take the view that where 
what is included in the application can be demonstrated to have some relevance to the issues 
in the trial, in particular, credibility and/or consent, then what might be termed “fair trial” 
considerations tend to outweigh the rights of the complainer.   
 
 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
 
10.17 Given the significant increase in numbers of applications, and their very high rate of 
success, there is a marked increase in the amount of sexual history and character evidence 
being legitimately elicited and admitted than before. This means that there is more use of 
evidence of sexual matters in the court than previously  
 
10.18 This leads us to conclude that the 2002 legislation has not gone in the direction 
intended. It has resulted in the introduction of more sexual history and character evidence 
than under the previous legislation, even allowing for the higher rates of sexual history and 
sexual character evidence introduced with disregard for the provisions under the previous 
legislation. The proportion of trials with applications have increased markedly, questioning 
on sexual history and character is now sought by both the Crown and the Defence, the 
numbers of multiple applications have doubled and the “belt and braces” approach adopted 
by Defence lawyers means that the questioning or evidence sought in written applications is 
now far more detailed and extensive than that sought in verbal applications made during the 
trial under the 1995 Act. Moreover, applications are rarely disallowed and the Defence is 
likely to introduce all of the evidence and question the complainer on all of the matters 
sought in the application.  
 
10.19 The “belt and braces” or “scatter-gun” strategy adopted by Defence lawyers in the 
drafting of applications suggests that the objective is to find anything that the court will 
accept. The findings that the exception provisions were rarely specified and the evidential 
basis for proposed questioning was rarely scrutinised in detail (the possibility of calling 
witnesses to this purpose was never taken), means this is an effective strategy. 
 
10.20 The research data has shown that it is relatively straightforward and easy to construct 
a case to claim that whatever questioning or evidence that the Defence want to put to the 
complainer has some relevance. Moreover, most Judges seem to take the view that if what the 
Defence seeks can be claimed to have some relevance to fair trial considerations, then those 
considerations outweigh those in relation to the complainer, and the evidence sought is 
allowed.  If greater weight were placed by the court on the rights of the complainer, there is 
little doubt that the legislation would be more effective in terms of protecting complainers 
from distressing and intimidating questioning.  
 
10.21 Legal practice has weakened the reform intent. The legal reform has not only not had 
the intended effect but could be said to have moved in the opposite direction. The intent of 
the reformers to limit sexual history and character evidence in sexual offence trials has not 
been realised, although arguably, it has had the effect of rendering common practice much 
more visible.  The “chilling” effect on applications of the potential disclosure of analogous 
previous convictions anticipated by some practitioners, has not occurred. Although the 
numbers are small, we also remain sceptical that practice follows legislative intent in relation 
to the disclosure of any analogous previous convictions of the accused following a successful 
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Defence application.  Whereas practice may ensure the accused is protected from having 
potentially damaging information disclosed, the anticipated increased protections for 
complainers have not been forthcoming. 
 
10.22 The outcome of various strands of legal practice has had the unfortunate and 
unintended consequence of undermining the intention of the legislators. In conducting sexual 
offence trials, lawyers are not just “interpreting” the law but are implementing it through 
legal practice in ways that “fit” with legal constructions and understandings of fairness, and 
this is in apparent tension with the legislative intent.  That the 2002 Act has had an 
unanticipated and perverse outcome, increasing the presence of sexual history and character 
evidence rather than limiting it, was a common view expressed by several legal practitioners 
interviewed. 
 
10.23 The overall, paradoxical result is that 7 out of 10 complainers in the most serious 
sexual offence trials are now virtually guaranteed to be questioned on their sexual history and 
sexual character. Questioning about sexual history and character in order to contest consent 
and challenge the credibility of the complainer have always been characteristic features of 
sexual offence trials; the routine submission of s.275 applications is ensuring that these 
features will endure.  This plainly runs counter to the policy aims of the 2002 Act, expressed, 
for example, in the prior discussion document, Redressing the Balance, which were to 
prevent complainers being subjected to unnecessary and irrelevant questioning. It seems clear 
from this research that the legislation has not improved the position, and indeed has probably 
had the opposite of the anticipated, and hoped for, effect of reducing such questioning.  
 
INFORMING THE COMPLAINER  
 
10.24 Another of the policy aims of the 2002 Act, to provide advance notification to the 
complainer, is also clearly not being met. The research found that advance notice of s.275 
applications, like the advance notice of a defence of consent, is not typically translated by the 
Crown into explicit advanced notification to the complainer. Advocates Depute are wary of 
the possibility of being seen to ‘coach’ complainers in advance of trial, and so, whilst the 
Crown will consider whether it is necessary to re-precognosce a complainer to get his or her 
position concerning any emergent events or issues raised in a Defence s.275 application, this 
does not necessarily involve informing the complainer that such an application has been 
made, by either party, or of the detail of the lines of questioning which the Defence seek to 
admit.  Nevertheless, it is widely believed by both Judges and Defence practitioners that 
complainers are indeed informed. The practice of the Crown in this area is to change 
following the recommendations of the COPFS Review (2006).  Implementation of the 
recommendations will require that there is a presumption in favour of further precognition of 
the complainer and that in all cases the complainer will be informed of the fact that an 
application has been made and the outcome of the court’s consideration of the application. 
 
10.25 Complainers interviewed felt inadequately prepared for the process of giving 
evidence, in that they had little information about what giving evidence would entail, and 
were unaware that they may be questioned about sexual matters. Questioning around “bad” 
character evidence during cross-examination was identified as particularly distressing, and 
some complainers had further difficulty in understanding the relevance of specific issues 
which had been raised (e.g. marital status, self harming behaviour). 
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10.26 The level of relevant information provided to complainers about the provisions 
contained within the 2002 Act has been highlighted as an area of particular concern. The 
COPFS Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Offences (2006) has made a 
number of positive recommendations in this regard. However, as yet, it is too early to 
evaluate the implementation of these recommendations, and the subsequent impact they may 
have on complainers’ experiences of preparing to go to court, and giving evidence in a sexual 
offence trial. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Drawing on the data in this report, the following recommendations are made:  
 
• The legislation would be more effective in protecting victims if greater weight was 
placed on the rights of the victim. This may mean that there may be, at times, a need 
to exclude evidence notwithstanding that it may be of some relevance to the 
credibility of the complainer.  There should be some recognition that such an 
approach  can be adopted while maintaining a fair trial;  
 
• The court should consider resisting the view that any relevance to a complainer’s 
credibility is adequate grounds for admission under “fair trial” considerations;   
 
• The court should consider recording in more detail why it is satisfied of the merits of 
a s.275 application and, in particular the reasoning why the evidence or questioning 
sought is considered relevant;  
 
• The making of successive s.275 applications should be strongly deterred, as this is 
sometimes an opportunistic use by the Defence of the procedures in order to 
maximise their chances of  introducing sexual history and character evidence and in 
this sense runs counter to legislative intent;  
 
• Given that most sexual offence trials now involve a (successful) s.275 application, 
then the routine provision, to all complainers in sexual offence trials, of written 
information about the legislative provisions and the implications for questioning on 
sexual history and character in the trial should be seriously considered;  
 
• The provision of timely and sufficiently detailed information to individual 
complainers about the contents of any s.275 application made by either party in the 
case, and the court’s decision on the merits of the application needs to be seriously 
considered;  
 
• Whilst the provision of comprehensive information for victims spanning their 
information needs was recommended by the COPFS review, research needs to be 
undertaken to monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the COPFS 
Review, in particular those which refer to the provision of information to the 
complainer about successful s.275 applications; 
 
• Consideration should be given to extending the provisions relating to disclosure of 
previous convictions to those committed within the context of domestic abuse, 
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regardless of whether these were perpetrated on the same women as in the index 
offence; and 
 
• There should be research to monitor the implementation and impact of the legislation 
in sexual offence trials heard under solemn procedure in the Sheriff Courts.  
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APPENDIX ONE: PRO FORMA FOR TRANSCRIBED AND 
ATTENDED TRIALS  
 
SPSS Ref:     Court Ref.   Accused(s)   
Court:   Trial Dates:   Duration (days):   
 
Charge(s):       No and sex of complainers:   
Offence location:    Defence of consent lodged:    
 
Rel between com and acc:    
 
THE APPLICATION PROCESS 
Number of application(s):    
 
If multiple complainers, which complainer(s) did application relate to?     
 
Who made application:     
When submitted?   Pre-trial    PH Date: 
At start of trial     During trial        
 
Judge:           For prosecution:    For accused:   
 
Evidence sought: 
 
Nature of proposed questioning: 
 
Issues at Trial to which questioning relevant:  
 
Reasons why evidence considered relevant: 
 
 Inference:  
 
Objections to application?  
 
 
Judge’s Views on Relevance/Admissibility:   
(E.g. were any of the following addressed by judge – Dignity/Privacy of complainer; distress to complainer; 
probative value of evidence):  
 
Application decision:    
  
Any restrictions/limits?   
 
 
Total no. of application ‘hearings’  
 
 
THE TRIAL PROCESS 
 
Judge:    For prosecution:    For accused:   
 141
 
Application parameters adhered to in trial ? 
 
 
Any sexual evidence led which was not agreed in application?  If yes, describe (e.g. past sexual history with 
accused/others, medical/gynaecological history, ‘sexual reputation, character)   
 
 
Who by?              During whose evidence?    
 
Any objections? (give details)  
 
 
Disclosure of accused’s previous convictions?  Yes  No     
 
Demeanour of Complainer when giving evidence 
Audibly distressed (crying, difficulty speaking)                                   Anger/hostility  
Silence/Inability to answer   Court adjourned 
 
Tone of questioning during cross-examination 
 Hostile (loud, stern)  Sarcastic Disbelieving  Neutral  
 
Complainer’s evidence  (hours)    Any special measures  
 
Verdict/outcome   
 
Further Comments  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher name …………………………….. 
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APPENDIX FOUR: CONTENTS OF  S.275 APPLICATIONS 
 
A) THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE ADMITTED OR ELICITED 
Past sexual history with the accused 
• Past remarks by, or behaviour of, complainer to, the accused said to be indicative of a 
romantic or sexual interest;  
• A previous sexual relationship or incidents of sexual intercourse with accused; 
• Other previous forms of sexual behaviour short of intercourse (kissing, cuddling, 
fondling) between the complainer and the accused; 
• Details of the practice of (past) sexual behaviour between the complainer and the 
accused (e.g. frequency of intercourse, locations of intercourse, nature of sexual 
behaviour, circumstances in terms of alcohol consumption, clothes worn, things said 
etc.). 
Sexual behaviour with accused on or around same occasion as alleged offence   
• Complainer’s willingness to go with (or to) accused (e.g. to accused’s home, get in 
taxi with accused, accompany accused to another location);  
• Sexually explicit remarks made by complainer to accused;  
• Complainer giving accused her address; phone number, etc.; 
• Complainer’s behaviour in presence of accused said to be indicative of readiness to 
engage in sexual foreplay (e.g. provocative dancing, sensual posturing, kissing, 
cuddling, showing breasts, unzipping accused’s trousers).  
 Non-sexual behaviour with accused on or around same occasion as alleged offence 
• Physical confrontation involving complainer slapping, kicking and scratching 
accused; 
• Verbal argument between complainer and accused. 
Sexual behaviour with (or in presence of) third party/ies on or around same occasion 
• Provocative dancing in public, in club, bar, or someone’s private home; 
• Sexually explicit remarks made by complainer (e.g. ‘I feel like sex tonight’); 
• Sexual intercourse or sexual activity with a third party prior or around time of 
offence. 
 
Non-sexual past history with the accused 
• Previous incidents indicative of ‘bad feeling’ between complainer and accused or 
possible anger or vindictiveness on part of the complainer towards accused (e.g. 
suggesting motive for false allegation);  
• Volatile ‘on-off’ relationship (relationship characterised by aggressive arguments, 
break-ups and make-ups). 
Complainer’s current relationship status  
• Whether complainer has partner at or around time of alleged offence;  
• Possessive, jealous and/or violent partner;  
• Recent argument/break-up with partner.   
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Sexual history of complainer   
• Working as prostitute at or around time of alleged offence; 
• Past history of working as a prostitute; 
• Extent of previous sexual activity (e.g. past sexual relationships; number of previous 
sexual partners); 
• Nature of previous sexual activity (e.g. ‘kinky’ sex; more than one partner at a time); 
• Past sexual behaviour demonstrating complainer’s sexual practices and proclivities 
(e.g. keeping condoms by her bed, use of sex aids, indulging in sexual fantasies; 
pierced clitoris, [false] history of abortion); 
• Past allegations of sexual assault or abuse;  
• Complainer’s virginity or lack of sexual experience; 
• Complainer’s contraceptive history.  
 
Sexual character of complainer  
• Sexually bullying or blackmailing by complainer (e.g. threatening false accusation of 
rape if he refused to sleep with her; threatening to tell accused’s wife of their sexual 
relationship); 
• Homosexuality; 
• Sexual maturity (e.g. early menstruation; developed breasts) 
• Sexual reputation of complainer (e.g. references to being known as ‘easy’; sexual 
boasting’ to others by complainer, e.g. number of past partners; sexual prowess). 
General character of complainer  
Mental instability of complainer  
• Complainer’s past mental health (e.g. history of depression, self-harm, antidepressant 
medication, personality problems);  
• Complainer’s mental state at or around time of alleged offence (e.g. depressed, 
anxious, volatile, mood swings, irrational). 
Violence, unpredictability, disorderliness   
• Complainer’s physically violent or verbally abusive conduct;  
• Disorderly conduct by complainer (e.g. playing loud music, hosting wild parties, 
having disreputable friends); 
Alcohol or drug use  
• Complainer’s history or practices of drug or alcohol use;  
• Complainer’s consumption of alcohol or drugs at or around time of offence (e.g. 
under influence). 
False allegation 
• Past instances in which the complainer has allegedly lied or made unproven 
allegations of sexual assault or abuse; 
• Motive for false allegation by complainer (e.g. in order to keep other people’s ‘good 
opinion’; out of embarrassment or shame; inability to take responsibility for actions; 
at risk of losing room at homeless hostel if stayed out all night). 
Dishonesty 
• Complainer’s previous convictions or arrests;   
• Complainer dishonesty (e.g. working and claiming unemployment benefit; benefit 
fraud; CICB claims; lying to get a party invitation); 
• Complainer lying about age; 
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• Complainer known for making up stories (e.g. ‘lying to an unusual degree’; ‘cannot 
be relied upon to tell truth’);  
• Lack of medical or forensic evidence to support complainer’s account.  
Rootlessness 
• Complainer’s homelessness or lack of fixed abode; 
• Complainer sacked from job. 
Relationships  
• Complainer’s relationships with others of questionable character (e.g. relationships 
with alcoholics, drug users, prostitutes, known offenders). 
Behaviour of complainer after alleged offence 
• Maintaining contact with accused (e.g. complainer attempts at contacting accused; 
continuing to live in same house as accused despite having own home; allowing 
accused to look after children; giving gift to accused);  
• Complainer displaying no visible signs of distress; 
• Complainer’s refusal to report to police; 
• Complainer’s refusal to undergo medical examination or declining medical attention  
• Complainer’s acknowledgement of consensual sex with accused/withdrawal of 
allegation (e.g. to someone else, in diary, in a letter); 
• Inconsistency in complainer’s account (e.g. difference between statements given in 
police interview and medical examination);  
• Complainer’s attempt to blackmail accused; 
• Complainers sexual behaviour after the alleged incidents (e.g. masturbation, touching 
other boys, looking at older men. 
B) NATURE OF ANY QUESTIONING PROPOSED  
 
• To elicit evidence (of above) from complainer; 
• To elicit evidence from other witnesses in trial (including evidence in form of audio 
recording of accused police interview); 
• To put evidence of false allegation to complainer ; 
• Any other appropriate questions arising from examination-in-chief or cross-
examination; 
• To elicit whether complainer engaged in work as prostitute immediately after being 
with accused and whether complainer was then robbed by a client; 
• To ask complainer whether she was dressed only in underwear when she caused a 
member of the public to telephone police; 
• To ask complainer if she was victim of assault immediately prior to incident and if 
she stole drugs from her assailant; 
• To elicit contents of a letter forming part of Crown production, with intention of 
contradicting same; 
• To question the complainer as to her motive in seeking prescription of contraceptive 
pill. 
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C) ISSUES AT TRIAL TO WHICH EVIDENCE IS CONSIDERED RELEVANT  
 
Complainer’s character or predisposition 
• Complainer not of good character;  
• Credibility and reliability of complainer;  
• Predisposition of complainer towards sexual behaviour on same occasion; 
• Complainer’s mental state at or around time of alleged offence (e.g. as alternative 
explanation for distress); 
• Complainer’s lifestyle; 
• Motivation for false complaints and explanation for delay in reporting.  
 
 Consent 
• Accused’s genuine/honest belief in consent; 
• Consent. 
 
Medical or forensic evidence 
• Evidential significance of injuries (e.g. medical and forensic evidence); 
• Medical evidence (e.g. disrupted hymen).  
Accused  
• Accused’s guilt; 
• Credibility of accused; 
• Defence of self-defence. 
 
D) REASONS WHY EVIDENCE IS CONSIDERED RELEVANT TO ISSUES 
 
• Consent; 
• Credibility of accused; 
• Credibility and/or reliability of complainer; 
• Past sexual relations between complainer and accused;  
• Accused’s guilt; 
• Sexual activity which is subject of indictment is not an isolated incident; 
• To place allegation in context (e.g. no need for complainer to otherwise disclose [to 
accused] being on pill except in a sexual context). 
• Complainer’s impaired judgement due to alcohol/drugs. 
• Complainer’s behaviour ‘at odds’ with one who has been raped. 
• Alternative explanation (e.g. disrupted hymen as evidence of previous sexual activity; 
injuries consistent with type of sexual activity complainer regularly engages in);  
• Explanation/background (e.g. for false allegation); 
• Probative value is significant; 
• To rebut evidence by Crown (e.g. that complainer unlikely to participate in more than 
one sexual relationship at a time, or that because of her age she had no prior sexual 
experience); 
• Interests of justice; 
• To demonstrate complainer’s motivation for false allegation; 
• To demonstrate complainer sought to blackmail the accused; 
• Relevant to special defence of self-defence; 
• Gives rise to reasonable doubt that complainer was victim of rape; 
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• To allow complainer to give full account. 
  
E) INFERENCES WHICH COURT SHOULD DRAW FROM THE EVIDENCE 
• Complainer consented;  
• Complainer not credible/reliable;  
• Complainer not of good character (e.g. fabricator; spiteful);  
• Complainer not of good sexual character (e.g. complainer willing to have sex for 
money, alcohol and/or drugs); 
• Alternative explanation for complainer’s demeanour after alleged offence (e.g. 
distress due to other reasons such as drink, drugs, depression, relationship 
breakdown); 
• Motivation and reasons for false allegation (e.g. complainer sought to conceal true 
nature of relationship with accused; jealousy; afraid partner would find out; to gain 
sympathy and centre of attention from others present); 
• Complainer has attempted to blackmail applicant to obtain money in past;  
• Accused not guilty. 
 
In Crown applications only 
• Unlikelihood of accused’s version of events / accused’s comments not 
true/inconsistent/false;  
• Rebut defence inference (e.g. that complainer was working as prostitute does not 
necessarily mean consent);   
• Employment as a prostitute does not mean that complainer is not credible and 
reliable; 
• Medical evidence consistent with complainer’s account; 
• Complainer is credible and reliable witness; 
• Prior consensual sexual activity involving kissing and cuddling does not necessarily 
mean complainer consented to sexual intercourse;  
• None.  
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APPENDIX FIVE: APPLICATION TO INTRODUCE SEXUAL 
CHARACTER    
 
Comparison of application dialogue in cases involving sexual character 
 
Two baseline study cases are described, one in which the Advocate Depute did not oppose 
the application and it was granted and one in which the Advocate Depute did oppose the 
application and it was refused in part.  These are compared with an application case post 
2002 in which the Advocate Depute opposed the sexual character evidence and it was 
partially refused.   
 
Baseline study case 1110 (1999) Attempted Rape; case abandoned by the Prosecution after 
the complainer’s evidence.  
The Defence application sought to question the complainer in respect of 3 matters; 2 of these 
pertained to sexual character: that the complainer danced naked in the pub a few weeks 
earlier than the alleged incident; that the complainer offered oral sex to barman in return for 
free drinks a few weeks before the alleged incident; the third concerned a previous allegation 
of rape. 
 
As the Defence described the proposed evidence, the Judge intervened and said that s/he did 
not see the relevance of naked dancing in a pub. The Defence argued that it was a matter of 
the credibility and reliability of the complainer and shows her to be of bad character in 
relation to sexual matters.  The Defence also argued that the issue did not really require an 
application but if it did then he asked the Judge to exercise the discretion allowed by the 
exception clause ‘in the interests of justice’. With regard to the other item, the Defence said 
that this indicated the free and easy way the complainer offered sexual favours to others and 
her general behaviour when drunk.  The Advocate Depute accepted these issues were relevant 
to character of the complainer and agreed with the Defence that naked dancing was not 
within the ambit of the prohibitions of the legislation: ‘it may be distasteful but [it’s] not 
strictly speaking relevant under the statute’.  The Judge allowed the application simply stating 
satisfaction that all 3 matters were relevant in this case.  The whole dialogue took 12  
minutes. 
 
Baseline study case 1202 (1999) Rape, amended to Attempted Rape at the end of the 
complainer’s testimony; Not Guilty Verdict.  
 
In this rape case the Defence made 2 applications: the first was to question a witness about 
the complainer dancing in underwear in front of him and others at his house, and her 
tendency for exhibitionism and sexually provocative behaviour such as going up to men in 
bars fondling and propositioning them, and sleeping with strangers despite having a 
boyfriend.  The Defence also noted that that the complainer had admitted to the Crown to 
having worked as a prostitute but did not seek to raise this. The Judge allowed questions to be 
asked of the witness about what happened at his house but refused the motion regarding other 
matters of exhibitionist or sexually provocative behaviour.  
 
In a second application immediately following the complainer’s evidence in chief, the 
Defence sought to put questions to the complainer about 3 issues claiming that the Advocate 
Depute did not object to the first two and should not object to the third. Two of these issues 
concerned sexual behaviour with others than the accused, which the Defence said 
demonstrated a pattern relevant to the current charge.  Clearly they also introduced evidence 
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that were also likely to suggest that the complainer was of bad character in relation to sexual 
matters, although this not an aspect that the Defence explicitly acknowledged. The first 
involved questioning the complainer about the forensic report which had found DNA of 2 
men in addition to the accused in samples taken from her. The second issue involved 
questioning her about the medical record taken by the doctor, and as opening up questions 
about what the doctor had recorded concerning her sexual history, this allowed questioning 
about the fact that she was an alcoholic.  Finally, the third issue involved questioning her 
about sex with a named man.  The Defence again emphasised that despite the complainer 
admitting to police she worked as an escort and prostitute, they did not wish to raise any of 
that.  The intention was to show that the complainer was willing on her own admission, to 
have sex with strangers. The Advocate Depute objected about putting evidence before the 
jury about occasions other than the alleged offence which were prejudicial to complainer and 
don’t have a bearing on the night in question. The Defence argued that it was important to 
show that the complainer lost inhibition as a consequence of drink.  The judge allowed 
questions to be put to the complainer about: 1. content of forensic report showing that DNA 
from several people found on samples taken from the complainer; 2. the medical history she 
had given to the police doctor; and 3. an incident with another named male.  The judge ruled 
that the other issues raised by the Defence were not material to the trial but invited the 
Defence to revisit the application if it becomes necessary.   
 
Post 2002 case 121 (2004) This case included the submission of 3 written applications with 
application 2 and 3 additional clauses, to those contained in the first application. The written 
substance is replicated below:   
 
Evidence sought:    
1. Any sexual activity was instigated by complainer and encouraged by her and that she 
made promiscuous sexual advances to the accused after she had consumed alcohol; 
2. That prior to the alleged incident complainer had made similar advances to her niece 
on a previous occasion after consuming alcohol and had kissed her niece but had 
thereafter denied that she had made any such advances and had not consented to the 
conduct;  
3. That complainer confessed to her sister that the allegation was false and was only 
intended to allow her to make a claim for criminal injuries compensation.  The 
complainer disclosed that she had encouraged the accused because she found he was 
sexually inexperienced.  Complainer’s sister advised her to immediately withdraw the 
allegation and inform the police; 
4. That complainer’s nephew (currently in prison), lived with the complainer on 
landlord/tenant basis during which time complainer made frequent inappropriate 
advances to towards him after consuming alcohol.  It will also be shown that 
complainer’s statement to police that she is lesbian and hates men, is false. 
 
Nature of proposed questioning:  
To challenge complainer’s truthfulness, to show a pattern of behaviour of complainer’s 
willingness to engage in sexual behaviour with persons related to her when consuming 
alcohol, which will support the truthful evidence to be given or led by the accused, and to 
provide the court with a balanced picture of the evidence as a whole to allow it to properly 
weigh and evaluate the evidence. 
 
Issues at Trial to which questioning relevant:  
Complainer’s consent to sexual conduct with the accused; Complainer’s credibility. 
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Reasons why evidence considered relevant 
To show that: the incident libelled was not an assault by the accused; the complainer is not 
credible in essentials of her evidence and that it is improbable her allegations are 
true;evidence has a positive probative value which will show applicant is not guilty 
 
Inference 
That conduct was instigated by complainer and was consensual. 
Evidence of complainer’s alleged distress cannot be relied on as supporting proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
 
In the consequent discussion of the applications, the Advocate Depute argued that much of 
what the Defence sought to introduce under 1 and 3, was against the purpose of the 
legislation and a general attempt to undermine the complainer’s credibility without showing 
relevance to the charge. The Judge was similarly not satisfied that the proposed evidence was 
relevant to establishing guilt or satisfied that probative value of that evidence was likely to 
outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.  ‘Having regard to the 
need to protect the complainers privacy and dignity and to ensure that the facts and 
circumstances put before the jury are commensurate to the importance of the issue of the 
jury’s verdict.  I will therefore refuse the applications one and 3’.  
 
ISSN 0950 2254
ISBN 978 0 7559 6755 1
Price £5.00
www.scotland.gov.uk/socialresearch
The text pages of this document are produced from 100% Elemental
Chlorine-Free material.
The paper carries the Nordic Ecolabel for low emissions during
production, and is 100% recyclable.
RR Donnelley B53088 09/07
